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Introduction 
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1.1. Motivation, Aim, and Contribution 
Investment in household and school education at an early stage shapes human capital and contri-
butes to sustainable economic development. Heckman (2006) cited the great advantage of early 
intervention in the life cycle, since children’s cognitive and non-cognitive abilities develop 
through interaction with their parents and the surrounding environment. Economists have pointed 
to the consequences of early childhood circumstances and later-life outcomes (Currie, 2001; 
Heckman, Pinto, & Savelyev, 2013; Jürges, 2013). Furthermore, they have highlighted the asso-
ciation between inequality in the distribution of both wealth and income and inequality in educa-
tion, which has lasting effects beyond the generation that experiences it (Benabou, 1994; Black, 
Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005). School quality, particularly during the primary education stage, is 
viewed as one of the most important inputs into an education function. Hence, a broad array of 
studies has shown that the achievement of students can be raised and their behavioral problems 
mitigated if the quality of the school improves (Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Häkkinen, Kirjavainen, & 
Uusitalo, 2003; Lavy, 2010; Leung & Ferris, 2008). An under-resourced school environment 
coupled with exposure to violence can have a short-run ―direct‖ impact as well as a long-run ―in-
direct‖ effect on human capital, especially if these violent events are frequent and directly affect 
the household and educational process (Chamarbagwala & Morán, 2011; Rodriguez & Sanchez, 
2012). This work contributes to this strand of literature by providing four chapters that employ 
individual-level data capturing several key traits to offer a better understanding of the causes and 
consequences of investment in human capital in Palestine. 
 Education is still one of the predominant topics of public policy debates even several decades 
after the birth of the human capital theory. Although several empirical studies around the world 
have shed light on the relationship between accumulated human capital and country growth, the 
country-specific effect with a variety of human capital variables constitutes the main problems 
that economists face in this regard (Van Leeuwen & Foldvari, 2008). At the national level, in this 
thesis I measure several aspects of human capital indicators, namely cognitive ability test scores, 
school achievements, years of education, income, and health. With regard to the country-specific 
issue, the focus is on the Palestinian territories, in particular contrasting the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip; these two regions are geographically and administratively segmented, and each oper-
ates with respective labor market characteristics. 
3 
 
   
 The Palestinian economy relies heavily on financial aid to support its national budget, with 
the educational sector representing a significant portion of its public expenditure (MoFP, 2016). 
The country is still under occupation, and the Government does not have full control over all as-
pects of life. Thus, in all the empirical works in this thesis, I try to control many contextual vari-
able levels that may affect the results to overcome the omitted variable bias. Investment in hu-
man capital is an attractive proposition to Palestinians, since this investment is less likely to be 
affected by Israeli measures (Daoud, 2005). In addition, education reduces the wage gap among 
different groups in society classified according to gender, refugee status, and socio-economic 
rank; it may also enhance the chances of an applicant securing a job in the service sector, which 
constitutes the largest sector of the Palestinian economy (PCBS, 2016). The thesis focuses on 
two significant components of the Palestinian society that represent a sizeable portion of a coun-
try’s human capital: children and refugees. Understanding the defining characteristics of these 
two groups is crucial to a better understanding of their impact on the economy. 
 This thesis aims to provide empirical evidence on the diverse determinants and consequences 
of human capital in Palestine at different life stages. The early-life measurements emphasize the 
role of household and schooling in the context of early childhood poverty, an unstable political 
environment, and under-resourced schools in children’s cognitive development as well as their 
school achievements. The later-life outcomes relate to the role of education and other wage de-
terminants in reducing the wage gap in the Palestinian society based on refugees’ status. The 
conceptual framework in this thesis is illustrated in Figure (1.1). The solid arrows present the 
direct impact of different events on human capital determinants and outcomes (the 1948 and the 
1967 Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, the First and the Second Palestinian Intifada, and an unsuppor-
tive environment). The boxes shown in bold are the human capital determinants used in this the-
sis (household, schools, and individual identification as a refugee). The dashed arrows reflect 
other direct (short-run) and indirect (long-run) influences of these circumstances on an individu-
al’s early-/later-life outcome. The circled numbers indicate the thesis chapters that discuss the 
causes and consequences of the aforementioned components. The first two studies discuss the 
role of family in the educational function. To be more specific, chapter two addresses the inter-
generational education spillover form and chapter three employs conflict-related incidents to ex-
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plore the long-term consequences of household exposure to political violence on children’s 
school achievements. In chapter four, I investigate the impact of class size as a proxy for one of 
the school quality components of child cognitive abilities, bullying, and violent behavior. The 
current thesis also evaluates the effect of health outcomes on human capital. In particular, I use 
mental health and non-cognitive traits as likely channels through which the main covariates (con-
flict incidents and class size) may affect children’s educational achievement and violent beha-
vior. The findings of the three studies can be helpful in promoting cost-effective policies for 
high-risk children to alter the relationship between the unsupportive environment of ―disadvan-
taged family and under-resourced schools‖ and the educational function. Finally, chapter five 
presents another long-term adverse consequence of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict on human 
capital measured by the wage differential between Palestinian non-refugees and Palestinian refu-
gees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The results of this study emphasize the importance of 
education to reduce the wage gap between the two population groups as well as a way to reduce 
the Palestinian labor market’s dependency on employment in Israel.   
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Figure1.1: Conceptual framework of the thesis 
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1.2. Overview  
This thesis consists of four parts, one of which is a joint work with Professor Hendrik Jürges, 
Luca Stella, and Alexandra Schwarz at the University of Wuppertal. All the essays are written to 
be read both individually and collectively; therefore, some degree of overlap is unavoidable. The 
following section briefly introduces the topics of each chapter and summarizes the main findings. 
1.2.1 First Palestinian Intifada and Intergenerational Transmission of Hu-
man Capital  
This chapter attempts to estimate the intergenerational transmission of human capital in Pales-
tine. The main question is whether formal parental education improves their offspring’s cogni-
tive skills and school achievements. I use the instrumental variable method in the estimations to 
overcome the potential endogeneity of parental education. The main source of variation in paren-
tal educational attainment is parents’ exposure to the First Palestinian Intifada (1988–1993) dur-
ing their middle and high school ages. During the First Palestinian Intifada, many school days 
were lost due to frequent school closures and other restrictions. Furthermore, many young people 
preferred to search for low-skill employment in Israel, since it provided them with better wages 
than the local labor market and hardly required any level of educational attainment. In contrast, 
the motivation for some women to complete their education to secure jobs increased differential-
ly to compensate for the overall loss of household income during that turbulent time. This study 
employs two outcomes, namely the standardized cognitive test scores and school achievements 
during the academic year 2012/2013 for students between grade 5 and grade 9 in West Bank 
schools. The cognitive score results show the educational spillover between maternal education 
and offspring, while school achievement results provide significant evidence of paternal school-
ing and children’s achievements. Focusing on female and male students’ results separately, the 
IV coefficients precisely demonstrate a strong causal relationship between both parents’ educa-
tional attainment and their daughters’ educational attainment with quite similar positive magni-
tude effects. 
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1.2.2 Cohort at Risk: Long-Term Consequences of Conflict for Child School 
Achievement 
(with Hendrik Jürges, Luca Stella, and Alexandra Schwarz) 
This chapter investigates the long-term effect of household exposure to the Israeli–Palestinian 
Conflict during the Second Intifada (2000–2005) on children’s primary school (grades 5 to 9) 
achievements in the West Bank. The identification strategy exploits the exogenous geographical 
variation in locality-level conflict intensity proxied by the number of fatalities during the Second 
Intifada. Exposure to the conflict is assessed using a direct self-reported measure of household 
experience with violence during the conflict period, such as house inspection and occupation by 
the Israeli Army. We employ the IV technique to overcome the omitted variable bias due to the 
potential correlation of household experiences of violence with various unobservable determi-
nants of student achievement. For example, one of the potential endogeneity sources is that the 
richer and better-educated families, who have children who display better academic abilities, re-
sided in areas less prone to Palestinian violence, which in turn reduced the chance of counter-
violence by the Israeli army. While the model controls for observed background characteristics 
to address this concern, there may still be unobserved confounders. Another source of endo-
geneity is the presence of time-invariant unobservable factors at the locality level, which is cor-
related with both conflict intensity and child primary education performance. The main results 
suggest that an increase in family experience of conflict has a large negative long-term impact on 
the educational attainment of children. Exposure to conflict may also affect the development of 
the important skills in life. Thus, the study proposes that impaired non-cognitive, such as con-
duct, problems and a reduced level of conscientiousness are likely channels through which con-
flict may affect children’s educational achievements. Although cognitive skills are an important 
determinant of school achievement, it appears that it was not affected by family exposure to con-
flict. 
1.2.3  Class Size, Cognitive Abilities, Bullying, and Violent Behavior 
The third chapter explores the importance of school resources as an indicator of the shaping of 
human capital. The debate about the class size effect on cognitive as well as non-cognitive skills 
is still vibrant. The empirical results of the impact of class size range from no effects to signifi-
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cant and substantial ones. Small classes are still recommended by educationalists to improve stu-
dents’ achievements, despite the cost and the lack of any guarantees that class reduction will lead 
to improved students’ achievements. However, large classes can influence other non-cognitive 
skills, such as conduct problems that hurt school performance and academic process as a whole. 
This study sheds light on the effects of class size on students’ cognitive tests as well as bullying 
and violent behavior. I use the maximum class size rule to create a regression discontinuity (RD) 
relation between cohort enrollment size and class size in the public and UNRWA school system.
1
 
In addition, I provide evidence that there is no violation of the RD assumptions resulting from 
discontinuities in the relationship between enrollment and students’ household background at 
cutoff points induced by a maximum class size rule. The main findings suggest that class size has 
no direct impact on students’ cognitive skills except for those in grade 6. However, class size re-
duction improves the quality of life for children by mitigating bullying and violent behavior 
among pupils, which may negatively affect their achievements. Finally, I point to peer relations 
and mental health problems as a potential mechanism through which class size affects children’s 
self-reported bullying–victim instances and violent behavior. The study argues that the long-run 
return on mitigating behavioral problems with respect to students’ achievement offsets the in-
cremental costs of decreasing the class size. The costs and benefits of a class size reduction poli-
cy should be weighed carefully, especially if the school resources are limited, the school suffers 
from ill-behaved pupils, or the pupils come from a disadvantaged background. Much of the gain 
from a class size reduction policy depends on students’ and teachers’ characteristics in the con-
textual setting. 
1.2.4  Wage Differential between Palestinian Non-refugees and Palestinian 
Refugees in the West Bank and Gaza 
As a result of the 1948 war, thousands of Palestinians fled their homes and became refugees. Un-
like the refugees in other parts of the world, Palestinian refugees who were forced to relocate to 
                                                 
 1 The UNRWA is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 
UNRWA schools provide children of Palestinian refugees with basic education until grade 9. 
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Palestinian territories, like the West Bank and Gaza, led to consecutive generations of Palestinian 
refugees. Although they have the same nationality as their hosting communities, these Palestini-
an refugees are still suffering from different adverse life circumstances. This chapter measures 
the wage differential between Palestinian non-refugees and Palestinian refugees in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip over the years 1999–2012. First, I present the main individual and occupa-
tional differences between the two groups in the two regions. Then, the wage differential is de-
composed into two components: a ―human capital effect, explained part‖ and a ―coefficient ef-
fect, unexplained part.‖ Second, I find that the wage gap has always existed and favored non-
refugees in the West Bank; it has more of a substantial impact among low-skilled workers and 
those in the private sector. Furthermore, most of this gap is attributed to the unexplained part of 
the wage decomposition model. In Gaza, the wage gap favored refugee workers. Most of this 
wage gap among unskilled workers is attributed to the endowment/human capital effect, while, 
for skilled workers, most of the wage gap is due to the unexplained part, the ―coefficient effect,‖ 
after 2006.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
First Palestinian Intifada and Intergenerational Transmis-
sion of Human Capital 
 
 
 10 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Environmental factors have a significant role in determining students’ school achievements and 
cognitive abilities at different learning stages. One of these factors is the child’s socioeconomic 
status, which is profoundly affected by the parents’ level of education. Well-educated parents 
can provide their children with a better learning environment, and many works of literature have 
documented the importance of the intergenerational return on human capital (Anger & Heineck, 
2010; Bauer & Riphahn, 2013; Black et al., 2005; Chevalier, 2004). Ideally, better-educated 
parents may increase their skills or knowledge relevant to the well-being and capabilities of a 
child. Researchers have suggested that parenting interventions may be more effective than health 
interventions in improving cognitive outcomes (Grantham-McGregor, Walker, Chang, & Powell, 
1997). 
 With regard to policy implications, it is important to know the long-run impact of investing 
in human capital. Economists have recognized the accumulation of human capital as a key 
determinant of economic growth (Van Leeuwen & Foldvari, 2008). The importance of school 
education lies in the fact that the children of today will become the adult citizens of tomorrow. 
The economic growth and future of society are highly dependent on the quality of the present 
education. Moreover, governments spend a significant portion of their budget on education
2
; 
understanding the benefits of this spending can reduce the degree of inequality in the opportunity 
for education. Attention to such inequality will grow if there is evidence of a causal relationship 
between the educational attainment of parents and that of their offspring. On the national level, 
in particular, for the newly established state of Palestine, education plays a crucial role in 
securing economic and social progress in addition to improving income.  
 Parents have an important influence on their children’s outcomes. On average, better-
educated parents have better-educated children (Ermisch & Pronzato, 2010). Parents transmit 
some abilities genetically or, on further examination, this may also partly reflect human capital 
spillovers from parent to child, since education may change the way in which parents interact 
with their children (Lee, Roys, & Seshadri, 2015). Undermining a causal interpretation of the 
                                                 
 
2
 For example, the education sector represents 18 percent of the Palestinian National Authority public expendi-
tures (MoFP, 2016). 
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intergenerational correlation are aspects of the family environment that facilitate the acquisition 
of cognitive skills during childhood, which may also correlate with parents’ education. A 
growing body of recent empirical studies has attempted to investigate the causal relationship 
between parents’ and children’s education. Economists have suggested three identification 
strategies to address the endogeneity problem caused by omitted variables: twin parents 
(Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2005); adopted children (Plug, 2004); and instrumental variables 
(Black et al., 2005; Chevalier, 2004; Oreopoulos, Page, & Stevens, 2006; Stella, 2013). In this 
study, I employ the instrumental variable approach by identifying parents’ exposure to the First 
Palestinian Intifada (1988–1993) at the preparatory and high school ages3 to create an exogenous 
variation in their educational attainment. The political conflict during that period affects the 
ability of parents to attend schools without directly affecting their children. Losing school days 
during a political conflict causes severe damage to human capital, since this loss can translate 
into significant losses in lifetime earnings. Those Palestinian adolescents who were affected by 
conflict during the First Intifada are now parents, and their children represent the larger part of 
the human capital of their country.
4
 
 This chapter contributes to two distinct strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the 
literature that discusses the intergenerational transmission of human capital in developing 
countries. Most of the literature addressing human capital spillovers has focused on developed 
countries, while the literature addressing developing countries has tended to focus on child 
outcomes, such as health, mortality, and well-being, rather than educational attainment. Second, 
it contributes to the body of literature discussing the long-term impact of the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict on schooling and quality of education. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study to take the First Intifada as an IV to create variation in parents’ educational attainment. The 
article also considers how political instability may give rise to distinct impacts on the educational 
outcomes of males and females, respectively. Therefore, the chapter aims to discuss the varying 
                                                 
 
3
 Before the establishment of the Palestinian Ministry of Education in 1994, grades were classified into three 
categories: elementary, grades 1–6; preparatory, grades 7–9; and secondary, grades 10–12. UNRWA schools pro-
vide education until the end of the preparatory stage (grade 9) (MoEHE, 2016b; UNRWA, 2014).  
 
4
 At the end of 2013, 39.9 percent of the Palestinian population was aged under 15 years (PCBS, 2014). Moreo-
ver, children in primary school accounted for 20 percent of the total human capital in the country (MoEHE, 2015). 
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roles played by mothers and fathers in the transmission of knowledge to their offspring.    
 The primary outcomes in this chapter are the test scores of survey data from approximately 
4,000 students in grades 5 to 9 in West Bank schools. These data were collected by a cooperative 
research project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The rich data set provides 
information on educational attainment for two family generations. The data allow me to control a 
large set of observed demographic and socioeconomic family background covariates that might 
affect child cognitive outcomes. I also control for the school fixed effect, which captures a range 
of unobserved differences across schools and covers other location-specific unobserved 
determinants of students’ abilities. The comprehensive breadth of the data enables me to 
formulate relevant policy recommendations within the Palestinian context.  
 The main results suggest that 1 more year of maternal education correlates with a 1.14 
percentage point increase in child cognitive test scores. Focusing on female and male students’ 
results separately, the study demonstrates a significant causal relationship between the schooling 
of both parents and that of their daughters. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large: an 
additional year of parental education raises girls’ cognitive scores by 2 percentage points. 
Employing the school achievements for the 2012/2013 academic year as a secondary outcome 
confirms the positive educational spillover between both parents and their daughters. Unlike the 
primary outcome, the school performance results suggest a causal relation only between paternal 
schooling and offspring. The findings are robust to a number of specification tests.  
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The second section discusses the 
background of the First Palestinian Intifada and its impact on education. Section (2.3) reviews 
the literature related to the intergenerational transmission of human capital and the effect of the 
ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict on education. Section (2.4) describes the data used in this 
study. In Section (2.5), I present the empirical specification and the identification strategy. The 
OLS and instrumental variable results are reported in Section (2.6); Section (2.7) provides 
robustness checks, while the discussion and concluding remarks are presented in section (2.8).  
2.2 Background 
The Palestinian education system faced several challenges over the periods during which it was 
controlled by different authorities until 1994, when the Palestinian Ministry of Education was 
established and became responsible for all educational processes in the Palestinian territories (the 
13 
 
West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) (UNESCO, 2011). Before then, and mainly 
between 1988 and 1993, all Palestinian territories were subject to different types of political 
violence due to the first Palestinian uprising (Intifada). During these years, the educational 
system in Palestine suffered severely from various Israeli actions against schools and 
universities.  
 The First Palestinian Intifada was an uprising against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories, which lasted from December 1987 until 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords. 
According to B’Tselem (2017), the first Intifada claimed the life of more than 1000 Palestinians.5  
 The events of the First Palestinian Intifada imposed several restrictions on adolescents’ 
schooling. At that time, young people were hindered from obtaining their right to education at 
various stages. Many factors led to the decline in the quality of education. One reason was the 
loss of school time during the Intifada resulting from frequent school closures, curfews, and 
other measures (UNESCO, 1995). Table (2.1) shows an example of the destruction of the 
learning process during that period. 
 
Table 2. 1: Maximum number of days on which schools were open during the years 1988–1989 
(total number of school days 205–210) 
Level 
Total no. 
of 
days/year 
Percentage 
of school 
days 
Elementary (grades 1–6) 135 64 
Preparatory (grade 7–9) 115 55 
Grades 10–11 85 40 
Grade 12 120 57 
Source: Tawil (1997). 
 The learning environment and access to education suffered during the First Intifada. As a 
result of the lack of financial resources for maintenance or construction, schools in the West 
Bank were set up in rented buildings that were not constructed for this purpose. Schools operated 
                                                 
 
5
 During the First Palestinian Intifada, a large number of victims were children, 2,532 persons had their houses razed to the 
ground, and between 57,000 and 120,000 were arrested (López-Ibor, Christodoulou, Maj, Sartorius, & Okasha, 2005).               
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on double or triple shifts, and classes were overcrowded (UNESCO, 1995). 
 The Israeli Civil Administration and the Israeli Army considered the universities’ 
administrations to be directly responsible for the conduct of students and hence ordered the 
immediate closure of all Palestinian campuses.
6  
As a result, several Palestinian higher 
educational institutions were closed (Barghouti, 2005).
7
 Figure (2.1) represents the number of 
students enrolled in West Bank universities before, during, and after First Intifada. 
 The First Palestinian Intifada was characterized by a high level of youth participation and 
activism (Ghanem, 2012). Because students played a vital role in the daily Intifada activities, 
their time and attention were directed away from education. Instead, they were exposed to 
different types of violence and were affected physically, socially, and psychologically (Barber, 
1997; Qouta, Punamäki, & Sarraj, 1995; Tessler, 1994). 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE, 2016a) data. 
Figure 2. 1:Admission to universities before and after the First Intifada (1989–1993) 
 School students were also less likely to complete their education due to economic factors. 
For decades, many young Palestinians searched for low-skilled jobs in the Israeli labor market, 
for example in construction and agriculture, since the Israeli market provided better daily wages 
                                                 
 
6
 The universities remained closed until the autumn of 1991 with the exception of Birziet University, which remained closed 
until April 29, 1992 (Robinson, 1997, p. 106). 
 
7
 On February 2, 1988, Israeli Radio announced that the Israeli Army had ordered all 1,194 schools in the West Bank to 
close until further notice. In addition, 6 universities, 13 colleges, and 5 government training schools were officially ordered to 
close (ARIJ, 2007). 
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than the local market. The salaries in the West Bank still increased regularly until 1988, when the 
First Intifada began and wages decreased dramatically due to the curfews and strikes that 
prevented access to the Israeli labor market (Elkhafif & Daoud, 2005). Additionally, during that 
period, there was less incentive to return to schooling in the Palestinian territories due to the 
increase in the number of Palestinian college and university graduates (Angrist, 1995).    
 Despite the significant obstacles to formal education mentioned above, the motivation for 
learning increased during the First Intifada (Nasser & Berlin, 2011). Teachers and students 
managed to resume the educational process despite the damage caused by the closures. During 
the first two years of the Intifada (before the Israeli decision to reopen the schools and 
universities under pressure applied by the European Parliament), Palestinian society adopted 
alternative modes of education as a reaction to the closure of schools and universities. The 
following actions were key aspects of this alternative education: 1) universities set up off-
campus classes; 2) universities set up popular or neighborhood schools in which teachers taught 
students within a geographic area; and 3) private and UNRWA schools distributed special 
educational materials for remote education, for example learning objective assignments, self-
evaluation tests, and graded exercises (Mahshi & Bush, 1989). 
2.3 Conceptual Framework and Related Literature  
Researchers have suggested that children’s cognitive abilities have a significant impact on their 
future outcomes, such as earnings. These abilities may affect children directly as part of the 
individual overall human capital or indirectly through educational attainment if innate abilities 
determine schooling outcomes (Anger & Heineck, 2010). Recently, a growing body of 
knowledge has suggested that low levels of cognitive development in early childhood have long-
term adverse consequences for adult well-being (Paxson & Schady, 2007). Further, other factors, 
such as the level of non-school home activities and the quality of education, can be important 
inputs into human capital production (Glick & Sahn, 2009). 
   There are two main channels for the transmission of cognitive skills between generations: the 
inheritance of genes (―nature‖) and the productivity effect of parental education (―causal‖) 
(Anger & Heineck, 2010). To understand whether formal parental education improves children’s 
cognitive abilities and school performance, researchers have suggested three possible 
channels for the correlation in education between generations: liquidity constraint, causal, and 
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nature. Less educated parents have a greater probability of facing a liquidity concern than well-
educated parents. This liquidity constraint will prevent their children from realizing their 
schooling potential (Becker & Tomes, 1994).
8
 A parents’ decision to invest in his or her child’s 
education might be affected by his or her own observable and unobservable characteristics. Some 
of these features may be correlated with parenting skills, while others are genetically transmitted 
from parents to children, thus generating a correlation between parents’ and offspring’s cognitive 
abilities. To identify the causal relation of parents’ education on their offspring, economists have 
relied on three identifying strategies: twin parents, adopted children, and instrumental variables. 
The first two strategies do not eliminate the non-genetic endogeneity that stems from 
unobservable characteristics in the educational choices, which are also correlated with parenting 
skills (Chevalier, 2004). The related literature has differed in discussing the causal relationship 
between parents and their offspring’s educational outcome based on these three strategies. 
 Chevalier (2004) used the change in the minimum age of school leaving that took place in the 
1970s in Britain as a way of measuring the exogenous effect on parents’ educational choice, at 
least for those wishing to drop out of school at the first opportunity. The law provided some 
parents with an extra year of education compared with parents born just before the reform. He 
found that mothers’ education has a larger positive impact on that of their offspring but that 
fathers’ education has no significant impact. Further, he pointed out that the intergenerational 
link in education is causal when focusing on natural parents only, while step-parents have no or a 
negative impact on children’s education.9 Plug (2004) employed data on adopted children to 
investigate whether the intergenerational transmission of human capital is due to the causal 
relationship or other unobserved variables. The results demonstrated a positive effect of fathers’ 
education on children’s education but no significant effect for mothers. The maternal influence 
vanishes with innate genetic abilities and if assortative mating is taken into account. However, 
the results had two limitations; the sample size was small, and children were not randomly 
placed with adoptive parents.  
 Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006) estimated the intergenerational mobility in income and 
                                                 
 
8
 Even when education is free, parents from higher socioeconomic backgrounds may send their children to well-
resourced schools that provide a better educational level.  
 
9
 The estimations for step-parents in Chevalier’s (2004) study are rather imprecise due to the small sample size.  
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parents’ education using data on adoptees born in Sweden and their biological and adoptive 
parents. They found that pre-birth factors (e.g., genetic and parental education) and post-birth 
factors (e.g., long-term earnings) for both adaptive and biological parents contribute to 
intergenerational earnings and education transmission. In addition, they provided evidence that 
biological mothers’ coefficient in the intergenerational transmission coefficients was slightly 
larger than that of biological fathers.  
 Over the last decades, a growing body of literature has used the instrumental variable 
identification strategy to remove the potential endogeneity from the estimated education 
spillover coefficient. Studies have taken advantage of real or ―natural‖ experiments that produce 
exogenous variation in family and contextual variables of interest (Duncan, Magnuson, & 
Ludwig, 2004). Black et al. (2005) relied on the change in implementing the reform of the 
education system in Norway across different municipalities in 1960 to create an exogenous 
variation in parents’ education. As a result, the IV estimations were consistently lower than the 
OLS estimates; they concluded that the high correlation between parental schooling and 
offspring’s education is due to unobserved abilities and family background rather than causal 
relationships. Oreopoulos et al. (2006) examined the causality in parents and their children by 
exploiting the variation in implementing compulsory schooling laws across states in the U.S. 
They found that increasing parents’ education reduces the probability of children repeating 
grades. Stella (2013) used the change in compulsory schooling reforms across nine European 
countries over the period 1920–1956 as an IV to instrument parents’ years of education; he found 
that the size of the estimated effect of parents’ education on their offspring’s education is larger. 
He also concluded that mothers’ schooling is more important than fathers’ education for the 
academic performance of their children.   
2.4 Data and Measurements 
2.4.1 Study Sample  
This study uses a cross-sectional, micro-level survey containing information on approximately 
6000 students enrolled in grades 5 to 9 in single-sex primary schools in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem. The survey data were collected from May to September 2013 in the context of a 
cooperative research project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). A total of 100 
schools were randomly selected based on their regional distribution (north, central, and south) 
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and classified by education authority (60 governmental and 40 UNRWA). Then, from each 
school, 60 students were randomly selected and stratified by grade (12 students from each class). 
The students were asked to complete the standardized cognitive test and the health behavior 
questionnaire. Then, the school nurses collected their anthropometric measurements. The parents 
of the participants were asked to complete a survey directed to them. Another questionnaire was 
distributed to the school principals using the same items as those used in the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). 
 This chapter employs the following parts of the survey: (1) the standardized cognitive test; 
(2) student grades in different subjects obtained from the Palestinian Ministry of Education and 
Higher Education records; and (3) the parental background questionnaire, which provides 
information about household income, parental education, age, and household structure. Due to 
the sample requirement,
10
 girls are over-represented in this sample by approximately 67 percent. 
The contextual database on the locality level
11
 was collected from the Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics and the World Bank Report Poverty in the Palestinian Territories, 2014. The report 
includes information on the poverty level based on a household consumption survey from 2009. 
Finally, observations without parental education and cognitive score results were eliminated. 
Approximately 4,000 cases remain for the analyses across 98 schools (under full specification). 
 
2.4.2 Parental Educational Attainment 
The parental educational level was measured with ten categories used by the PCBS from 
illiterate to Ph.D. Out of 5,017 observations, 4,718 respondents, usually mothers, answered their 
level of education and provided information about their partner’s education. Similar to other 
studies, I converted parents’ educational levels into years of schooling.12 The summary statistics 
                                                 
 
10
 To meet the selection criteria, single-sex schools should contain grades from 5 to 9. Only 436 schools in the 
West Bank matched the sample requirement: 382 governmental schools (160 boys and 222 girls) and 54 UNRWA 
schools (20 boys and 34 girls). Private and gender-mixed schools were excluded. 
 
11
 The locality is the smallest administrative unit used by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.  
 
12 
 I converted the educational attainment into years based on the number of grades in each level. For example, 
illiterate (0); can read and write (3 years); elementary (6 years); preparatory (9 years); secondary (12 years); diploma 
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in table 2.2 show that fathers and mothers have a close level of education (the average schooling 
level is 10.77 years for mothers and 11.10 years for fathers). 
 The data set that I used also provides information about both parents’ years of birth, which 
enable me to determine whether parents’ educational attainment was affected by exposure to the 
First Intifada during the identified age. Since fathers tend to be older than mothers, 
approximately 67 percent of mothers in my sample were exposed to the First Intifada while 51 
percent of fathers were exposed between the ages of 13 and 19 years according to tables (2.A.1) 
and (2.A.2) in the appendix.  
2.4.3 Outcome Variables  
2.4.3.1 Cognitive Test Scores 
The primary outcome is the cognitive test scores.
13 Students’ cognitive ability was measured 
through exams distributed to all the students who participated in this survey; the test contains 
181 items. These questions examine three aspects of child cognitive abilities, numerical, verbal, 
and figural. Each of the three groups consists of several subtests. Table (2.A.3) in the appendix 
shows that the internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) is high for each subtest, for example 0.87 for 
the figure analogies test and 0.82 for the verbal classification test.  
 For the purpose of this study, the final results were obtained by computing the percentage of 
correctly answered items. Figure (2.2) shows that the distribution of the cognitive test results has 
a left-skewed distribution, with an arithmetic mean of 62 percent and a standard deviation of 17 
percent. The cognitive result is profoundly affected by gender (females, in general, are better 
than males).  
                                                                                                                                                             
(14 years); bachelor (16 years); higher diploma (17 years); master (18 years), and Ph.D. (21 years). These classifica-
tions are very close to the ISCED-97 codes.  
 
13
 The test questions were selected and adapted from established tests of general ability: the Cognitive Ability 
Test (CAT; Thorndike & Hagen, 1971), Malta – a Hebrew version of the Lorge–Thorndike Test (Ortar & Shachor, 
1980), Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1983), and the Cattell and Cattell (1965) Culture Fair Intelligence 
Test. 
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2.4.3.2 School Achievements 
I use the school grade point average (GPA) in the academic year 2012/2013 as a secondary 
outcome. To measure the educational performance, I compute students’ GPA in the six major 
subjects taken by all students in all schools.
14
 These topics are Religious Education, Arabic, 
English, Mathematics, Science, and Social Science. All the courses are graded on a 100-point 
scale. The pass grade is 50 percent or more in all the subjects. In our sample, the school 
achievements have a mean of 68 percent and a standard deviation of 18 percent.
15
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.  
Figure 2.2: Distribution of the cognitive test score 
2.4.4 Control Variables  
In addition to the explanatory and outcome variables, I control the following variables that could 
directly affect children’s cognitive abilities and academic performance: 
 Demographics: sex, age, grade number, and first-birth status.  
 Household structure and socioeconomic status: the number of siblings, mother’s and 
                                                 
 
14
 Approximately 80 percent of the weekly lessons for the elementary grades are allocated to these six subjects 
(UNESCO, 2011).  
 
15
 All schools in the West Bank (public, UNRWA, and private) use the same national curriculum (MoEHE, 
2016b).  
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father’s age, and household income per month. 
 School type: governmental or United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
schools. The school fixed effect is used since it captures a range of unobserved 
differences across schools that could influence student performance. It also covers other 
location-specific unobserved determinants of cognitive abilities (Brück, Di Maio, & 
Miaari, 2014; Jürges & Schwarz, 2015).     
 Contextual data: these variables are related to the locality of the students and consist of 
the population per locality in 2013, the poverty rate, the percentage of this locality 
located in area C,
16
 and a dummy indicating whether this locality is affected by the 
separation wall.
17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
16
 Area C: Areas in the West Bank are still under full Israeli military and civil control based on the Oslo Ac-
cords of 1993, while the Palestinian Authority (PA) has civil and security control in area A. The PA has civil auton-
omy but no security control in area B (Vishwanath et al., 2014). Communities in area C are living in difficult life 
circumstances due to the lack of major services. For more details, see www.btselem.org/topic/area_c.  
 
17
 The Israeli West Bank barrier or wall is a separation barrier built by the Israeli Government in the West Bank 
along the 1949 Armistice Line known as the ―Green Line‖ (B’Tselem, 2012). The barrier divides Palestinian com-
munities, encircles some, and isolates others from their surroundings while separating East Jerusalem from the rest 
of the West Bank (UNSCO, 2014).  
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Table 2. 2: Summary statistics for outcomes and explanatory variables 
Variable Observation Mean Std Dev. 
Cognitive tests 4,067 61.91 16.32 
School achievement (2012/2013) 4,065 67.85 18.43 
School achievement (2011/2012) 4,064 70.96 15.99 
Mother’s years of education 4,067 10.77 3.6 
Father’s years of education 4,023 11.1 3.8 
Mother with a college degree (0,1) 4,067 0.19 0.4 
Father with a college degree (0,1) 4,023 0.24 0.43 
Mother’s years of Intifada (age 13–19) 4,067 2.43 2.21 
Father’s years of Intifada (age 13–19) 4,067 1.86 2.22 
Male student 4,067 0.3 0.46 
Student age (years) 4,067 12.8 1.51 
Student went to Kindergarten (KG) (0,1) 4,067 0.11 0.31 
Number of siblings 4,067 2.6 1.79 
Household net monthly income: 
   <NIS 1500 4,067 0.36 
 NIS 1500–NIS 2499 4,067 0.33 
 NIS 2500–NIS 3999 4,067 0.17 
 NIS 4000–NIS 5000 4,067 0.08 
 >NIS 5000 4,067 0.06 
 Mother’s age (years) 4,067 39.57 6.58 
Father’s age (years) 4,067 44.8 7.09 
School authority (Gov. 1) 4,067 0.59 0.49 
Population per locality (2013) 4,067 28,563 50,826 
Separation wall (0,1) 4,067 0.4 0.49 
Area C (proportion) 4,067 0.3 0.3 
Poverty rate 4,067 0.21 0.11 
 
2.5 Empirical Model and Identification Strategy  
To estimate the effect of parents’ education on their offspring, I use the following model:  
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑙 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ (𝐸𝑑𝑢
p)𝑖𝑠𝑙 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑙  + 𝜑𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑙                (2.1) 
where unit of observation i represents a child enrolled in school s during the academic year 
2012/2013 in locality l in the West Bank. The dependent variable is the child’s cognitive test 
score (primary outcome) or student’s academic performance (secondary outcome). Parental edu-
cational attainment (Edu
p
) is the variable of interest. Following Chevalier (2004), this variable is 
estimated separately for mothers and fathers to eliminate assortative mating bias and measured 
by years of schooling. (Xisl ) denotes a set of controls at the level of the individual, family, locali-
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ty, and school type, as mentioned in section 2.4.4. I also include the school-level fixed effect 
(𝜑𝑠) to control the unobservable differences across schools that may influence child outcomes. 
Finally, (𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑙) represents an idiosyncratic error term. I cluster the standard errors at the school 
level. 
As discussed earlier, parents’ education is potentially endogenous and might be related to 
unobservable attributes of their offspring, such as ability, that explain the differences in 
children’s cognitive abilities or educational outcomes. Therefore, parental educational attainment 
is instrumented by parents’ exposure to the First Intifada during their preparatory and high 
school ages (13–19 years), which produces variation in their schooling that is exogenous and 
unlikely to be related to children’s cognitive abilities or educational outcomes.18 The first-stage 
regression is given by:   
(𝐸𝑑𝑢p )𝑖𝑠𝑙 =  𝜋 + 𝜗𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑙 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑙+ 𝜏𝑠 +  𝜇𝑖𝑠𝑙           (2.2) 
 The dependent variable is parental educational attainment for child i in school s in locality l. 
The term (Xisl) is defined in the same way as in equation (2.1). (𝜏𝑠) stands for the school fixed 
effect, and (D) is the instrument and denotes the number of years for which the child’s parents 
were exposed to the First Intifada (1988–1993) aged 13–19. Thus, in equation (2.2), parameter ϑ 
measures the effect of parental exposure to the First Intifada. Tables (2.A.1) and (2.A.2) in the 
appendix show the construction of the instrument based on the year of birth for the parental 
sample and determines which parents were aged between 13 and 19 during the First Intifada; the 
values of the variables range from 0–6 years of exposure. For example, Table 2.A.1 indicates 
that, if a student’s father was born in 1972, then he was exposed to the First Intifada at the 
identified age of 4 years, and if another father was born in 1975, he was exposed to the First 
Intifada at 6 years of age, and so on. Finally, ( 𝜇𝑖𝑠𝑙) represents an idiosyncratic error term and, 
similar to equation (2.1), standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
The main assumption of this identification is that exposure to the First Intifada at a certain 
age should affect child outcomes only through its effect on the parental years of schooling. Nev-
ertheless, there are a number of potential identification threats. Exposure to violent conflict may 
                                                 
18
 The employed instrument cannot have affected children directly, because they were all born after the First In-
tifada. The oldest group of individuals observed is in grade 9, born 5 years after the First Intifada ended. 
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have an adverse long-term impact on the accumulated wealth of families. One of these causes is 
decreasing returns of education as a result of a reduction in productivity due to the collapse of 
the quality of education under conflict (Santos, 2014).
19
 Thus, those parents who experienced the 
First Intifada during schooling age might face a decrease in their income, and their situation will 
be different from parents who did not have such an experience. I investigate the impact of the 
First Intifada on household income based on the following specification:  
 (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖𝑠𝑙 =  𝜏 + 𝜙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑙 + 𝜁𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑙  + 𝜕𝑙 + 𝜇𝑖𝑠𝑙           (2.3) 
where the outcome variable is the household income for student i enrolled in school s in locality l 
and represents different levels of family income (intervals).
20
 (D) is the instrument employed and 
takes the value 1 if the father was exposed to the First Intifada aged 13–19 years and 0 otherwise. 
The term (F) captures the father’s characteristics (schooling, age, and age squared). ∂l is the lo-
cality fixed effect.
21
 The results are presented in Table (2.A.4) in the appendix and suggest that 
there is no significant impact of paternal exposure to the First Intifada at the identified age on 
income. However, in Palestinian territories, education is not only the main tool that helps in in-
creasing income, since employment in Israel provides a wage premium over the local labor mar-
ket and individuals with higher levels of schooling are less likely to be employed in Israel 
(Daoud, 2005). Furthermore, in all the estimations, I include the household income to capture 
any impact of family wealth on their offspring’s outcomes. Finally, the Palestinian economy ex-
perienced some improvements after the First Palestinian Intifada. As a result, the Palestinian Na-
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 Some literature has stated that the labor force participation stayed below the long-term average during the 
first 10 years after the conflict (Bircan, Brück, & Vothknecht, 2017). In general, during the conflict period, disrup-
tion exerted a negative impact on all economic activities, and the process to reach fully recovery is long (Cerra & 
Saxena, 2008). However, other researchers have suggested that conflict can cause severe damage to the economy 
and human capital in the short run, while most countries recuperate after wars are over in the long run. For instance, 
one can observe Japan and West Germany, where the postwar economic recovery was speedy (Brakman, Garretsen, 
& Schramm, 2004; Davis & Weinstein, 2002). 
 
20
 I run an ordered logit model, since the outcome represents five unequal intervals for household income meas-
ured in the new Israeli shekel currency: [1] <1500; [2] 1500–2499; [3] 2500–3999; [4] 4000–5000; and [5] >5000. 
 21 
I run this regression only for fathers, since the majority of mothers in the sample are not working.  
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tional Authority was established in 1994, which provided more working opportunities inside the 
Palestinian territories (MAS, 2014). 
In addition to the economic consequences of the First Palestinian Intifada, it may have af-
fected the psychological well-being of families. The literature has shed light on the direct effects 
of violent conflict, such as depression (Do & Iyer, 2012; Swee, 2011), as well as behavioral 
problems and PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) in both children and adolescents in Palestine 
(Mataria et al., 2009; Thabet, Abed, & Vostanis, 2002). However, there is less evidence about 
this effect on human capital in the long run or the possibility that these effects will spill over to 
the next generation and negatively affect its members’ well-being and human capital develop-
ment (Akresh, 2016).
 
Finally, another threat to the identification strategy is that possibility that 
the parents whose educational attainments were affected by the First Intifada may live in an area 
suffering from several long-term adverse life circumstances. This problem is mitigated by the 
employed model capturing several locality-level contextual variables as well as a school fixed 
effect, which covers other location-specific unobserved determinants of students’ outcomes.   
2.6 Results and Discussion 
2.6.1 First-Stage Regression (Intifada and Parents’ Education) 
Exposure to the First Intifada during adolescence (13–19 years) had different effects on paternal 
and maternal educational attainment. Columns 7 and 8 in panel A of Table (2.3) show the 
negative and significant impact of the First Intifada on fathers’ years of education. Fathers who 
were exposed to the First Palestinian Intifada acquired 0.13 fewer years of schooling than other 
fathers, who were not exposed to the First Intifada during the identified age. Additionally, Table 
(2.8) shows that those fathers were 3.2 percentage points less likely to attend university or 
college than those who were not exposed.  
 This result is expected and consistent with the contextual data obtained during the First 
Intifada. Figure (2.1) demonstrates a sharp decrease in the enrollment of male students in West 
Bank universities and colleges during that period. There was a 20–24 percent reduction in 
enrollment from 1986–1987. This may be attributed to the closure of educational institutions and 
lost school days. Furthermore, that period was characterized by economic instability; many 
young males sought low-skilled jobs in Israeli markets, which provided better wages. Figure 
(2.3.a) shows the decrease in male participation in the labor force in Palestine during and after 
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the First Intifada, since many of those males went to work inside Israeli territory.  
 Panel B of Table (2.3) shows that females who were exposed to the First Intifada during the 
identified age (13–19 years) acquired 0.12 years of schooling compared with other females, who 
were not exposed to the First Intifada at this age.
22
 This result emerged after controlling for both 
maternal age and age of marriage, since the latter could negatively affect the completion of 
education. Figure (2.1) shows that the number of female students increased slightly after the third 
year of the Intifada (1991). There are four plausible explanations for this positive correlation. 
First, the increase may be due to a reaction to the Israeli Army’s decision to close all educational 
institutions for approximately two years. Second, it may be due to an increase in the number of 
higher education institutions; in particular, several branches of Al-Quds Open University in West 
Bank cities and the Gaza Strip.
23
 In general, the demand for higher education increased after 
1981, since several higher educational institutions opened (Angrist, 1995). Third, it may be due 
to a change in women’s work preference to support themselves and their families. For example, 
Shemyakina (2015) indicated a shift in the labor market outcome by gender after exposure to the 
1992–1998 armed conflict in Tajikistan. Further, Fernández, Ibáñez, and Peña (2014) suggested 
that females who experienced violent shocks in rural Colombia decreased their leisure time and 
increased the time devoted to household chores and caring for children and other family 
members. 
 Two pieces of evidence support the third reason. First, according to Figure (2.3.b), female 
participation in the labor force increased continuously after the First Intifada and the 
establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1993. Further evidence was provided in 
the PCBS (1996) Labor Force Survey in 1995, which showed that 46 percent of female jobs fall 
into the categories of professionals, technicians, associates, and clerks according to the 
international standard classification of occupations ISCO-08, all of which require at least 12–13 
                                                 
 
22
 Further, Table (2.7) indicates that those mothers were 0.7 percent more likely to complete their college or 
university education than other mothers, who were not exposed to the First Intifada during the identified age. 
 
23
 Al-Quds Open University officially started accepting students in 1991. This university adopted an open and 
remote educational system, with less demanding criteria for admission, such as a lower minimum score on the Gen-
eral Secondary Certificate Exam (compared with 65 percent in other universities at that time). Unlike other universi-
ties, regular attendance is not compulsory. The education process depends on paperwork systems instead of lectures 
and exams. For more details, see http://www.qou.edu/ 
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years of education. The traditional value of women’s education, especially formal schooling, has 
strengthened over time. Formal education was perceived as a means of securing white-collar jobs 
with a steady income and to enhance the social status in a predominantly peasant society. 
 Finally, the alternative education process is implemented more efficiently in girls’ schools. 
Most of the boys at this age were engaged in the Intifada’s violent activities, and it was less risky 
for females to meet in one place, like public schools or worship houses, to conduct educational 
sessions.
24
  
 Concerning the validity of the instrument, Table (2.3), panel A also reports the corresponding 
F-statistic of the first stage for each specification that accounts for the clustering of standard 
errors at the school level and the school fixed effect (columns 7 and 8). The F-statistic is greater 
than 10 and passes the rule of thumb for a weak instrument (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995) for 
the main specification (around 22), but it falls to around 7 after adding the school fixed effect. In 
panel B, the first-stage regression is positive and significantly different from zero; the F-statistic 
is around 25, but it falls to 8.6 after adding the school fixed effect. 
 
2.6.2 OLS and IV Regression Results 
The primary outcome of this study is the cognitive test scores. In the next section, I will present 
the impact of parents’ education on students’ school achievements. 
 Table (2.3) presents the main results of the OLS and IV regressions. The first-stage and 
reduced-form estimations are also presented in the same table. Panel A shows the effects of 
fathers’ years of education on their children’s cognitive abilities, while the effect of mothers’ 
educational attainments is presented in panel B. 
                                                 
 
24
 Some sociological studies (Ricks, 2006) have indicated that high-school-age girls (16–18 years) during the 
First Intifada played a vital role in the non-violent resistance to the Israeli measures. They also insisted on attending 
schools just to study because they were always waiting for another curfew to be called. Another study, by Velloso 
(1996), concluded that girls’ education in Palestine improved during and after the First Intifada. They played an ac-
tive part during the struggle rather than doing nothing. This study indicated that women’s organizations started their 
work in Palestine during and after the First Intifada, running projects for female empowerment and capacity build-
ing.  
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Figure 2.3.a: Male participation in the labor force 
 
Figure 2.3.b: Female participation in the labor force 
Source: Elkhafif and Daoud (2005).  
Figure 2.3: Male and female participation in the labor force 
 
Columns with odd numbers represent the estimations with all the control variables in addition to 
the school type (governmental versus UNRWA schools). Columns with even numbers show the 
results after adding the school fixed effect to the model.  
 In panel A, the OLS estimate suggests that a one-year increase in a father’s years of 
schooling is associated with a 0.837 percentage point increase in his child’s cognitive test. This 
coefficient is significant taking into consideration the inclusion of the set of controls that were 
discussed in the previous section. After including the school fixed effect in the model (column 
2), I continue to find that fathers’ education is positively and significantly associated with their 
children’s cognitive abilities, although the coefficient is slightly lower: 0.75. 
Column (1) in panel B shows the effect of mothers’ schooling on their children’s cognitive 
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outcome. The OLS estimate indicates that a 1-year increase in a mother’s education is associated 
with a 0.8 percentage point increase in her child’s cognitive tests. The coefficient remains almost 
the same after adding the school fixed effect to the model. In general, the OLS estimates confirm 
a strong positive correlation between parents’ years of schooling and their offspring’s cognitive 
abilities, even when the school fixed effect, along with a large set of demographic and socio-
economic variables, is controlled. In the following paragraphs, employing the IV strategy will 
allow me to explore whether this positive correlation is due to a causal relation or other omitted 
variables. Such omitted variables may include family characteristics or inherited ability 
transmitted to the children rather than education spillovers.  
 Columns 3 and 4, in panels A and B, respectively, present the 2SLS results. The coefficients 
of both parents’ education are imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant. In panel A 
(column 3), the 2SLS estimate is smaller than the OLS estimate and falls from 0.464 to 0.298 
percentage points after adding the school fixed effect. This result suggests that child cognitive 
ability is positively correlated with unobserved ability or family characteristics rather than hu-
man capital spillovers from father to child.  
  The main reason for this imprecise estimate is the relatively weak reduced form between 
fathers’ exposure to the First Intifada and their children’s cognitive outcome. These results 
suggest that the First Intifada did not have an impact on the cognitive abilities of the next 
generation.   
 The 2SLS estimate for mothers indicates that a year of maternal education increases her 
child’s cognitive ability tests by 1.131 percentage points. The IV estimate is slightly larger than 
the OLS but not significant due to the large standard error (1.003). Concerning the magnitudes, 
the effect of mothers’ education becomes smaller when I introduce the school fixed effect into 
the estimation but is still larger than the OLS (0.722 versus 1.117 percentage points, 
respectively). The results suggest that there is evidence of a causal relationship for educational 
spillovers between mothers and their offspring despite the estimate’s lack of precision. 
2.6.3 Change in Outcome by Student Gender  
In this section, I will try to explain the different roles that fathers and mothers play in the 
transmission of human capital by gender. Some pieces of literature state that same-sex 
intergenerational links are the strongest (Chevalier, 2004), while other researchers have found, in 
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contrast, a positive effect of mothers’ education only on their sons (Black et al., 2005). To 
conduct the analysis, I consider samples of male and female children separately. The results for 
sons and daughters are presented in Table (2.4). Before discussing the 2SLS results, I will 
comment on the OLS results in panels A and B. The OLS estimates confirm that both parents’ 
educational attainment has a stronger correlation with their daughters’ cognitive outcome than 
with that of their sons (0.926 versus 0.659 and 0.989 versus 0.335 percentage points, paternal 
and maternal, respectively). When conducting the analysis on girls, the IV coefficients for both 
parents’ education are statistically significant and larger than those generated by the full sample 
(2.3 versus 0.404 for fathers and 2.023 versus 1.131 for mothers). Moreover, the IV estimates are 
greater than the OLS estimates. When examining the sample of sons, the IV estimation on 
paternal and maternal schooling yields an imprecise result, which is not statistically different 
from zero, with a high standard error and wrong sign. A potential explanation for the implausible 
result of parental education’s effect on boys could be the sampling error rather than gender 
differences.  Girls are more representative in my sample than male students (approximately 70 
percent due to the sample requirement, as mentioned in section 2.4). The IV estimations 
demonstrate an educational spillover across generations. The size of the estimated effect is large: 
increasing paternal and maternal education by 1 year will raise their daughters’ cognitive 
outcome by 2.3 and 2.03 percentage points, respectively. The smaller maternal effect may be due 
to the fact that better-educated mothers work more in paid employment and spend less time 
interacting with their daughters.   
 The results demonstrate an educational spillover across generations with respect to daughters 
only. Cultural specificity can explain this finding. In a mostly conservative society, such as that 
of Palestine, girls are more connected to their parents and spend most of their time either at 
school or at home, acquiring the majority of their experience by observing their parents. In 
contrast, boys are exposed to different experiences, having more choice when it comes to 
selecting their peers and interacting with their environment.
25
 
                                                 
25
 For example, according to the PCBS (2014), males aged over 10 years tend to spend more time per day on 
leisure activities (sports participation and out-of-home exercises) than females (17 minutes per day vs. 4 minutes, 
respectively). Meanwhile, the percentage of females engaged in performing domestic work in the West Bank is sig-
nificantly larger than that for males (90.2% vs. 43%).  
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2.6.4 Outcome of School Achievements in 2012/2013 
In this section, I will employ another vital educational outcome to investigate the human capital 
spillover. The students’ school achievements during the academic year 2012/2013 represent a 
long-term educational investment in children by their parents. The student GPA is a good 
indicator, since it measures parents’ investment in their child during the entire academic year 
rather than over a short period. These results are documented in the school administration 
records and measure the students’ abilities in the main educational subjects. Moreover, the 
students’ GPA during the year could reflect another indicator of the level and quality of non-
school “home” inputs into human capital production.  
 Thus far, the primary outcomes in the results suggest educational spillover effects of 
mothers’ schooling on children’s cognitive abilities, while the fathers’ IV estimations lack 
precision with a large standard error. These findings are contrary to some pieces of literature 
that have found evidence that fathers’ education is more important than that of mothers in 
influencing children’s educational attainment (Ermisch & Pronzato, 2010). 
Table (2.5), panel A demonstrates that the IV estimates are higher than the OLS estimates of 
the effect of paternal educational attainment on children’s school results. The IV estimates have 
the same sign as the OLS estimates and are statistically significant (10 percent). The OLS 
estimates suggest that increasing a father’s education by 1 year increases the child’s score by 
1.19 percentage points. Moreover, the IV estimates show that 1 additional year of parental 
education significantly increases child school achievement by 1.5 percentage points. Introducing 
the school fixed effect into the model does not change the results.  
The 2SLS model confirms a causal relation between paternal education and offspring’s 
academic achievements. The findings show that the estimates obtained from the IV models are 
larger than their OLS counterparts. These results are consistent with the existing literature that 
instrumented parental educational attainment by introducing exogenous variation into family 
and contextual variables of interest, such as a change in compulsory school law, and found that 
IV estimates are larger than OLS estimates (Chevalier, 2004; Oreopoulos et al., 2006; Stella, 
2013). That said, the finding could call into question the assumption of correlation between 
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child education and other omitted variables, such as inherent genetic abilities or family input.   
The fact that the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates could be due to measurement 
error in self-reporting parental educational attainment (the endogenous variable). Another 
interpretation is the compiler effect, since the obtained results are consistent with the local 
average treatment effect (LATE) interpretation. The First Intifada did not affect the entire 
population. The applied IV strategy captures the impact on only the subgroup of parents whose 
educational attainment was affected by exposure to the First Intifada at the identified age. 
Hence, the treatment effect of those parents whose schooling complied with the First Intifada 
effect tends to be above the average marginal effect for the entire population,
26
 in particular 
those children whose parents completed their education or have less schooling, regardless of 
whether they were exposed to the First Intifada during the identified age range (always 
takers/never takers). 
                                                 
26 
For example, Card (2001) pointed out that IV estimates based on changing in mandatory schooling law will 
yield estimated returns to schooling above the average marginal return to schooling in the population and potentially 
above the corresponding OLS estimates, since the group of individuals captured by the local average treatment 
effect (LATE) is most likely to be affected by the compulsory schooling law. 
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Table 2.3: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of parents’ years of education on cognitive ability       
 OLS  2SLS  Reduced form  First stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Dependent variable:  Cognitive tests  Cognitive tests  Cognitive tests  Parents’ edu. 
 Panel A       
Father’s years of education  0.837*** 0.749***  0.464 0.298       
 (0.072) (0.064)  (0.745) (0.887)       
Father’s exposure to Intifada (age 13–19)       -0.075 -0.040  -0.163*** -0.133*** 
       (0.123) (0.119)  (0.029) (0.030) 
First-stage F-statistic          21.73 6.72 
Observations 3,994 3,994  3,994 3,994  3,994 3,994  3,994 3,994 
R-squared 0.265 0.375  0.258 0.365  0.231 0.349  0.104 0.162 
  Panel B       
Mother’s years of education  0.790*** 0.722***  1.131 1.117       
 (0.086) (0.078)  (1.003) (1.138)       
Mother’s exposure to Intifada (age 13–19)       0.135 0.105  0.119*** 0.094*** 
       (0.122) (0.110)  (0.025) (0.026) 
First-stage F-statistic          25.29 8.62 
Observations 4,067 4,067  4,067 4,067  4,067 4,067  4,067 4,067 
R-squared 0.254 0.366  0.249 0.360  0.228 0.347  0.134 0.212 
Individual controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Family controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
School type YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO 
Contextual variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
School FE NO YES   NO YES   NO YES   NO YES 
Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Individual controls: sex, age, month of birth, and a dummy showing whether 
the student attended Kindergarten (KG). Family controls: number of siblings, household income, and father’s and mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or governmen-
tal. Contextual controls: area population in 2013, whether this area was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the locality in area C, locality poverty rate, and 
school fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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In panel B, I continue to find that a mother’s education is positively and significantly associated 
with her child’s scores. Increasing maternal schooling by one year increases the child’s school 
GPA by one percentage point. However, when the coefficient is instrumented, the 2SLS becomes 
lower than the OLS, with insignificant statistical power. Due to the lack of precision of the 
maternal IV estimates, and since the IV estimates are smaller than the OLS estimates, the results 
are not conclusive regarding the effect of maternal schooling on child school achievements. This 
may be due to possible correlation with other unobserved variables, such as ability or family 
background and characteristics, rather than a causal relationship.  
The overall results in Table (2.5) provide some evidence that fathers’ education has a larger 
effect than that of mothers. As indicated by Ermisch and Pronzato (2010), the explanation for this 
result could be that better-educated mothers work more in paid employment and spend less time 
interacting with their offspring. 
 Table (2.6), panel A presents the OLS and IV estimates by gender differences. As I found with 
the main outcome variable, the IV father–all and father–daughter estimates are statistically 
significant, greater than the OLS estimates, and confirm the causality in the transmission of human 
capital. Despite the strong OLS relationship, in panel B, I find little causal relationship between 
maternal education and child school achievements. The only exception is mother–daughter 
relations; the IV estimate is still larger than the OLS estimate and provides some evidence of 
human capital spillover. 
 The overall IV findings are in the vicinity of the OLS estimations. Both cognitive test scores 
and students’ school performances demonstrate the educational spillover in father–daughter and 
mother–daughter relations. While the father–son and mother–son coefficients are imprecisely 
estimated and lack significant power, these findings need further analysis to investigate whether 
the strong correlation between paternal schooling and sons’ GPA is due to family characteristics or 
inherited ability rather than education spillovers.   
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Table 2.4: OLS and IV analysis – Effects of parents’ educational attainment on cognitive abilities by gender 
    All   Girls   Boys   All   Girls   Boys 
Dep. var: Cognitive 
tests 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
    OLS 2SLS   OLS 2SLS   OLS 2SLS   OLS 2SLS   OLS 2SLS   OLS 2SLS 
Panel A 
Father’s schooling    0.841*** 0.404 
 
0.926*** 2.299** 
 
0.659*** -2.397* 
 
0.757*** 0.205 
 
0.841*** 1.989  0.573*** -1.769 
    (0.073) (0.769) 
 
(0.079) (1.006) 
 
(0.135) (1.344) 
 
(0.065) (0.912) 
 
(0.076) (1.407) 
 
(0.115) (1.177) 
Observations   3,994 3,994 
 
2,803 2,803 
 
1,191 1,191 
 
3,994 3,994 
 
2,804 2,804 
 
1,191 1,191 
First-stage F-statistic     21.73     16.49     9.08     6.72     7     5.32 
R-squared   0.266 0.257   0.274 0.166   0.212    0.377 0.363   0.354 0.284   0.366 0.168 
        
Panel B 
         
 Mother’s schooling    0.790*** 1.131  0.989*** 2.023**  0.335** -1.190  0.722*** 1.111  0.889*** 1.660  0.335** -0.595 
    (0.086) (1.003)  (0.089) (0.878)  (0.145) (4.150)  (0.078) (1.138)  (0.085) (1.107)  (0.145) (4.180) 
Observations   4,067 4,067  2,861 2,861  1,206 1,206  4,068 4,068  2,862 2,862  1,206 1,206 
First-stage F-statistic     25.29     19.88     17.92     8.62     8.81     5.76 
R-squared   0.254 0.249  0.266 0.212  0.358 0.126  0.366 0.361  0.344 0.317  0.358 0.332 
Individual controls   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Family controls   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
School type   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   NO NO   NO NO   NO NO 
Contextual variables   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
School FE   NO NO   NO NO   NO NO   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Individual controls: sex, age, month of birth, and a dummy showing whether the student 
attended KG. Family controls: number of siblings, household income, and father’s and mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or governmental. Contextual controls: area population 
in 2013, whether this area was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the locality in area C, locality poverty rate, and school fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5: OLS and IV analysis – Effects of parents’ years of education on children’s school achievement   
 OLS  2SLS  Reduced form  First stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: GPA2013  GPA2013  GPA2013  Parents’ edu. 
Panel A 
Father’s years of education  1.189*** 1.186***  1.524* 1.551       
 (0.084) (0.085)  (0.863) (1.026)       
Father’s exposure to Intifada (age 13–19)       -0.242* -0.204  -0.159*** -0.132*** 
       (0.141) (0.142)  (0.029) (0.031) 
First-stage F-statistic          21.67 6.69 
Observations 3,999 3,999  3,999 3,999  3,999 3,999  3,999 3,999 
R-squared 0.145 0.205  0.141 0.200  0.092 0.155  0.117 0.172 
Panel B 
 Mother’s years of education  1.236*** 1.194***  0.869 0.928       
 (0.096) (0.096)  (1.035) (1.225)       
Mother’s exposure to Intifada (age 13–19)       0.105 0.089  0.121*** 0.096*** 
       (0.130) (0.122)  (0.025) (0.026) 
First-stage F-statistic          25.06 8.55 
Observations 4,073 4,073  4,073 4,073  4,073 4,073  4,073 4,073 
R-squared 0.142 0.200  0.138 0.198  0.092 0.158  0.133 0.211 
Individual controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Family controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
School type YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES NO 
Contextual variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
School FE NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES 
Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Individual controls: sex, age, month of birth, and a dummy indicat-
ing whether the student attended KG. Family controls: number of siblings, household income, and father’s and mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or go-
vernmental. Contextual controls: area population in 2013, whether this area was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the locality in area C, locality 
poverty rate, and school fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.    
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Table 2.6: OLS and IV analysis – Effects of parents’ educational attainment on school achievements by gender 
  All Girls Boys All Girls Boys 
Dep. var.: 
GPA2013 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Panel A 
Father’s schooling  1.186*** 1.524* 1.266*** 2.024 1.055*** 0.452 1.184*** 1.551 1.252*** 2.128 1.083*** 0.722 
  
(0.083) (0.863) (0.104) (1.346) (0.134) (0.910) (0.085) (1.026) (0.106) (1.848) (0.132) (0.960) 
Observations 3,999 3,999 2,804 2,804 1,195 1,195 3,999 3,999 2,804 2,804 1,195 1,195 
First-stage F-
statistic   25.06   16.33   9.18   6.69   6.69   5.36 
R-squared 0.145 0.141 0.132 0.111 0.208 0.194 0.205 0.2 0.187 0.161 0.269 0.264 
          Panel B             
Mother’s schooling  1.240*** 0.869 1.398*** 1.786 0.876*** -2.693 1.197*** 0.919 1.344*** 2.088 0.876*** -2.418 
  
(0.096) (1.037) (0.113) (1.124) (0.159) (2.951) (0.097) (1.224) (0.113) (1.430) (0.159) (3.072) 
Observations 4,073 4,073 2,863 2,863 1,210 1,210 4,073 4,073 2,863 2,863 1,210 1,210 
First-stage F-
statistic   25.06   18.9   7.5   8.55   8.64   5.62 
R-squared 0.143 0.138 0.137 0.132 0.247   0.201 0.199 0.19 0.174 0.247   
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Family controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School type YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Contextual var. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Individual controls: sex, age, month of birth, and a dummy indicating 
whether the student went to KG. Family controls: number of siblings, household income, and father’s and mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or governmen-
tal. Contextual controls: area population in 2013, whether this area was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the locality in area C, locality poverty 
rate, and school fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.    
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2.7. Robustness Checks  
In this section, I apply some robustness checks to verify the findings. First, I conduct the 
estimation on the sample with higher education cutoff points. I create a dummy variable for those 
parents with more than 12 years of schooling (university or college degree). One advantage of 
this check is that it eliminates the measurement error of self-reporting of parental education. 
Information about paternal and maternal schooling was obtained from the household 
questionnaire and classified into ten levels (from illiterate to Ph.D.) according to the PCBS scale. 
At some levels (for example preparatory), it is not clear whether parents have 7 or 9 years of 
education. The elementary stage is also unclear (grade 1 or 4). The OLS estimates in Table (2.7) 
confirm a significant positive effect of parents with more than 12 years of education on their 
offspring’s cognitive abilities, which is much larger in size than the OLS obtained for years of 
schooling. However, I continue to find that the IV for fathers with a college degree is smaller 
than the OLS estimate. In panel B, the IV estimate for mothers with a college degree is larger 
than the OLS estimate. Despite the estimate being insignificant due to the large standard error, it 
assumes a causal relation between highly educated mothers and their offspring, while the actual 
causal effect of paternal education on the child cognitive outcome appears to be weak. One 
exception is that, when I run the regressions separately for parents and their daughters, I find that 
the IV estimates, especially for fathers, precisely confirm the causality in the intergenerational 
transmission of human capital and are larger than the OLS estimates.  
Table (2.8) assumes a causal relationship between mothers with more than 12 years of 
education and their offspring’s school achievements. Regarding the magnitudes, the IV estimate 
is greater than the OLS estimate (12 versus 9.051, respectively). The IV estimates give quite a 
close estimate to the OLS for the effect of fathers with more than 12 years of education on their 
offspring’s school performance. 
Another robustness check is implemented by considering the student’s GPA as an outcome. 
By running the same regression on the previous academic year (2011/2012), both the OLS and 
the IV estimates in Table (2.9) yield similar results to those that were obtained in the main 
analysis. The 2SLS for paternal schooling confirms an intergenerational educational spillover, 
while there is no such evidence for a causal relationship between maternal education and 
offspring’s school performance. 
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Table 2.7: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of parents with a university degree on their children’s 
cognitive ability 
 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
First stage 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  Cognitive tests 
 
Cognitive tests 
 
Parents’ edu. 
Panel A 
         Fathers with uni./college degree 5.058*** 4.489*** 
 
2.239 1.295 
   
 
(0.616) (0.527) 
 
(3.610) (3.873) 
   Father’s exposure to Intifada (age 13–19) 
      
-0.034*** -0.031*** 
       
(0.003) (0.003) 
First-stage F-statistic 
      
24.82 7 
Observations 3,994 3,994 
 
3,994 3,994 
 
3,994 3,994 
R-squared 0.247 0.361 
 
0.242 0.355 
 
0.118 0.163 
                
Panel B 
         Mothers with uni./college degree 4.918*** 4.382*** 
 
15.684 14.035 
   
 
(0.704) (0.678) 
 
(14.623) (15.491) 
   Mother’s exposure to Intifada (age 13–19) 
     
0.009*** 0.008** 
       
(0.003) (0.003) 
First-stage F-statistic 
      
29.37 8.37 
Observations 4,067 4,067 
 
4,067 4,067 
 
4,067 4,067 
R-squared 0.24 0.355   0.182 0.312   0.153 0.201 
Individual controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Family controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
School type YES NO 
 
YES NO 
 
YES NO 
Contextual variables YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
School FE NO YES   NO YES   NO YES 
Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Individual controls: sex, age, 
month of birth, and a dummy indicating whether the student went to KG. Family controls: number of siblings, household 
income, and father’s and mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or governmental. Contextual controls: area population in 
2013, whether this area was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the locality in area C, locality poverty rate, and 
school fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.  
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Table 2.8: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of parents with a university degree on their children’s 
school achievements 
 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
First stage 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  GPA2013   GPA2013   Parents’ edu. 
Fathers with uni./college degree 7.626*** 7.154*** 
 
7.277* 6.713 
   
 
(0.768) (0.772) 
 
(4.198) (4.580) 
   
       
-0.033*** -0.030*** 
Father’s exposure to Intifada (age 13–
19) 
      
(0.003) (0.003) 
First-stage F-statistic 
      
25.52 7.19 
Observations 3,999 3,999 
 
3,999 3,999 
 
3,999 3,999 
R-squared 0.12 0.179 
 
0.12 0.179 
 
0.134 0.175 
Mothers with uni./college degree 9.051*** 8.350*** 
 
12.004 11.542 
   
 
(0.814) (0.826) 
 
(14.275) (15.231) 
   Mother’s exposure to Intifada (age 13–
19) 
      
0.009*** 0.008*** 
       
(0.003) (0.003) 
First-stage F-statistic 
      
29.37 8.37 
Observations 4,073 4,073 
 
4,073 4,073 
 
4,073 4,073 
R-squared 0.124 0.184   0.121 0.18   0.152 0.201 
Individual controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Family controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
School type YES NO 
 
YES NO 
 
YES NO 
Contextual variables YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
School FE NO YES   NO YES   NO YES 
Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Individual controls: sex, age, 
month of birth, and a dummy indicating whether the student attended KG. Family controls: number of siblings, household 
income, and father’s and mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or governmental. Contextual controls: area population in 
2013, whether this area was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the locality in area C, locality poverty rate, and 
school fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.    
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Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Individual controls: sex, age, month of 
birth, and a dummy indicating whether the student attended KG. Family controls: number of siblings, household income, and 
father’s and mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or governmental. Contextual controls: area population in 2013, whether this area 
was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the locality in area C, locality poverty rate, and school fixed effect. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.    
 
 The third robustness check is undertaken by controlling the school performance for the 
previous year, 2011/2012, when the cognitive test scores are the outcome variable. In Table 
(2.A.6) in the appendix, the IV estimates for paternal education yield an imprecise smaller 
coefficient than the OLS estimates, with the wrong sign. However, the OLS estimate for maternal 
education produces a smaller coefficient than the one derived from the model without cognitive 
scores (0.294 versus 0.79, respectively), while the IV estimate is still larger than the OLS estimate. 
Overall, the 2SLS results for maternal education suggest some evidence for a causal relationship 
for intergenerational transmission of human capital. On the other hand, the paternal 2SLS 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.9:  Robustness checks, OLS and IV estimates of the effect of parents’ years of education on school 
achievements 
Dep. var.  Student GPA 2011/2012 
 
Student GPA 2012/2013 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Panel A 
Father’s years of education  1.107*** 1.084*** 
 
1.758** 1.711* 
 
1.190*** 1.188*** 
 
1.553* 1.593 
 
(0.070) (0.069) 
 
(0.717) (0.871) 
 
(0.084) (0.085) 
 
(0.865) (1.032) 
First-stage F-statistic 
   
22.89 7.08 
    
22.81 7.06 
Observations 3,998 3,998 
 
3,998 3,998 
 
3,996 3,996 
 
3,996 3,996 
R-squared 0.193 0.243   0.172 0.224   0.145 0.205   0.140 0.200 
Panel B 
Mother’s years of education  1.050*** 0.992*** 
 
0.536 0.567 
 
1.236*** 1.194*** 
 
0.858 0.924 
 
(0.089) (0.088) 
 
(0.964) (1.198) 
 
(0.096) (0.096) 
 
(1.033) (1.221) 
First-stage F-statistic 
   
27.1 9.32 
    
26.95 9.28 
Observations 4,072 4,072 
 
4,072 4,072 
 
4,070 4,070 
 
4,070 4,070 
R-squared 0.179 0.227   0.167 0.220   0.142 0.201   0.138 0.199 
Individual controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Family controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
School type YES NO 
 
YES NO 
 
YES NO 
 
YES NO 
Contextual variables YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
School FE NO YES   NO YES   NO YES   NO YES 
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estimates confirm that the positive correlation between maternal education and child cognitive test 
scores is due to the association with other unobserved factors, such as ability, family background, 
or inherent genetics rather human capital spillovers. 
 The last robustness check is executed by changing the specification of the instrument. The 
primary instrument is constructed by recognizing the parents’ exposure to the first Intifada 
between 13 and 19 years of age. One concern is that those parents of college age (19–22) were 
additionally influenced by the Intifada, and along these lines they had a lower chance of being 
admitted to colleges during that period. Table (2.A.7) in the appendix does not support an 
educational spillover after changing the instrument specification. The IV lacks precision and has a 
high standard error. Indeed, even the first stage is significant, and the F-statistic is greater than 10 
before adding the school fixed effect. However, the IV estimates are consistently lower than the 
OLS estimates with the wrong sign. 
2.8. Conclusion 
In this study, I use cognitive test scores from approximately 4,000 students from grade 5 to grade 9 
in the West Bank to investigate the intergenerational transmission of human capital. I identify the 
exogenous effect of parental education using exposure to the First Palestinian Intifada as the 
instrumental variable. The results suggest a partial causal relationship between fathers’ schooling 
and that of their children, while there is some evidence of an educational spillover between 
mothers and their offspring. However, when focusing on girls’ and boys’ results separately, I find 
that both mothers’ and fathers’ education have quite a similar causal impact solely on their 
daughters’ cognitive test scores. Employing the school achievements for the 2012/2013 academic 
year as a secondary outcome indicates a significant educational spillover between fathers and their 
offspring. Furthermore, this outcome confirms the positive educational spillover between both 
parents and their daughters. Nevertheless, there remains much to explore about parents’ roles in 
enhancing their children’s cognitive abilities and how these abilities are correlated with parents’ 
education. 
 The findings of this study are in line with other existing literature that has discussed the 
intergenerational transmission of human capital. The cognitive test results suggest that maternal 
education has a larger impact on children than paternal education. These results are also consistent 
with other studies that have shed light on the educational spillover across generations. Black et al. 
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(2005 ) attributed this stronger effect of maternal education to positive assortative mating. Another 
explanation is the fact that women with more education have fewer children and therefore more 
resources to invest in each child’s education. They also suggested that educated mothers may 
reduce the cost (in terms of effort) of education for the child. Chevalier (2004) indicated that the 
stronger effect of maternal education could be explained by the role that an educated mother plays 
in her family, for example spending more time with her children, helping them with homework, 
reading to them, or taking them outside. 
 The overall findings are consistent with the idea that policies aimed at improving education 
will have a substantial impact on the second generation. Although some unobserved variables 
related to the Palestinian context may exist and girls are over-represented in the sample, the 
sampling process captures all West Bank governorates, thus enhancing the policy implications of 
the study. 
 Long-term impacts should be considered when estimating the social return on education. The 
findings of this chapter indicate the importance of education intervention policies that would 
augment the human capital spillover across generations. Furthermore, understanding the benefit of 
investment in human capital can lead to a reduction in the inequality of opportunity in the 
educational attainment of subsequent generations. Another indication of the results is the long-run 
effect of educational destruction during conflict. Losing school days can be translated into 
significant loss not only in life but also in the educational outcome of the next generation. Thus, 
formulating policies that undergird educational institutions during conflict periods will have a 
remarkable accumulated positive impact on human capital. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2.A.1: Fathers’ exposure to the First Intifada (1988–1993) during the age 
13–19 years  
Father’s YOB Freq. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Before 1950 70 38 39 40 41 42 43 
1951 15 37 38 39 40 41 42 
1952 13 36 37 38 39 40 41 
1953 17 35 36 37 38 39 40 
1954 38 34 35 36 37 38 39 
1955 35 33 34 35 36 37 38 
1956 43 32 33 34 35 36 37 
1957 46 31 32 33 34 35 36 
1958 72 30 31 32 33 34 35 
1959 64 29 30 31 32 33 34 
1960 110 28 29 30 31 32 33 
1961 94 27 28 29 30 31 32 
1962 151 26 27 28 29 30 31 
1963 162 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1964 160 24 25 26 27 28 29 
1965 189 23 24 25 26 27 28 
1966 189 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1967 227 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1968 238 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1969 243 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1970 272 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1971 251 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1972 234 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1973 245 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1974 250 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1975 192 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1976 150 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1977 103 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1978 77 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1979 68 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1980 26 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1981 22 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1982 8 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1983 6 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1984 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Total 4,082             
Number of observations exposed to the First Intifada  
 
2,085   
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Table 2.A.2: Mothers’ exposure to the First Intifada (1988–1993) during the age 
13–19 years 
Mother’s YOB Freq. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1950 8 38 39 40 41 42 43 
1952 1 36 37 38 39 40 41 
1953 4 35 36 37 38 39 40 
1954 3 34 35 36 37 38 39 
1955 4 33 34 35 36 37 38 
1956 12 32 33 34 35 36 37 
1957 11 31 32 33 34 35 36 
1958 18 30 31 32 33 34 35 
1959 30 29 30 31 32 33 34 
1960 42 28 29 30 31 32 33 
1961 47 27 28 29 30 31 32 
1962 81 26 27 28 29 30 31 
1963 74 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1964 92 24 25 26 27 28 29 
1965 102 23 24 25 26 27 28 
1966 120 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1967 134 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1968 160 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1969 169 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1970 160 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1971 213 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1972 222 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1973 217 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1974 243 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1975 270 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1976 277 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1977 283 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1978 256 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1979 252 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1980 211 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1981 152 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1982 133 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1983 86 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1984 38 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Total 4,125             
Number of observations exposed to the First Intifada  2,773 
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Table 2.A.3: Subtests of the cognitive test  
Subtest no. 
(1)  Subtest name 
No. of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
α 
  Verbal tests     
1 Verbal classification 17 0.82 
3 Verbal analogies 18 0.76 
6 Vocabulary  30 0.73 
9 Verbal oddities  13 0.74 
12 Sentence completion  16 0.77 
  Numerical tests     
7 Number series  12 0.79 
11 
Word arithmetic prob-
lems  13 0.78 
  Figural tests     
2 Figure classification 15 0.71 
4 Figure analogies 15 0.87 
5 Matrices 8 0.8 
8 Figure series 10 0.76 
10 Figural oddities 14 0.55 
(1) Subtest order in the test     
 
Table 2.A.4: Effect of exposure to the First Intifada on household income  
  
Outcome: Household income  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Exposure to Intifada (age 13–19) 0.00926 0.0671 0.0724 0.0294 
  (0.0550) (0.0566) (0.0597) (0.0615) 
Observations 4,370 4,222 3,819 3,819 
Education  NO YES YES YES 
Age NO NO YES YES 
Age squared NO NO YES YES 
Locality fixed effect NO NO NO YES 
The results are obtained by ordered logit regression. The outcome variable is household income in 
2013, measured in the new Israeli shekel currency, and takes 5 intervals: [1] <1500; [2] 1500–2499; [3] 
2500–3999; [4] 4000–5000; and [5] >5000. Fathers’ exposure to the First Intifada is a dummy variable 
that takes the ‎value 1 if the father was exposed to the First Intifada at the age of 13–19 years and 0 oth-
erwise. ehT‎s tandard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * and p<0. 
 
47 
 
Table 2.A.5: OLS – The effect of all the variables on cognitive tests and school performance 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Dep. var.:   Cognitive tests 
 
GPA 2013 
Father’s years of education 0.637*** 0.584*** 
 
0.841*** 0.871*** 
 
(0.069) (0.066) 
 
(0.084) (0.083) 
Mother’s years of education 0.519*** 0.490*** 
 
0.852*** 0.836*** 
 
(0.074) (0.072) 
 
(0.090) (0.091) 
Male student -7.822*** -4.531 
 
-3.055*** -6.841* 
 
(0.500) (2.990) 
 
(0.603) (3.779) 
Student age (years) 3.431*** 3.467*** 
 
-1.027*** -1.018*** 
 
(0.155) (0.146) 
 
(0.187) (0.184) 
Student attended KG 0.06 -0.07 
 
-1.422 -1.623* 
 
(0.728) (0.694) 
 
(0.879) (0.877) 
Number of siblings -0.505*** -0.443*** 
 
-0.814*** -0.928*** 
 
(0.136) (0.131) 
 
(0.164) (0.165) 
Household net monthly income 1.289*** 1.351*** 
 
1.534*** 1.795*** 
 
(0.209) (0.204) 
 
(0.253) (0.257) 
Population per locality (2013) 0 -0.000* 
 
-0.000* 0 
 
0.000  0.000  
 
0.000  0.000  
Locality affected by the separation wall (0,1) 0.871* -5.066* 
 
-0.929 -9.539** 
 
(0.509) (2.975) 
 
(0.613) (3.760) 
Area C (proportion) -4.811*** 0.561 
 
-1.5 -5.381 
 
(0.878) (3.535) 
 
(1.058) (4.468) 
School authority (gov. 1) -4.695*** 
  
-3.540*** -4.695*** 
 
(0.468) 
  
(0.565) (0.468) 
      Observations 3,898 3,899 
 
3,904 3,904 
R-squared 0.275 0.384 
 
0.162 0.221 
School FE NO YES   NO YES 
The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * 
p<0.1.    
 
  
48 
 
Table 2.A.6: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of parents’ years of educa-
tion on cognitive ability 
            
  OLS 
 
2SLS 
Dep. var.: Cognitive tests (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Panel A 
Father’s years of education  0.332*** 0.267***   -0.279 -0.387 
  (0.070) (0.059)   (0.716) (0.831) 
First-stage F-statistic       37.54 11.48 
Observations 4,064 4,064   4,064 4,064 
R-squared 0.432 0.527   0.419 0.514 
 
 Panel B         
Mother’s years of education  0.294*** 0.262***   0.870 0.853 
  (0.081) (0.069)   (0.891) (1.044) 
First-stage F-statistic       65.48 10.44 
Observations 3,990 3,990   3,990 3,990 
R-squared 0.433 0.525   0.416 0.507 
Individual controls YES YES   YES YES 
Family controls YES YES   YES YES 
School type YES NO   YES NO 
Contextual variables YES YES   YES YES 
GPA 2011/2012 YES YES   YES YES 
School FE NO YES   NO YES 
Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. 
Individual controls: sex, age, month of birth, and a dummy indicating whether the student 
attended KG. Family controls: number of siblings, household income, and father’s and 
mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or governmental. Contextual controls: area popula-
tion in 2013, whether this area was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the lo-
cality in area C, and locality poverty rate. School achievement in 2011/2012 and school 
fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.    
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Table 2.A.7: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of parents with a university degree on their child-
ren’s cognitive abilities 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
First stage 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  Cognitive tests 
 
Cognitive tests 
 
Parents’ edu. 
Panel A 
Fathers with uni./college 
degree 5.038*** 4.515*** 
 
-10.999 -11.395 
 
  
 
 
(0.626) (0.541) 
 
(13.916) (13.304) 
   Father’s exposure to Inti-
fada (age 19–22) 
      
-0.045*** -0.043*** 
       
(0.014) (0.014) 
First-stage F-statistic 
      
22.68 6.73 
Observations 3,994 3,994 
 
3,994 3,994 
 
3,994 3,994 
R-squared 0.248 0.363   0.088 0.214   0.108 0.156 
Panel B 
Mothers with uni./college 
degree 4.918*** 4.382*** 
 
-7.763 3.18 
   
 
(0.704) (0.678) 
 
(34.412) (42.241) 
   Mother’s exposure to Inti-
fada (age 19–22) 
      
0.015 0.011 
       
(0.013) (0.014) 
First-stage F-statistic 
      
30.11 8.6 
Observations 4,067 4,067 
 
4,067 4,067 
 
4,067 4,067 
R-squared 0.24 0.355   0.16 0.355   0.151 0.2 
Individual controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Family controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
School type YES NO 
 
YES NO 
 
YES NO 
Contextual variables YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
School FE NO YES   NO YES   NO YES 
Note: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Individual controls: sex, 
age, month of birth, and a dummy indicating whether the student attended KG. Family controls: number of sibl-
ings, household income, and father’s and mother’s age. School type: UNRWA or governmental. Contextual con-
trols: area population in 2013, whether this area was affected by the separation wall, percentage of the locality in 
area C, locality poverty rate, and school fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.    
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3.1 Introduction 
Violent conflicts can have enormous social and economic consequences for the affected civi-
lian population. These consequences can be especially dramatic for children. A growing body 
of research from different countries has provided robust evidence of the short-run adverse ef-
fects of conflicts on a large array of children’s outcomes, including, for instance, health 
(Akresh, Lucchetti, & Thirumurthy, 2012; Minoiu & Shemyakina, 2014), psychological well-
being (Blattman & Annan, 2010), child labor (Di Maio & Nandi, 2013), and education (Brück 
et al., 2014; Di Maio & Nandi, 2013; Shemyakina, 2011). However, exposure to conflict may 
also affect the outcomes of individuals later in life, particularly if this happens during early 
childhood, which may be a sensitive or even critical period for the development of important 
skills in life (Conti & Heckman, 2014). 
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways: first, we investigate the long-term ef-
fects of households’ exposure to violent conflict on children’s educational attainment. So far, 
only a few authors have investigated such long-term effects, and the results remain inconclu-
sive and context dependent. For instance, whereas Akresh and De Walque (2008) and León 
(2012) found that exposure to conflict in early childhood reduces completed years of schooling 
by 0.3 to 0.5 years, Arcand and Wouabe (2009) found no such effect. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, we provide detailed analyses of the causal channels through which exposure 
to conflict may affect educational outcomes – which are critical for designing and implement-
ing effective policies that protect children from the negative conflict effects (Justino, 2011). We 
are not aware of any papers in the related literature that have examined skill development as a 
potential mechanism. We fill this gap by explicitly analyzing cognitive skills (IQ) and non-
cognitive skills (personality and behavioral problems) as possible causal mechanisms. In a way, 
we provide a mirror image of the work by Heckman and coauthors on the long-term beneficial 
effects of preschool programs; see, for example, Heckman et al. (2013). More generally, by in-
vestigating how exposure to conflict in the early stages of a child’s development affects her 
skills and outcomes later in life, this study contributes to our knowledge of how the early child-
hood environment affects long-term outcomes (see, for instance, Currie, 2001; Gould, Lavy, & 
Paserman, 2011; Heckman, 2000; Krueger & Whitmore, 2001). 
 Specifically, our study is set in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We study the 
intelligence, non-cognitive skills, and school grades of West Bank students seven years after 
the end of the Second Intifada, and we compare children whose families were directly affected 
by this conflict with those whose families were not. The Second Intifada took place between 
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September 2000 and February 2005. During that period, a resurgence in the intensity of vi-
olence between Palestinian organizations and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) resulted in more 
than 38,000 casualties (dead and wounded). It claimed the life of about 4,000 Palestinian and 
1,000 Israeli civilians (18 percent of whom were children), with the number of fatalities vary-
ing markedly across localities and over time.
27 For example, 2002 saw a peak in the number of 
deaths in the context of a large-scale Israeli military offensive, Operation Defensive Shield, in 
response to Palestinian suicide attacks. This military operation was concentrated primarily on 
some very violent localities in the West Bank, such as Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron (Mansour & 
Rees, 2012). During the conflict, the IDF also engaged in operations involving violence 
against civilians in Palestine, such as the occupation of Palestinian houses, beatings, and abuse. 
Tight restrictions were imposed on the movement of people and goods within the Palestinian 
territories and between the territories and Israel (see, for instance, B’Tselem, 2002; Calì & 
Miaari, 2013). As noted by Mataria et al. (2009), these mobility restrictions further depressed 
the Palestinian economy, leading to a rise in unemployment, a decline in real wages, and a re-
duction in the quantity and quality of food. The initial building of the separation barrier across 
the West Bank contributed to a further division of Palestinian communities by isolating them 
from their surroundings (UNSCO, 2014). The social and political consequences of this conflict 
did not stop with the end of the Second Intifada but continue to this day (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, 
& Paserman, 2012). An important aspect of the Second Intifada that is relevant to researchers 
is the temporal and spatial variation in the level of violence – which can fruitfully be exploited 
for the identification of causal effects. This is also made possible by the detailed information 
on the intensity of the conflict, as it is made publicly available by non-governmental organiza-
tions such as B’Tselem.28 
   Another feature of our analysis is the use of a direct, self-reported measure of household 
exposure to a violent event during the conflict. Such direct measures of exposure are often 
                                                 
27
 For a detailed description of the different periods of violence during the Second Intifada, see, for instance, 
Jaeger and Paserman (2008). 
28
 B’Tselem is an Israeli human rights organization, which provides information on each Palestinian and 
Israeli fatality, including the date, location, and circumstances of the fatality and the age, sex, and locality of res-
idence of the victim, since the beginning of the Second Intifada. The B’Tselem data have been employed by 
many authors analyzing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (see, for example, Jaeger et al., 2012, or Mansour & Rees, 
2012). They are considered to be accurate and reliable by both Israelis and Palestinians. 
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missing from conflict data. While retrospective self-reports have limitations, for instance due 
to recall bias, they improve our understanding of the consequences of conflict (Brück, Justino, 
Verwimp, Avdeenko, & Tedesco, 2015). Moreover, an individual family’s exposure to the 
conflict might depend on a range of characteristics that are also linked with children’s educa-
tional attainment and are thus likely not to be exogenous. Therefore, we exploit the locality-
level variation in conflict intensity to identify exogenous variation in households’ experience 
of conflict-related events. An earlier example of an analysis that employs the number of fatali-
ties in a given locality to measure conflict intensity during the Second Intifada is that by Brück 
et al. (2014). The authors used the year-to-year variation in the number of (Palestinian) victims 
at the school locality to investigate the short-term effects of violence on students’ probability 
of passing the high school final exam. We also use the locality-level number of fatalities as a 
measure of conflict intensity, but, since we consider the long-run effects of the conflict, we 
employ the cumulative number of victims over the entire Second Intifada period. Our identifi-
cation relies on the assumption that the number of fatalities in the household locality only in-
fluences children’s grades several years later through family exposure to conflict. This as-
sumption may not hold if time-invariant unobservable factors at the locality level are corre-
lated with both conflict intensity and children’s school performance. To circumvent this prob-
lem, we control for a range of local labor market and institutional characteristics, such as the 
unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under the Israeli administra-
tion, and the presence of the separation wall. 
A further threat to the validity of our exclusion restriction arises from the endogenous sort-
ing of households across localities in response to increased levels of violence. In particular, if 
households systematically move away and children’s primary education outcomes are corre-
lated with the household decision to move, this can lead to biased estimates of family exposure 
to conflict. While we cannot address this concern directly, we note that, in the West Bank dur-
ing the Second Intifada, internal and external mobility was extremely difficult and is still at a 
very low level. For example, Mansour and Rees (2012) pointed out that most Palestinian fami-
lies living in the West Bank could not migrate because of the mobility restrictions imposed by 
Israel. Furthermore, data from the most recent (2007) census suggest that less than 10 percent 
of the current West Bank residents have moved away from their mother’s place of residence at 
birth (PCBS, 2010a). 
For our empirical analysis, we draw on data collected in 2013 in the West Bank, which 
contain information on a random sample of primary school students in grades 5 to 9 and their 
54  
families. These data are well suited to our purposes. First, they contain administrative informa-
tion on children’s primary school grades for three subsequent school years, specifically 
2010/2011, 2011/2012, and 2012/2013. Second, they contain retrospective self-reported in-
formation on parents’ experience of violence during the Second Intifada. Finally, the data con-
tain detailed information on children’s skills, thereby enabling us to shed light on the potential 
mechanisms through which families’ exposure to conflict may affect children’s school 
achievement. Throughout the analysis, we combine the individual-level data with locality-level 
information on the number of fatalities from the beginning of the Second Intifada in Septem-
ber 2000 to February 2005, allowing us to exploit the previously discussed geographical varia-
tion in fatalities. 
Overall, our results demonstrate that families’ exposure to conflict during the Second Inti-
fada has long-term effects on their children’s primary education achievement in the West 
Bank. An additional event of household exposure to conflict reduces their children’s grade 
point average (GPA) by 5.74 points (on a 0 to 100 scale), which corresponds to a decline of 
approximately 0.3 standard deviations. As regards the potential mechanisms through which 
parents’ exposure to conflict may affect children’s performance at primary school, we show 
that more exposure to conflict leads to lower non-cognitive skills, such as conduct problems or 
a reduced level of conscientiousness. In contrast, there is little evidence that cognitive skills, 
although being important determinants of school achievement, are affected by family exposure 
to conflict. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section (3.2) presents a description 
of the data. Section (3.3) describes the empirical specification and identification strategy. Sec-
tion (3.4) shows our main results and related robustness checks. Section (3.5) provides evi-
dence on cognitive and non-cognitive skills as potential causal channels. Section (3.6) summa-
rizes our findings and concludes.  
 
3.2 Data 
The data used in this study are drawn from a new data set collected in 2013 in the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem in the context of a joint research project between Wuppertal University, 
Hebrew University, and Al-Quds University, funded by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG). The data set contains information on a sample of approximately 6,000 primary school 
students (around 4,000 girls and 2,000 boys – girls were oversampled) in grades 5 to 9 and 
their families. Students were randomly selected, stratified by grade level, from a random sam-
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ple of 100 single-sex primary schools across the West Bank, and stratified by region (north, 
center, and south) and school authority (public or UNRWA schools).
29
 
The data set combines administrative and survey data. First, it contains individual grades in 
each subject for three subsequent school years, specifically 2010/11, 2011/12, and 2012/13. 
This information was obtained from the Ministry of Education’s administrative records. We 
use this information to create our main educational outcome of primary schools: the student 
GPA, which is computed as the average of the most recent grades (i.e., school year 2012/2013) 
obtained in the six main subjects: Arabic, English, Science, Mathematics, Social Science and 
National Education, and Religious Education. This set of subjects covers more than 80 percent 
of the weekly lessons (UNESCO, 2011). Students are graded on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. 
Second, our data set provides information at the individual and household level collected 
through paper-and-pencil student and family questionnaires. Of particular importance for our 
study is the parent-reported information on whether households themselves were exposed to 
violent events during the Second Intifada. This information is used to create the main explana-
tory variable in our analysis. Each household respondent was asked the following question: 
―During the Second Intifada, has your household experienced any of the following events?‖ 
The list of possible answers comprised seven items and reflected two aspects of the exposure 
to conflict: violence and economic consequences. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on 
the following violent events: ―House was searched‖; ―House was occupied while you were in 
it‖; ―House was occupied and you were forced out‖; and ―House was sealed or destroyed.‖ 
Whereas one-fourth of households reported that the house was searched, between 5 percent 
and 8 percent reported any of the other events. Furthermore, households were asked about the 
year and month of the event. Among the households that reported exposure to conflict, 40 per-
cent did not provide an answer regarding the date. The answers of those that gave a date are 
summarized in Figure (3.B.1) in the Appendix. A small number of households reported events 
that happened during the First Intifada, and others reported events that happened after the end 
of the Second Intifada. These events were excluded from the analysis. An inspection of the 
reported dates further indicates that the events often took place in the same month and year, 
suggesting that the answers to our exposure questions refer to the same episode. Apparently, 
                                                 
29
 UNRWA schools are run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA). It provides children of Palestinian refugees with basic education until grade 9. All types 
of school are required to follow the same national curriculum. 
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there is no single ―correct‖ way to use self-reported information on exposure to conflict in our 
setting. For ease of interpretation, we use the raw count of events reported during the Second 
Intifada (a score ranging from zero to four). In a robustness analysis, we consider alternative 
definitions of exposure to conflict and demonstrate that our results are not sensitive to these 
changes.  
Third, our data contain information on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills, which 
we use to study the mechanisms by which household exposure to conflict affects educational 
attainment. Cognitive ability is measured through three major cognitive tests (verbal, numeri-
cal, and figural), each consisting of subtests covering a wide range of item contents (e.g., anal-
ogies, series, sentence completion, and vocabulary). The subtests were selected and adapted 
from established tests of general ability: the Cognitive Ability Test (Thorndike & Hagen, 
1971), Milta – a Hebrew version of the Lorge–Thorndike Test (Ortar & Shachor, 1980), Stan-
dard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1983), and the Culture Fair Intelligence Test (Cattell & 
Cattell, 1965). 
Our indicators of non-cognitive skills are often-used measures of mental health and perso-
nality traits. We assess student mental health using the Strengths and Difficulties Question-
naire (SDQ), a 25-item behavioral screening questionnaire designed to measure mental health 
problems in children and adolescents between 3 and 16 years old (Goodman, 1997; Goodman, 
Ford, Simmons, Gatward & Meltzer, 2000).
30
 SDQ items are used to construct three indicators 
of children’s mental health: the total difficulties scale and the corresponding sub-scales for ―in-
ternalizing‖ symptoms (emotional symptoms and peer problems) and ―externalizing‖ behavior 
problems (conduct problems and hyperactivity/inattention). ―Internalizing‖ symptoms are 
linked to anxiety and depression, whereas ―externalizing‖ behavior problems are related to de-
viant and aggressive behaviors. The items for these two subscales are listed in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix. To facilitate the interpretation, we standardize the scores for internalizing and ex-
ternalizing problems to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
Student personality is measured in terms of the Big Five model, a widely accepted ap-
proach to conceptualizing personality (Barenbaum & Winter, 2008; Goldberg, 1993), which is 
increasingly also used in labor market research to assess ―soft‖ skills (Heckman & Kautz, 
                                                 
30
 The SDQ exists in three versions, to be answered by children, teachers, and parents, respectively, and has 
been validated in many languages, including Arabic (see www.sdqinfo.org). In this paper, we use the parent-
reported version included in the parental background questionnaire. 
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2012). According to this model, personality traits can be organized in five basic dimensions: 
openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. We use a parent-
reported 15-item version of the Big Five questionnaire (see Table 3.A.2 in the Appendix). The 
scores on each dimension are z-standardized. 
With regard to the local context, we use locality-level information on labor market and insti-
tutional characteristics, such as the type of locality (rural, urban, or refugee camp), unemploy-
ment and poverty rates, whether the locality is affected by the separation wall, and the propor-
tion of the locality under area C.
31
 Localities are the smallest administrative units defined by 
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) based on their economic inter-linkages. 
There are 528 localities overall in the West Bank. Data on such a specific geographic level are 
available only occasionally. For instance, locality-level unemployment rates are available only 
for 2007 and are drawn from the PCBS. The information on unemployment for localities in 
East Jerusalem comes from the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ, 2014) and the Je-
rusalem Institute for Israel Studies. The poverty rates (available for 2009 only), the proportion 
of the locality under area C, and information on whether a locality is affected by the separation 
wall are obtained from the World Bank (Vishwanath et al., 2014). These contextual variables 
are then merged with the individual-level data using information on the residence of the 
household living in a locality. 
Our most important contextual variable is the number of Palestinian fatalities at each 
child’s school locality from September 2000 to February 2005, which is drawn from 
B’Tselem. These data measure the local area conflict intensity during the Second Intifada. 
While the measures of conflict intensity used in the literature differ considerably,
32
 the number 
of conflict-related Palestinian victims can be regarded as the best proxy for Palestinian expo-
sure to conflict in the West Bank during the Second Intifada (Amodio & Di Maio, 2016). 
                                                 
31
 Since 1995, the West Bank has been divided into three areas: A, B, and C. Figure (3.1) shows a map of the 
West Bank and the geographical division of Palestinian territories into those areas. The Palestinian National Au-
thority (PNA) has control over both administration (e.g., health, education, sanitation, water, and taxation) and se-
curity in area A, whereas control by the PNA is limited to administration in area B and is absent in area C 
(Vishwanath et al., 2014). Communities in area C are at higher risk of adverse life circumstances due to the lack 
of primary services (UNSCO, 2014). 
32
 For example, Di Maio and Nandi (2013) use the number of closure days, Calì and Miaari (2013) employ the 
number of IDF check points in the West Bank, and Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) utilize the number of Israeli vic-
tims of Palestinian attacks in Israel. 
58  
Our analytical sample is constructed as follows: only observations with missing data for 
students’ achievement in primary school and households’ experience of political violence are 
excluded from the analysis. To minimize the loss of observations, missing values in any other 
variable are substituted by mean values. Additionally, an indicator for such missing values is 
created.
33
 After these restrictions, we obtain a working sample that contains 4,235 children in 
grades 5 to 9 enrolled in 98 primary schools located across 74 distinct localities throughout the 
West Bank.
34
 
Table (3.1) reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. It 
consists of three panels, panel A for the sample at the individual level and panels B and C for 
the corresponding samples at the school level and locality level, respectively. The children in 
our sample are on average 12.8 years old, and 70 percent are girls. Their GPA is on average 
67.8 points and has a standard deviation of 17.6 points. On average, parents report having 
been exposed to 0.45 conflict-related incidents during the Second Intifada.
35
 Of the children 
in our sample, 41 percent have refugee status, meaning that they are descendants of families 
who were displaced after the 1948 Palestine War. A total of 25 percent of fathers and 19 per-
cent of mothers have a college degree, and 37 percent of fathers and 39 percent of mothers 
have a high school diploma. As regards children’s mental health and personality, we show the 
summary statistics before standardization. Children score, on average, 12.6 in terms of total 
difficulties, 6.1 in terms of ―internalizing‖ symptoms, and 6.5 in terms of ―externalizing‖ 
problems. These averages are fairly high compared with the corresponding figures from 
Western countries. For example, in the US, children of the same age score on average 7.1 in 
terms of total difficulties, 4.0 in terms of ―externalizing‖ problems, and 3.0 in terms of ―inter-
nalizing‖ symptoms (see www.sdqinfo.org). 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 While the inclusion of these observations does not substantially affect the point estimates, it does improve 
the precision of our estimates. 
34
 Data from two schools that did not collect household questionnaires (containing information on house-
holds’ exposure to conflict) had to be dropped from our sample. 
35
 Approximately 40 percent of the households reported at least one violent event, and, among those that reported 
at least one event, 95 percent reported that their house was searched. This is by far the most common violent 
event experienced by the students’ households during the Second Intifada. 
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Table 3. 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable                                                 Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
 
Panel A: Individual level. Observations: 4,235 
 
School achievement (2012/2013) 
 
67.8 
 
17.6 
 
7.2 
 
99.5 
Family exposure to conflict 0.45 0.85 0 4 
Child’s age in years 12.8 1.5 10 18 
Girl 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Refugee status 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Mother’s age 39.5 6.0 24 65 
Father’s age 44.7 6.6 27 91 
High school diploma (mother) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
College degree (mother) 0.19 0.40 0 1 
High school diploma (father) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
College degree (father) 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 
Cognitive test score 
 
0.62 
 
0.17 
 
0 
 
0.94 
Numerical test score 0.62 0.21 0 1 
Figural test score 0.58 0.19 0 0.97 
Verbal test score 0.64 0.16 0 0.95 
 
SDQ total score 
 
12.6 
 
5.7 
 
0 
 
34 
Internalizing problems 6.1 3.1 0 17 
Externalizing problems 6.5 3.6 0 19 
 
Conscientiousness 
 
3.9 
 
0.9 
 
1 
 
5 
Extraversion 3.3 0.7 1 5 
Openness 4.0 0.8 1 5 
Neuroticism 3.2 0.9 1 5 
Agreeableness 3.8 0.8 1 5 
 
Panel B: School level. Observations: 98 
 
UNRWA school 
 
0.41 
 
0.49 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Panel C: Locality level. Observations: 74 
 
Fatalities 
 
12.0 
 
34.5 
 
0 
 
229 Separation wall 0.43 0.50  1 
Locality under area C 0.32 0.33 0 1 
Poverty rate 2007 0.22 0.12 0.02 0.50 
Unemployment rate 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.40 
Locality: rural 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Locality: refugee camp 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Notes: All the samples contain children for whom information on their school achievement and 
their exposure to conflict during the Second Intifada is not missing. To minimize the loss of ob-
servations, missing entries in any other covariate are replaced using mean values. Accordingly, 
an indicator for such missing values is created. * The mental health and personality variables 
are not standardized. 
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3.3 Empirical Specification and Identification Strategy 
The first part of our analysis aims to estimate the effects of parents’ exposure to conflict on 
their children’s educational attainment. To this end, we estimate the following linear model for 
student school achievement: 
Yisl  = α + β Exposureisl + γXisl + ξUsl + λZl + εisl                                                    (3.1) 
where the index isl denotes child i enrolled in primary school s and residing in locality l in the 
year of the interview. The outcome variable Yisl  represents the GPA of child i for the school 
year 2012/2013. 
Our variable of interest is Exposureisl, defined as the number of violent events during the 
Second Intifada reported by the household respondent (child’s mother or father) and detailed in 
the previous section. Thus, β captures the impact on the student GPA in the interview year of 
an additional event of parents’ exposure to political violence at least seven years earlier. Xisl is a 
vector of individual covariates, including child sex, refugee status, dummies for children’s and 
parents’ age, and indicators for the maximum of fathers’ and mothers’ educational level as well 
as indicators for missing values of these covariates. Usl  is a school type indicator (UNRWA vs. 
public school). Zl  is the set of locality-level labor market and institutional characteristics, such 
as the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the 
presence of the separation wall, and the type of locality (rural, urban, or refugee camp). Finally, 
εisl represents an idiosyncratic error term. 
 The need for an identification strategy arises from the potential correlation of household 
experience of violence during the Second Intifada with various unobservable determinants of 
student achievement. Such correlation, related in particular to family background characteris-
tics but also the education infrastructure, may confound our relationship of interest. One ob-
vious concern might be, for example, that richer and better-educated families – who have 
children of better academic ability – may reside in certain areas that are less prone to Palestini-
an violence, which may have provoked counter-violence by the IDF. While we are able to con-
trol for observed background characteristics to address this concern, there may still be unob-
served confounders. 
We therefore apply an IV strategy to identify the long-term effect of household exposure to 
conflict on children’s primary school achievement, using the number of Palestinian fatalities at 
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the locality level as an instrument for family exposure to conflict. However, since the present 
analysis focuses on the long-term academic outcomes of children, seven years after the conclu-
sion of the conflict, we can exploit only the cross-locality variation in the total number of Pal-
estinian victims (and not the variation over time within the locality during the Second Intifada) 
to identify the effect of family exposure to conflict. Thus, one potential threat to the validity of 
our instrument is the omitted variable bias resulting from the presence of time-invariant unob-
servable factors at the locality level correlated with both conflict intensity and child primary 
education performance. We argue that this problem is substantially mitigated by controlling 
for locality-level contextual variables. 
Model (3.1) is estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS), with the following first-
stage regression: 
Exposureisl = η + δ Fatalitiesl + θXisl + ζUsl + ζZl  + νisl                                            (3.2) 
where Exposureisl  is regressed on Fatalities l, defined as the locality-level number of all con-
flict-related Palestinian victims during the Second Intifada. Xisl, Zl, and Usl are defined in the 
same way as in Equation (3.1). The standard errors are clustered by locality, the level of varia-
tion of our instrument. 
To illustrate the variation of our instrument, Figure (3.1) provides a map of the West Bank. 
Each circle represents a locality contained in our sample. The size of the circle indicates the 
locality-level number of Palestinian fatalities during the Second Intifada. Overall, Figure (3.1) 
shows a substantial degree of variation in the number of Palestinian fatalities, with the highest 
levels of conflict intensity being concentrated in some very violent localities, such as Nablus, 
Jenin, Tulkarm, Hebron, and Ramallah. Figure (3.2) shows the relationship between the total 
number of fatalities during the Second Intifada at the governorate level (there are 11 governo-
rates in the West Bank) and the average level of exposure to conflict as reported by parents. 
This graph reflects the (first-stage) variation that we exploit in our analysis. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Main Results 
Table (3.2) reports the estimates of the effects of an increase in household exposure to conflict 
during the Second Intifada on children’s primary school achievement obtained from an OLS 
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regression (column 1) and a 2SLS regression (column 4). In addition, we show the correspond-
ing results from the reduced-form (column 2) and first-stage (column 3) regressions. As de-
scribed in the previous section, in each regression, we include individual-level, school-level, 
and locality-level control variables. 
The OLS coefficient suggests a negative and significant association between households’ 
exposure to conflict and their children’s school performance: an additional event of parents’ 
experience of conflict is associated with a 1.32-point decrease in students’ GPA in primary 
school, which corresponds to approximately 8 percent of a standard deviation. The reduced-
form regression suggests that the GPA drops by approximately 2 points per 100 fatalities in the 
locality. 
The first-stage regression shows that 100 more fatalities in the locality increase parents’ 
exposure to conflict by 0.35 events on average. With a first-stage F-statistic of 46, our instru-
ment easily passes the conventional thresholds for strong instruments. The 2SLS coefficient 
for parents’ exposure to conflict remains negative and statistically significant and is larger than 
our OLS estimate. We find that 1 additional event of parents’ exposure to conflict induced by 
the Second Intifada reduces the primary school GPA of their children by 5.74 points. This ef-
fect represents a decline of about 30 percent of a standard deviation.  
 
63  
 
Source: Own calculations based B’Tselem data. 
Figure 3.1: Map of the West Bank, school locations, and the number of Palestinian fatalities 
during the Second Intifada 
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Source: Own calculations based on survey data and B’Tselem data. 
Figure 3.2: Correlation between the average exposure (number of reported events) and the total 
number of Second Intifada fatalities by governorate 
 
As previously mentioned, we also estimate a range of regressions with alternative opera-
tional definitions of the exposure variable, obtaining very similar results. The details can be 
found in Table 3.B.1 in the Appendix. Importantly, as shown in Columns E and F, our instru-
ment does not predict exposure to conflict before or after the Second Intifada. We interpret this 
as evidence that the instrument does not pick up any trends in location-specific levels of vi-
olence. 
3.4.2 Robustness Checks 
We assess the robustness of our main results to a number of further specification changes. The 
results are reported in Table (3.3). First, in Column (1), we check the sensitivity of our results 
to a change in the functional form of the first-stage and reduced-form regressions. The major 
concern here is that the exposure to conflict and GPA may not follow linear functions of the 
number of fatalities. To allow for this possibility, we recode our instrument into 4 categories 
(as shown in Figure (3.1)): 0 fatalities, 1–10 fatalities, 11–50 fatalities, and >51 fatalities. Our 
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point estimate changes somewhat, we lose precision, and the first-stage F-statistic decreases, 
but the qualitative result remains. 
 
Table 3. 2:Effects of family exposure to conflict on children’s primary school GPA, main spe-
cification 
 
 (1) 
OLS 
 (2) 
Reduced form 
 (3) 
First stage 
 (4) 
2SLS 
Dep. var.: Child GPA  Child GPA  Family exposure 
to conflict 
 Child GPA 
 
Family exposure to conflict 
 
Fatalities (in hundreds) 
 
-1.32*** 
(0.26) 
— 
  
— 
 
-2.04*** 
  
— 
 
0.35*** 
  
-5.74*** 
(1.60) 
— 
   (0.59)  (0.05)   
 
First-stage F statistic 
    
 
46.12 
 
 
46.12 
 
Mean of dep. var. 
 
67.83 
 
 
67.83 
 
 
0.45 
 
 
67.83 
SD of dep. var. 17.63  17.63  0.85  17.63 
 
Individual-level controls 
School-level controls 
Locality-level controls 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
N obs. 
 
4,235 
 
 
4,235 
 
 
4,235 
 
 
4,235 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The individual-level 
controls include the sex of the child, the sex of the household respondent, dummies for children’s and parents’ 
age, dummies for parental educational levels, and indicators for missing values of these covariates. The school-
level control variable is an indicator for UNRWA versus public school. The locality-level variables contain the 
unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the presence of the separation 
wall, and the type of locality (rural, urban, or camp). * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** signifi-
cant at 1%. 
 
 
Second, to investigate heterogeneous effects across the distribution of the GPA, in columns 
(2) to (4), we report the treatment effects at the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy-fifth percen-
tiles. Our results suggest that the effect of family exposure to conflict induced by the Second 
Intifada is concentrated in the lower quantiles of the GPA distribution. In other words, the long-
term effects of family exposure to conflict induced by the Second Intifada seem to be driven by 
poor academically performing students. 
Third, another concern regards the sensitivity of our findings with respect to the year in 
which school achievement in primary school is measured. As previously mentioned, our data 
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set provides information on student GPA not only for the school year 2012/2013 but also for 
the two preceding school years, namely 2010/2011 and 2011/2012. Hence, we run two addi-
tional 2SLS regressions of model (1) using the student GPA for the school years 2010/2011 
(column 5) and 2011/2012 (column 6) as alternative outcomes. The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged relative to the main specification: the coefficient for family exposure to conflict has 
negative and significant effects on children’s GPA in primary school. Note, however, that the 
point estimates are actually smaller in the two earlier years than in 2012/13. This suggests that 
the effects on student GPA do not tend to subside over time. We interpret this as corroborating 
evidence for the plausibility and usefulness of our long-term analysis. 
Fourth, in column (7), we verify the robustness of our results when using a broader meas-
ure of conflict intensity that includes the locality-level number of all Palestinian and Israeli 
victims during the Second Intifada. The reason for this check is that both sides of the conflict 
may react in a regular and predictable way to violence against them. This would imply that an 
increase in the number of conflict-related Israelis fatalities may lead to more violent actions 
against the civilian population in the West Bank. Again, the estimated parameter closely re-
sembles the one obtained in the benchmark specification. 
Next, we check what happens when we include governorate fixed effects (column 8) in 
model (3.1). The identification then rests on within-governorate variation in the intensity of 
conflict. Differences in exposure to violence or children’s educational attainment that are 
linked to the larger region are hence controlled for – addressing potential concerns about the 
validity of our instrument. Again, we find that the point estimate hardly changes. The standard 
errors increase a little, but the first-stage F-statistic remains safely above 20. In a related ro-
bustness check, we exclude single governorates one at a time to examine whether the results 
are driven by a specific governorate. This exercise, for which we do not report detailed results, 
confirms that our main results are robust. 
As the final check, in columns (9) and (10), we split the sample into two parts based on the 
date of birth of the children in our sample. Specifically, in column (9), we restrict the sample 
to all children born before February 2000. These children attended school for at least one year 
during the Second Intifada. One might argue that part of the effect that we measure is not due 
to parental exposure to conflict but rather to disruptions to teaching, such as the closing of 
schools, the detainment of teachers, road closures keeping children from reaching schools, and 
so on (Brück et al., 2014). In column (10), we focus on children born in February 1999 or lat-
er, who entered school in September 2005 (after the end of the Second Intifada) and whose 
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schooling has not been directly affected by the conflict. Taken together, the results in columns 
(9) and (10) do not provide any evidence for differential effects of household exposure to con-
flict by date of birth. 
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Table 3. 3: Robustness checks, 2SLS estimates 
    (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)                 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Categorical  Distribution Earlier years All Province In school  
instrument  Top 75% Top 50% Top 
25% 
GPA 
10/11 
GPA 
11/12 
fatalities fixed ef-
fects 
During 
Second I. 
After 
Second I. 
                        
Family exposure to con-
flict 
-4.07*  -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.02 -4.45*** -3.68*** -5.74*** -4.64 -5.17* -5.86*** 
 (2.20)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (1.31) (1.31) (1.65) (2.87) (3.01) (1.95) 
            
First-stage F statistic 10.3  46.1 46.1 46.1 45.8 46.1 61.3 31.6 33.6 45.1 
Mean of dep. var. 67.8  0.75 0.5 0.25 72.7 70.5 67.9 67.8 65.8 69.2 
SD of dep. var. 17.6  0.43 0.5 0.43 16 15.9 17.6 17.6 17.8 17.4 
            
Individual-level controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School-level controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Locality-level controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            N obs.                                       4,235   4,235 4,235 4,235 4,206 4,231 4,235 4,235 1,737 2,498 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The individual-level controls include a female dummy for children and parents, dummies 
for children’s and parents’ age, dummies for parental educational levels, and indicators for missing values for these covariates. The locality-level variables contain the unemploy-
ment rate, the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the presence of the separation wall, and indicators for UNRWA school and type of locality (rural, urban, or 
camp). * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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3.5 Potential Mechanisms 
We now turn to the second part of our analysis: the identification of the potential mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between family exposure to conflict and primary school achieve-
ment of children. We hypothesize that exposure to conflict and violence in the early stages of a 
child’s development may have long-term detrimental consequences for their skills, both cogni-
tive and non-cognitive, which in turn translate into worse school outcomes. Our hypothesis is 
related to a recent strand of the literature suggesting that non-cognitive skills have independent 
predictive power for a wide range of socio-economic outcomes. For instance, Heckman, Sti-
xrud, and Urzua (2006) show that non-cognitive skills – which include personality traits – are 
important determinants of academic and economic success and that their long-run effects seem 
to be comparable to those of cognitive skills. Currie and Stabile (2009) argued that non-
cognitive skills are conceptually linked with mental health. They showed that mental health 
problems in early childhood, in particular those associated with ―externalizing‖ and ―interna-
lizing‖ behavior problems, have negative and persistent effects on future educational out-
comes. 
With our data, we are not able to identify completely the causal path from exposure to con-
flict to educational attainment via impaired cognitive and non-cognitive skills. However, we 
are able to study whether – using the same identification strategy as before – exposure to con-
flict has a causal impact on these mediating variables. Finding no effect would rule out certain 
candidate channels. 
Before we report the results of the 2SLS regressions with the mediators as dependent va-
riables, we show that they have an ―effect‖ on educational attainment at least in the descriptive 
sense. As regards cognitive ability, we consider the sub-scores for numerical, verbal, and fi-
gural tests as well as the total score obtained in the three tests; regarding non-cognitive skills, 
we use the score for total strengths and difficulties (SDQ), the corresponding sub-scores for 
―internalizing‖ and ―externalizing‖ behavioral problems, and the Big Five personality traits 
(i.e., openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism). 
Table (3.4) shows the results of the OLS regressions of the GPA on z-standardized meas-
ures of cognitive ability and the scores for internalizing and externalizing problems, as well as 
the Big 5 personality dimensions. Column (1) shows the results of twelve separate regressions, 
in which each mediating variable is included one at a time. As expected, cognitive ability is 
strongly related to the GPA. Moreover, all the measures of non-cognitive skills are significant 
predictors of the GPA as well. Since the coefficients show the estimated association in terms 
70  
of standard deviation changes, a comparison of the size of the coefficients illustrates the quan-
titative relevance of non-cognitive skills. For instance, as predictors, externalizing problems 
and conscientiousness are about half as strong as cognitive skills. 
 
Column (2) shows the results when the cognitive ability sub-scores and the SDQ sub-
scores are included jointly. We find that the influence of internalizing problems disappears al-
most completely. The coefficient for externalizing problems becomes smaller but remains 
strong. In column (3), we report the results when the Big Five and cognitive ability are in-
cluded jointly, and we find that conscientiousness remains the only personality trait with a si-
zeable association with the GPA. Overall, cognitive and non-cognitive skills have independent 
―effects‖ on children’s educational achievement. The most important non-cognitive skills are 
conscientiousness and (the absence of) externalizing, that is, behavioral, problems. 
To establish whether these variables lie on the causal path from exposure to conflict to 
GPA, we now estimate the same specification as in model (1) with children’s cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills as outcomes. We report the results of this analysis in Table (3.5). When 
examining cognitive ability (panel A), we do not find any significant effects, with the magni-
tude being close to zero for numeracy and positive coefficients being obtained for the figural 
and verbal tests. In contrast, the results for non-cognitive skills (panel B) reveal that family 
experience of conflict increases children’s SDQ total score by 0.2 standard deviations. This 
coefficient masks the heterogeneous effects between ―internalizing‖ problems (column 2), for 
which our coefficient of interest remains positive but the magnitude is substantially reduced, 
and ―externalizing‖ behavior problems (column 3), for which we find a significant 0.25 stan-
dard deviation effect of family exposure to conflict. This evidence is in line with the results of 
Currie and Stabile (2006, 2009), who find that ―externalizing‖ behavior problems is more 
likely to lead to negative outcomes than ―internalizing‖ problems. We therefore believe that 
increased ―externalizing‖ behavior problems may be one important channel through which 
exposure to conflict for at least seven years in the past affects children’s GPA today. 
We now move to the examination of the Big Five personality traits (see columns 4 to 8 of 
panel B). Our main result is that parents’ exposure to conflict during the Second Intifada re-
duces children’s level of conscientiousness by 0.23 standard deviations. In light of the evi-
dence reported in Table (3.4), this finding suggests another important channel, possibly re-
lated to the ―externalizing‖ problems channel. Extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism 
also seem to be affected by family exposure to conflict. However, as demonstrated in Table 
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(3.4), these personality traits show no significant correlation with the GPA when controlling 
for cognitive skills and the other personality dimensions. The remaining personality trait, 
openness, is instead not affected by the exposure to conflict. 
 
Table 3. 4: Effects of child cognitive and non-cognitive skills on the GPA, OLS esti-
mates 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dep. var.:  Child GPA Child GPA  Child GPA 
  Separate regressions Joint regression Joint regression 
Cognitive ability 7.73*** — — 
 (0.52)   
Numeracy 6.01*** 1.79*** 1.71*** 
 
(0.43) (0.48) (0.45) 
Figural 6.23***  1.51***  1.62***  
 (0.42) (0.35) (0.35) 
Verbal  7.46*** 4.52***  4.56***  
 (0.47)   
SDQ total -3.75***  — — 
 
(0.24) 
  Internalizing -2.28*** -0.26 — 
 (0.26) (0.23)  
Externalizing -3.94***  -2.68***  — 
 (0.23) (0.26)  
Openness 2.48*** — 0.70*** 
 (0.25)  (0.21) 
Conscientiousness 3.22***  — 2.11*** 
 (0.24)  (0.25) 
Extraversion -0.56** — -0.17 
 (0.24)  (0.21) 
Agreeableness 1.19*** — -0.17 
 (0.21)  (0.19) 
Neuroticism -0.90*** — -0.05 
 (0.23)  (0.22) 
    Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Locality-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
N obs. (minimum) 4,059 4,051 4,114 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The individual-
level controls include a female dummy for children and parents, dummies for children’s and parents’ age, 
dummies for parental educational levels, and indicators for missing values for these covariates. The locality-
level variables contain the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, 
the presence of the separation wall, and indicators for UNRWA school and type of locality (rural, urban, or 
camp). * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3. 5: Effects of family exposure to conflict on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills, 2SLS estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Cognitive skills 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. var.: Total Numeracy Figures Verbal     
Family exposure to conflict 0.04 -0.04 0.12 0.00     
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.16)     
 
First-stage F-statistic 
 
46.1 
 
46.1 
 
46.1 
 
46.1 
    
Mean of dep. var. 0 0 0 0     
SD of dep. var. 1 1 1 1     
N obs. 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235     
 
Panel B: Non-cognitive skills 
Dep. var.: SDQ Internalizing Externalizing Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
 
Family exposure to conflict 
 
0.20** 
 
0.06 
 
0.25*** 
 
0.01 
 
-0.23* 
 
0.19** 
 
-0.20** 
 
0.17** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
First-stage F-statistic 
 
64.3 
 
57.7 
 
63.1 
 
50.5 
 
48.8 
 
46.7 
 
51.3 
 
50.6 
Mean of dep. var. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD of dep. var. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N obs. 4,089 4,118 4,097 4,172 4,186 4,204 4,188 4,183 
 
Individual-level controls 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Locality-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The individual-level controls include a female dummy for children and parents, dummies for 
children’s and parents’ age, dummies for parental educational levels, and indicators for missing values for these covariates. The locality-level variables contain the unemployment 
rate, the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the presence of the separation wall, and indicators for UNRWA school and type of locality (rural, urban, or camp). * 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we answer two related questions: does a family’s exposure to violent political 
conflict affect the educational attainment of its children not only in the short but also in the 
long run? If so, can we identify important channels that could be addressed to mitigate the ad-
verse effects of political conflicts on educational outcomes? 
 While several studies from a variety of different countries have shown short-term conse-
quences of exposure to conflict on children’s educational achievement, less is known about a 
causal relationship in the long run. We provide new evidence that household exposure to con-
flict during the Second Intifada has long-term impacts on the human capital of students in the 
West Bank. Specifically, we examine the effect of house searches or occupation by the Israeli 
Army between 2000 and 2005 on students’ grade point averages in primary school (grades 5 to 
9) in 2013. 
 Our identification strategy exploits the variation in the locality-level number of Palestinian 
fatalities during the Second Intifada as an arguably exogenous determinant of a family’s expo-
sure to conflict-related events. According to our estimates, one additional event reduces its 
children’s GPA by approximately 30 percent of a standard deviation of the grade point average 
distribution. This result is quantitatively robust to a number of specification changes, such as 
different definitions of the exposure variable, using a categorical instead of a continuous in-
strument, including Israeli fatalities as well in our instrument, or using GPAs in different 
school years. We also show that the effect of exposure to conflict is concentrated at the bottom 
and in the middle of the GPA distribution. In contrast, only small insignificant effects can be 
shown for the likelihood of being in the top quartile of the distribution. 
 With regard to causal channels, we estimate the effect of exposure to violence on detailed 
measures of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. We find no effect of exposure on performance 
in a long and thorough cognitive skills (IQ) test. In contrast, important non-cognitive correlates 
of educational achievement, such as externalizing behavior problems and conscientiousness, 
appear to be affected. This finding provides an interesting mirror image of the findings on the 
effect of early education programs. For instance, with regard to the Perry Preschool Program, 
Heckman et al. (2013) concluded: ―Although Perry did not produce long-run gains in IQ, it did 
create persistent improvements in personality skills. The Perry program substantially improved 
externalizing behaviors (aggressive, antisocial, and rule-breaking behaviors)‖ (p. 2053). It al-
most appears as if exposure to conflict acted in the same way – with a negative sign: although 
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exposure is not detrimental to IQ, it leads to worse personality skills, which in turn affect edu-
cational attainment and other future outcomes. 
 Several limitations of our study are worth mentioning. Although we have no theoretical 
prior regarding the direction in which OLS would be biased compared with the true causal ef-
fect of exposure, the size of our 2SLS coefficients may raise concerns about the validity of our 
results. Large 2SLS compared with OLS estimates are quite common in applied research, and 
three explanations can be put forward. The first is measurement error in the explanatory varia-
ble, which (if classical) attenuates the OLS coefficients. Clearly, if some households that have 
experienced violence do not report this in our survey, whereas others over-report events, and if 
misreporting is uncorrelated with the error term, the OLS estimates would be biased towards 
zero. However, it seems to be at least equally plausible to assume that misreporting is in some 
way related to unobserved determinants of student achievement. The second explanation is 
that the IV approach identifies (a weighted average of) complier-specific causal effects, which 
can potentially be larger than the OLS estimates. It is plausible that, at least among always-
takers (households that are prone to conflict events regardless of the level of conflict in the lo-
cality), the effect is smaller than among compliers (households that are only affected if the lev-
el of conflict in the locality is high). Whether this also holds for never-takers is unclear. The 
third explanation – potentially damaging to the IV approach – is that the exclusion restriction 
does not hold. Of course, this cannot be ruled out entirely in our setting. To address this con-
cern partially, we report the reduced-form coefficients for all the specifications in Tables 
(3.B.2) and (3.B.3) in the Appendix. These results clearly show that the locality-level conflict 
intensity during the Second Intifada is associated with worse educational attainment more than 
seven years later and that this association is robust to a number of specification changes. Thus, 
even if the exclusion restriction does not hold, there is robust evidence that the violent political 
conflict has long-term consequences for educational attainment mediated through non-
cognitive skills. This reduced-form analysis is similar to what most of the literature has under-
taken when data on individual experience of conflict are lacking (see, for instance, Brück et 
al., 2014). 
 Finally, in terms of policy recommendations, our study suggests that children whose fami-
lies have been exposed to conflict should be identified and invited to participate in interven-
tions that are designed to improve social skills and self-control. Such interventions are likely to 
lead to better educational attainment at school and possibly better labor market outcomes. 
When this is not possible during a conflict, children should be the main focus of interventions 
in the post-conflict recovery period.                                                  
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Appendix 
A    Description of the measures of non-cognitive skills  
 
Table 3.A.1: Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) 
 
For each item, please mark the box for not true, somewhat true, or certainly true. It would help us 
if you answered all the items as best as you can even if you are not absolutely certain or the item 
seems daft! Please give your answers on the basis of the child’s behavior over the last six months. 
 
Panel A: Internalizing problems 
Emotional symptoms            ... often complains of headaches, stomachaches, or sickness 
Emotional symptoms            ... worries or often seems worried 
Emotional symptoms            ... often fights with other children or bullies them 
Emotional symptoms            ... is nervous or clingy in new situations, easily loses confidence 
Emotional symptoms            ... fears, easily scared 
 
 
Peer relationship problems   ... is rather solitary, prefers to play alone 
Peer relationship problems   ... has at least one good friend 
Peer relationship problems   ... is generally liked by other children 
Peer relationship problems   ... is picked on or bullied by other children 
Peer relationship problems   ... gets along better with adults than with other children 
 
 
Panel B: Externalizing problems 
Conduct problems*               ... often fights with other children 
Conduct problems                 ... often loses temper 
Conduct problems                 ... generally well behaved, usually does what adults request 
Conduct problems                 ... often lies or cheats 
Conduct problems                 ... steals from home, school, or elsewhere 
 
 
Hyperactivity/inattention      ... restless, overactive, cannot stay still for long  
Hyperactivity/inattention      ... constantly fidgeting or squirming                  
Hyperactivity/inattention      ... easily distracted, concentration wanders          
Hyperactivity/inattention       ... can stop and think things out before acting    
Hyperactivity/inattention      ... good attention span, sees work through to the end 
Notes: Parents were asked to state how much they agreed with each statement about their child on a 3-point scale 
(―not true,‖ ―somewhat true,‖ ―certainly true‖). Both internalizing and externalizing problems are defined on a 0 to 20 
scale. The total score for the SDQ is given by the sum of the sub-scores for internalizing and externalizing problems 
(on a 0 to 40 scale) and does not include the prosocial behavior score (Goodman, 1997). * This conduct problem was 
accidentally omitted from the instrument; that is, the scale representing conduct problems consisted only of four items 
and was scaled up to a maximum of 10. 
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Table 3.A.2: Big Five Personality Questionnaire (15-item version) 
Below are some statements that may or may not describe what your child is like. For each 
statement, please indicate how much you agree or disagree that it describes your child. I 
see my child as someone who ... 
                                                                                        (Dimension) 
 
1. Is talkative Extraversion 
2. Does things carefully and completely Conscientiousness 
3. Is original, comes up with new ideas Openness 
4. Is reserved; keeps thoughts and feelings to self Extraversion [–] 
5. Has a forgiving nature Agreeableness 
6. Worries a lot Neuroticism 
7. Has an active imagination Openness 
8. Tends to be lazy Conscientiousness [–] 
9. Likes artistic and creative experiences Openness 
10. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone Agreeableness 
11. Does things efficiently (quickly and correctly) Conscientiousness 
12. Stays calm in tense situations Neuroticism [–] 
13. Is outgoing, sociable Extraversion 
14. Gets nervous easily Neuroticism 
15. Is sometimes rude to others Agreeableness [–] 
Notes: Parents were asked to state how much they agreed with each statement on a five-point Likert scale. 
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3.B    Supplementary Tables and Figures 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.  
Figure 3.B.1: Self-reported years of exposure to conflict and number of fatalities by year 
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Table 3.B.1: Effects of family exposure to conflict on the GPA, 2SLS estimates, alternative definitions of exposure 
 
Specifications: (A) Raw number of events (all periods); (B) raw number of events (during Second Intifada – valid dates only); (C) raw number 
of events (Second Intifada + missing dates); (D) raw number of events (missing dates only);I) raw number of events (pre-Second Intifada); (F) 
raw number of events (post-Second Intifada); (G) exposure severity (all periods); (H) exposure severity (Second Intifada only); (I) binary ex-
posure: house occupied or worse; (J) exposure score based on principal component analysis; and (K) number of distinct events during the 
Second Intifada (with dates more than 6 months apart). 
Specification 
  (A) I (I(D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) 
Family exposure to con-
flict -5.95*** -10.80*** -5.74*** -12.26*** 158.69 -4575 -5.09*** -5.05*** -18.82*** -6.02*** -11.87*** 
 (1.78) (3.36) (1.60) (4.33) (113.87) (251,609
) 
(1.53) (1.44) (5.39) (1.69) (3.35) 
            
First-stage F-statistic 28.23 67.62 46.12 9.93 1.71 0 24.03 35.77 52.13 49.2 27.02 
            
Mean of dep. var. 67.83 67.83 67.83 67.83 67.83 67.83 67.83 67.83 67.83 67.83 67.83 
SD of dep. var. 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 
N obs. 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The individual-level controls include a female dummy for children and parents, 
dummies for children’s and parents’ age, dummies for parental educational levels, and indicators for missing values for these covariates. The locality-level variables con-
tain the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the presence of the separation wall, and indicators for UNRWA school and type of 
locality (rural, urban, or camp). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.B.2: Robustness checks, reduced-form estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Categorical Distribution Earlier years All Province In school 
instrument Top 75% Top 50% Top 25% GPA 10/11 GPA 11/12 fatalities 
Fixed ef-
fects 
During 
Second I. 
After 
Second I. 
           
Fatalities (in hundreds) — -0.04** -0.05*** -0.01 -1.58*** -1.30*** -1.86*** -1.43 -1.80* -2.06*** 
 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.49) (0.49) (0.54) (0.93) (1.05) (0.76) 
 
 
         
Mean of dep. var. — 0.75 0.5 0.25 72.7 70.5 67.9 67.8 65.8 69.2 
SD of dep. var. — 0.4 0.5 0.4 16 15.9 17.6 17.6 17.8 17.4 
 
 
         
Individual-level con-
trols 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School-level controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Locality-level controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
         
N obs. — 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,206 4,231 4,235 4,235 1,737 2,498 
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The individual-level controls include a female dummy for children and parents, dummies for 
children’s and parents’ age, dummies for parental educational levels, and indicators for missing values in these covariates. The locality-level variables contain the unemployment rate, 
the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the presence of the separation wall, and indicators for UNRWA school and type of locality (rural, urban, or camp). * 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
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Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The individual-level controls include a female dummy for children and parents, dum-
mies for children’s and parents’ age, dummies for parental educational levels, and indicators for missing values of these covariates. The locality-level variables contain the un-
employment rate, the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the presence of the separation wall, and indicators for UNRWA school and type of locality (rural, 
urban, or camp). * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
 Table 3.B.3: Effects of family exposure to conflict on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills, reduced-form estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Cognitive skills 
Dep. var.: Total Numeracy Figures Verbal         
Fatalities (in hundreds) 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0     
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)     
         
Mean of dep. var. 0 0 0 0 
SD of dep. var. 1 1 1 1     
N obs. 4,235 4,235 4,235 4,235     
 
Panel B: Non-cognitive skills 
Dep. var.: SDQ Internalizing Externalizing Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
         
Fatalities (in hundreds) 0.42** 0.06 0.33*** 0 -0.07** 0.05** -0.06** 0.05** 
 (0.17) (0.09) (0.11) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
         
Mean of dep. var. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD of dep. var. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N obs. 4,089 4,118 4,097 4,172 4,186 4,204 4,188 4,183 
         
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Locality-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Class Size, Cognitive Abilities, Bullying, and Violent Beha-
vior. Evidence from West Bank Schools 
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4.1 Introduction   
Educationalists, economists, and policy makers recognize the importance of schooling in shaping 
human capital. Economists emphasize several inputs in the educational production function as in-
dicators of school quality, such as teacher qualifications and school resources. Obviously, class 
size is one of these indicators. The impact of class size on the outcome of a child’s cognitive abili-
ty is still one of the major concerns of researchers due to the adverse results found in the econom-
ics literature. Class size can have a direct (short-run) effect on students’ achievement, well-being, 
and cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes (Dee & West, 2011; Jakobsson, Persson, & Svensson, 
2013). It might also lead to indirect (long-run) impacts on other outcomes, such as educational at-
tainment and wages (Fredriksson, Öckert, & Oosterbeek, 2013).  
 The observed class sizes may not be exogenous to students’ outcomes, since the class size may 
depend on the choices made by parents or school administrators. Economists have suggested two 
approaches to dealing with the endogeneity problem associated with class size. The first one is a 
randomized experiment, in which students are randomly assigned to classes of different size to 
create exogeneity of the class size variation (Krueger, 1999). The second approach is to implement 
quasi-experimental identification strategies that require the exploitation of exogenous variations in 
class size. These exogenous variations could come from the enrollment cohort (Angrist & Lavy, 
1999) or population variations in previous years (Hoxby, 2000). Numerous studies have adopted 
the second approach, and their findings differ significantly regarding the estimates of class size 
effects, varying from no effects to significant and substantial ones. Policy makers who recommend 
class size reduction have emphasized that small classes, in general, are associated with increased 
student achievement, since the teacher can give more individualized attention in smaller classes. 
On the other hand, its opponents see class size reduction as an expensive policy, since teachers’ 
salaries constitute the vast majority of schools’ non-capital expenses and there is no guarantee of 
improved achievement. 
 Several empirical studies have highlighted the crucial role of schooling in the development of 
almost all cognitive abilities (Carlsson, Dahl, Öckert, & Rooth, 2015; Nisbett, 2009). Cognitive 
skills, as measured by standard intelligence tests, have a remarkable impact on the labor market 
and subsequent later-life outcomes. However, while the literature has investigated the causal rela-
tionship between class size and students’ achievements in general, policy makers are also interest-
ed in whether or not class size reduction helps to mitigate problems such as bullying and violent 
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behavior, which are growing in schools (Eriksen, Nielsen, & Simonsen, 2012; PCBS, 2013). Bully-
ing and violent behavior among peers are an observed phenomenon in all cultures, and they are 
common in adolescent school students. These problems have costly consequences. The adverse 
circumstances in which education takes place in West Bank schools do not contribute to solving 
this problem.
36
 Bullying among peers leads to psychological suffering, low self-esteem, and isola-
tion, which are detrimental to learning and academic performance (Moura, Cruz, & Quevedo, 
2011). Moreover, recent studies have indicated an association between bullying and suicidality 
among adolescents (Abdeen et al., 2018; Sarzosa & Urzúa, 2015). The effects of class size are 
stronger for ill-behaved children than for well-behaved children (Lazear, 2001), and a common 
view holds that bullying problems are a consequence of large classes and schools (Smith, 1999). 
 However, previous studies measuring both the impact of schooling on cognitive abilities and 
the classroom behavioral problems have been conducted primarily in stable settings in Western 
countries. Other contexts of schooling may have different outcomes, such as schools in the West 
Bank. Public and UNRWA schools in the West Bank represent distinct schooling contexts. For 
instance, UNRWA schools are designed to accommodate children from refugee camps until grade 
9. In general, the class size in these schools (as well as other governmental schools) is large com-
pared with that in Western countries. The UNRWA believes that the costs of reducing the class 
size exceed the benefits, while other educational policies, such as improving teacher training and 
the quality of education, would be a better investment (UNRWA, 2014). Therefore, UNRWA 
schools have raised the maximum class size from 45 students per class to 50 students, while the 
maximum class size in governmental schools is still 40. 
 This study attempts to investigate the effect of class size on student standardized cognitive tests 
scores as well as bullying and violent behavior. In so doing, it adds to the sparse literature on class 
size effects from less developed countries, particularly the West Bank. I employ the survey data 
collected in 2013 from approximately 6000 students in grades 5 to 9 in West Bank schools in the 
context of a cooperative research agreement funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). 
An important advantage of this database is that it provides a large amount of student-level observa-
tions rather than class-level observations as well as other school and locality-level covariates. 
                                                 
   
36
 More than 20 percent of students enrolled in West Bank schools are exposed to peers’ and teachers’ violent beha-
vior inside schools (PCBS, 2013).   
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Moreover, some of these data are administrative, thereby giving rise to no or only slight measure-
ment error in the actual average class size, enrollment, and students’ age.   
 In this study, I use the maximum class size rule to create a regression discontinuity (RD) rela-
tion between cohort enrollment size and class size. Further, the econometric approach provides 
evidence for no discontinuities in the relationship between enrollment and students’ household 
background at cutoff points induced by a maximum class size rule, which violates the RD assump-
tions. The results reported in this chapter show that class size affects self-reported bullying–victim 
and violent behavior, while there is no evidence that class size affects students’ cognitive abilities 
in primary schools, except students in grade 6. Further, I point to peer relations and mental health 
problems, extracted from the impact supplement and follow-up questions in the Strengths and Dif-
ficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), as a potential mechanism through which class size affects child-
ren’s self-reported bullying–victim instances and violent behavior. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. Section (4.2) reviews the literature on the class size effects on 
achievement. Section (4.3) describes the relevant institutional features of the Palestinian schooling 
system, while Section (4.4) describes the data. Section (4.5) continues with the description of the 
identification strategy and the empirical approaches. The main results are reported in section (4.6); 
section (4.7) suggests the potential mechanism, while section (4.8) concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Related Literature 
Over more than a decade, a growing literature has attempted to estimate the link between class size 
and student achievements. Class size is an endogenous variable and could correlate with other un-
observed factors. For example, parents from higher socioeconomic backgrounds may put their 
children in schools with smaller classes or the school principals may put weaker students in small-
er classes. Researchers have adopted a quasi-experimental approach to isolate the effect of class 
size from other determinants of pupil outcomes to account for the endogeneity problem in the class 
size effect. Despite substantial research on class size, much about this relation is still unknown. 
Below, I present a brief review of some of these studies according to their main conclusion.  
 The first stream of studies found, in general, that smaller classes are associated with increased 
students’ achievements, usually measured by standardized tests in multiple subjects, such as ma-
thematics and reading. Akerhielm (1995) found that class size has a significant negative impact on 
student achievement. However, this study was criticized, since the identification strategy that the 
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researcher employed only addressed the potential bias due to sorting within schools and not that 
attributed to parental tastes for education. Krueger’s (1999) study analyzed the Tennessee Student 
Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) as a form of controlled experiment and concluded that, in the 
first year of elementary schools, students who attended small classes (13–17 students) outper-
formed their classmates assigned to regular classes (22–25 students) by 4 percentile points. There-
fore, the advantage of attending small classes expands by about 1 percentile point per year in sub-
sequent years. He also found that class size has a larger effect on minority students and those 
enrolled in free-lunch programs. 
 Angrist and Lavy (1999) employed Maimonides’ rule to create an exogenous variation in class 
size in Israeli public schools. According to this rule, if the size of an enrollment cohort in a school 
exceeds 40, an extra class should be created. This rule creates regression discontinuities (RDs) in 
the relation between cohort enrollment size and class size. However, the actual class size does not 
exactly match that predicted by the rule, which provides a source of exogenous variation in class 
size. Angrist and Lavy found a significant negative class size effect on pupils’ achievement in the 
fourth and fifth grades but not in the third grade, which indicates the issue of the cumulative nature 
of class size effects. Numerous more recent studies have implemented this approach similarly in 
related contexts. Gary-Bobo and Mahjoub (2013) applied the maximum size rule to French junior 
schools and obtained a small but significant and adverse effect of class size on the probabilities of 
educational success in grades 6 and 7, but this effect seems to vanish in higher grades. Bo-
nesrønning (2003) found significant effects in lower-secondary schools in Norway. In addition, the 
further examination recommended that the impact differs among student subgroups and that the 
advantages of small classes are larger in schools with a high proportion of pupils who come from 
intact families. In Denmark, Browning and Heinesen (2007) employed Maimonides’ rule to inves-
tigate the impact of class size on years of education and the completion of upper-secondary school 
as an alternative outcome. They found a marginally significant negative effect of class size. More-
over, Bingley, Jensen, and Walker (2005) used the Danish data to compare siblings who expe-
rienced different class sizes to control for different unobserved outcomes, such as a family back-
ground effect; they found that class size reduction in junior-high school significantly increases the 
students’ years of education, but the effect is too small to justify the public costs. In developing 
countries, other studies have applied the same technique and found a negative impact of class size 
on student outcomes. Urquiola (2006) investigated the class effect in Bolivia by focusing on 
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schools in a rural area with only 1 or 2 classes and found a negative effect of class size on test 
scores. Moshoeshoe (2015) used the two-stage least-square and instrumental variable quantile re-
gression methods on grade 6 students’ math and reading test scores in Lesotho to estimate respec-
tively the mean and the distributional effect of class size. He found strong evidence of a putative 
class size effect on reading but not on math achievement.  
 However, Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) raised some concerns regarding Angrist–Lavy’s re-
gression discontinuity approach. They provided evidence that Chilean private schools, seeking to 
maximize their profits, manipulate enrollment to avoid adding a classroom, and households sort 
themselves across schools in response to this situation. Thus, their empirical evidence demon-
strates that this behavior invalidates the RD design. Therefore, their data suggest that students after 
the cutoffs (smaller class size) consistently come from a stronger background, which means that 
RD estimates overestimate the effect of class size on students’ achievements. These findings were 
extended by Cohen-Zada, Gradstein, and Reuven (2009). After using the rich individual-level data 
set in secondary public schools in Israel, they concluded that IV estimates of class size effect are 
likely to be seriously biased. Thus, the success of the RD design hinges on the institutional details 
of the context in which it is applied.   
 The second stream of literature found that class size has either no or a positive effect on stu-
dents’ outcomes. Hoxby (2000) used demographic variation to identify the class size effect. She 
exploited the idea that, after correcting for a trend in school districts, cohort sizes can be larger or 
smaller in some years than others, creating a source of exogenous variation. Using data on elemen-
tary school pupils in the state of Connecticut, she did not find any statistically significant effect of 
class size on student achievement, and her estimates were precise enough to rule out even a modest 
effect. Leuven, Oosterbeek, and Rønning (2008) exploited a quasi-experimental method to esti-
mate the effect of class size on student performance at the end of lower-secondary school in Nor-
way. They found that the maximum class size rule and population variation identification give 
very similar estimates. Their results consistently point to a lack of any impact of class size on 
achievement; for instance, they found an effect as small as 1.5 percent of a standard deviation for a 
1-student change in class size during 3 consecutive years. Asadullah (2005) used the variation in 
the average pupil–teacher ratio in Bangladeshi schools as an IV. The policy there allows secondary 
school principals to recruit an extra teacher whenever the class size exceeds 60. He found strong 
positive class size effects on students’ achievements. Denny and Oppedisano (2013) used the data 
 87 
 
collected in 2003 from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) for the United 
States and the United Kingdom. They applied the IV strategy and controlled for school fixed ef-
fects to address the potential bias due to between-school sorting. Their results demonstrate that an 
increase in class size leads to an improvement in students’ mathematics score. Only the results for 
the United Kingdom are statistically significant. However, Moshoeshoe (2015) indicated major 
concern regarding the positive or lack of effect of class size on students’ achievements suggested 
by Asadullah (2005), Denny and Oppedisano (2013), and Leuven et al. (2008). In fact, there is an 
important common denominator in these studies in that they all use secondary school students’ da-
ta, which could explain their results. Those students, in general, have a longer listening span, are 
less disruptive in class, and can learn more on their own compared with younger primary school 
students. Therefore, the class size effects are likely to be swapped. Lazear (2001) explained the 
difficulty in finding class size effects as being due to the possibility that the optimal class size for 
well-behaved students may be larger than the optimal class size for ill-behaved students. The ob-
served relation of educational outcome to class size is small or even positive for well-behaved 
children, while the class size effects are larger for children with behavioral problems. 
 With regard to Palestinian schools, to the best of my knowledge, no particular study has been 
conducted to explore the effect of class size on students’ achievements apart from that of Altinok 
and Kingdon (2009). This study used TIMSS data in 45 countries. Its results show the statistically 
significant effect of class size for 16 countries, but the effect is negative only in 10 of them, includ-
ing Palestine, and the effect size is slight in most cases. Their findings are in line with other studies 
that have found a little evidence of the adverse effect of larger classes on student achievement. 
They concluded that the class size effects are smaller in developed countries than in developing 
countries. In addition, this impact is smaller in regions with higher teacher quality. 
4.3 Institutional Settings 
Compulsory education in Palestine covers 10 years, starting at age 6, and it consists of 2 stages: 
the preparatory stage or lower basic level (grades 1 to 4) and the empowerment stage or basic level  
(grades 5 to 10). There are 3 supervising authorities covering education in the West Bank: the 
Government, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and private schools. These 
types of schools differ in their individual and school characteristics. UNRWA schools are located 
in Palestinian refugee camps and provide primary education to refugees until grade 9. The Pales-
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tinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE) is the official body in charge of the 
educational process in schools and formulating the educational policies. Further, all schools follow 
the same national curriculum, provided by the MoEHE, and apply the same evaluation criteria 
(UNESCO, 2011). More than 70 percent of Palestinian students are enrolled in governmental 
schools, 23 percent in UNRWA schools, and less than 3 percent in private schools (PCBS, 2017). 
Most of the students attend the closest school to their residence. According to the ministry regula-
tions, registering children in schools that report to a different educational governorate from the 
parents’ local address is not allowed. The school sample used in this study consists of both go-
vernmental and UNRWA schools. Both types lack resources, infrastructure, and adequate class-
room space. Teachers suffer from overcrowded classes, a lack of discipline, and low salaries. They 
also lack motivation and professional commitment, and many of them have a second job (Jabr & 
Cahan, 2014). Each class is taught by a different teacher depending on the subject; the teacher ro-
tates among classrooms (MoEHE, 2016b).
37
 
 In general, the average class size is large compared with that in other countries.
38
 The recent 
statistics show that the average class size in Palestinian elementary schools is 27.8 and 32 stu-
dents/class in public and UNRWA schools, respectively (PCBS, 2017). According to the MoEHE 
regulations, the school principal can open a new section for the same grade in the case that the 
number of enrolled students exceeds 40 per cohort. This rule is not strictly implemented in all pub-
lic schools due to extra hiring costs and space availability. Unlike the public schools, and despite 
the fact that the UNRWA follows the same educational regulations, the maximum class size in 
UNRWA schools was 45 students and has recently been increased to 50 students. In addition, the 
teachers’ workload in UNRWA schools is 28 classes per week, while it is 22 classes per week in 
governmental schools.  
                                                 
    
37
 Any academic year consists of two semesters, and marks are divided equally between the two semesters. All 
courses are graded based on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. The passing grade is 50. Students who obtain a score lower 
than 50% in 3 subjects or less are required to sit a make-up exam, and if they fail 4 subjects or more, they repeat the 
same grade based on the allowed repetition rate (MoEHE, 2016b).  
    
38
 For example, see Altinok and Kingdon (2009). They investigated the effect of class size in 45 countries. The av-
erage class size in Palestine (39.52) was among the largest sizes in their sample. 
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 In September 2015, teachers in the West Bank led the largest mass protests in Palestine in re-
cent years due to their pay scale staying the same when other governmental sectors’ pay scale in-
creased. The Palestinian Authority allocates approximately 20 percent of its annual budget to the 
MoEHE, salaries representing the largest proportion of this budget (MoFP, 2016). The MoEHE 
has suggested several solutions to improve students’ performance rather than reducing the class 
size. At the beginning of 2014, the UNRWA announced the possibility of postponing the starting 
date of the first semester of the 2014/15 academic year due to the staff strike, which continued for 
more than two months as a result of the UNRWA’s new policy of merging classes (UNRWA, 
2015). Many reports have documented that parents of UNRWA school students objected to this 
policy, which adds more students to each class. According to parents, this can weaken the quality 
of education. The UNRWA justified its merging policy by citing the fact that class size itself is not 
a key determinant of good quality. If the class size is around 40–45 students, reducing it is not cor-
related with a significant improvement in students’ achievements. Most importantly, a minimum 
reduction in class size has a substantial impact on the overall education costs (UNRWA, 2014).  
4.4 Data 
This study employs the survey data collected during the academic year 2012/2013 on approximate-
ly 6,000 students enrolled in grades 5 to 9 in gender-segregated primary schools in the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem. This rich data set was collected as part of a cooperative research agreement 
between Al-Quds University, Hebrew University, and the University of Wuppertal and was funded 
by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The survey covered 100 primary schools selected 
randomly and stratified according to region (north, center, and south) and school supervisory au-
thority (60 government and 40 UNRWA). Then 12 students were selected randomly from each 
grade (5–9), which yielded 60 students/school. Those students were asked to complete standar-
dized cognitive ability tests administrated in class. The intelligence abilities test was designed to 
measure 3 major cognitive aspects (verbal, numerical, and figural). Each group has several subtests 
covering a wide range of item contents (analogies, series, vocabulary, and inference). The subtests 
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were initially selected and adapted to the Arab culture.
39
 The tests consisted of 181 items com-
puted as the percentage of correctly answered questions. The cognitive test score was the first out-
come variable, and it has an arithmetic mean of 60.7 and a standard deviation of 16.7 score points.  
 Of particular importance in the context of this study are bullying and fighting inside the school 
(violent behavior). The second outcome, conduct problems proxied by self-reported bullying and 
violent behavior, may be influenced by class size. These data are drawn from the Health Behavior 
in School-Aged Children (HBSC) survey answered by students. According to the literature, bully-
ing
40
 was measured by asking students 2 questions: 1) How often have you been bullied? 2) How 
often have you taken part in bullying another student at school in the past couple of months? The 
response options ranged from never to 1–2 times, 2–3 times, once a week, and several times a 
week. Then, the final outcomes were converted into 3 binary variables, bullying others only, vic-
tim only, and bully–victim (those who are both bullies and victims). Violent behavior was meas-
ured by asking students the following question: During the past 12 months, how many times were 
you injured by other students and had to be treated by a doctor or nurse or paramedic? The answers 
to this question were provided on a scale from 0 to 4 times or more.   
 The data set includes the administrative database provided by the MoEHE on student age, 
gender, and school grades in each subject for three subsequent academic years (2011–2013). The 
main explanatory variable used in this study, class size, was obtained from these administrative 
records, which register all the schools participating in the survey and the number of classes per 
grade. For each student, I combine this information with the enrollment data to calculate the aver-
age class size at the grade level as  
                                         average class size=enrollment/no. of classes. 
Thus, I have data on the average class size per grade and not the actual class size (except when 
schools have exactly one class in a grade). The advantage of the average class size is that it elimi-
nates the biases resulting from within-school sorting, while there is a possibility of measurement 
                                                 
      39 The subtests were selected and adapted from established tests of general ability: the Cognitive Ability Test 
(CAT; Thorndike, Hagen, & Lorge, 1971), Milta – a Hebrew version of the Lorge–Thorndike Test (Ortar & Shachor, 
1980), Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1983), and the Cattell and Cattell (1960) Culture Fair Intelligence Test. 
    
40
 A student is characterized as being bullied or victimized when he or she is exposed, repeatedly and over time, to 
negative actions on the part of one or more other students (Olweus, 1997). 
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error that might underestimate the impact of class size, which will be addressed in the identifica-
tion strategy. Figure (4.1) shows the distribution of the average class size in grades 5–9 in both 
types of schools. The average class size in governmental schools is 30.7, while it is 33.4 in UNR-
WA schools. 
 Additionally, these administrative records allow me to include the students’ grade point aver-
age (GPA) during the previous two academic years in the main analysis, which is computed as the 
average of six main subjects: Arabic, English, Mathematics, Science, National Education, and Re-
ligious Education. 
 Further, this new data set contains a large number of students’ family background covariates, 
which are used as control variables (e.g., household structure, household monthly net income, pa-
rental education, books at home, and living standard). The students’ parents provided these data 
through a paper-and-pencil questionnaire.    
 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data.  
Figure 4. 1: Distribution of the average class size 
 The school characteristic variables include educational facilities, adequate stationery, the avail-
ability of qualified teachers, teachers’ commitment, and the school educational climate and were 
obtained from the school principal survey. This instrument adopted the same items as those used in 
the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). 
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 I also control for some contextual data related to school locality.
41
 The locality controls include 
the locality type (rural, urban, or refugee camp), the poverty rate based on a 2009 consumption 
survey,
42
 the population per locality in 2013, the proportion of a locality under area C,
43
 and 
whether the locality is affected by the separation wall.
44
 The primary source of this information is 
the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). 
 Finally, the data set includes detailed information on students’ physical and mental health and 
teacher/peer relations in school. These data are drawn from the HBSC survey and student back-
ground questionnaires answered by households. I interpret this information as a likely channel 
through which class size may affect children’s behavior. Section (2.7) provides more details about 
these questions and the way in which these questions are used to indicate behavioral problems.   
 To reduce bias due to omitted variables and to avoid reducing the sample size due to missing 
values of control variables, as well as increasing the precision of the estimates, some control va-
riables with missing values are substituted by mean values, and an indicator for such missing val-
ues is created. In the final analysis, and after imposing some restrictions according to the suggested 
identification strategy, the sample ends up with approximately 4,700 students in grades 5 to 9 dis-
tributed across 416 different classes and enrolled in 91 schools located in 71 distinct localities 
throughout the West Bank. Table (4.1) presents a summary of the statistics of the dependent and 
control variables. Due to the sampling requirement, female students are overrepresented in the 
sample (67 percent).  
 Next, to check the potential endogeneity problems, I perform regressions to account for the 
class size variation between and within schools. Table (4.A.1) in the appendix presents the results 
                                                 
    
41
 ―Locality‖ is the smallest administrative unit defined by the PCBS. There are 528 localities in the West Bank. 
    
42
 This is the most recent available survey, conducted by the World Bank and PCBS and issued in 2013. 
    
43
 Area C: Areas in the West Bank are still under full Israeli military and civil control based on the Oslo Accords of 
1993, while the Palestinian Authority (PA) has civil and security control in area A. The PA has civil autonomy but no 
security control in area B (Vishwanath et al., 2014). Communities in area C are living in difficult life circumstances 
due to the lack of major services. For more details, see www.btselem.org/topic/Area_c. 
    
44
 The Israeli West Bank barrier or wall is a separation barrier built by the Israeli Government in the West Bank 
along the 1949 Armistice Line known as the ―Green Line‖ (B’Tselem, 2012). The barrier divides Palestinian 
communities, encircles some, and isolates others from their surroundings, while separating East Jerusalem from the 
rest of the West Bank (UNESCO, 2014). 
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of the regressions of average class size in grades 5 to 9 on the individual, locality, and school level 
of controls. The results with the school fixed effect are presented in the last column. Locality attri-
butions and class size are highly correlated, as indicated in all the columns. The presence of the 
separation wall is associated with an increase in class size by 1.8 students. The result could be at-
tributed to the fact that the separation barrier reduces the mobility abilities for those people who 
live in densely populated localities plagued by the wall. Both the poverty rate and the locality’s 
proportion in area C have a significant adverse impact on class size. Usually, schools in poor 
communities and marginalized areas are less attractive to parents due to their lack of educational 
resources. Additionally, communities in area C are characterized as having inadequate primary 
services and suffer from unfortunate life conditions (UNESCO, 2014).  
 
Table 4. 1: Descriptive statistics         
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Individual-level observations: 4,664 
Cognitive tests score (child) 60.65 16.66 0.55 94.48 
Female child 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Refugee status  0.42 0.49 0 1 
High school diploma (father) 0.28 0.45 0 1 
College degree (father) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
High school diploma (mother) 0.30 0.46 0 1 
College degree (mother) 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Living standard scale (10 points) 3.53 2.27 0 9 
Net monthly income (NIS) (5-point scale)
45
 1.66 1.38 1 5 
Books at home (5-point scale)
46
 1.52 1.23 1 5 
No. of student’s siblings 4.38 2.98 0 18 
Continued on next page ...     
                                                 
45
 The scale is: (1)<NIS 1500; (2) NIS 1500–NIS 2499; (3) NIS 2500–NIS 3999; (4) NIS 4000–NIS 5000; and (5) 
>NIS 5000. 
46
 The scale is: (1) 0–10 books; (2) 11–25 books; (3) 26–100 books; (4) 101–200 books; (5) >200 books.  
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... Table 4.1 continued     
Number of rooms (above median)  0.54 0.50 0 1 
School average 2010/11 71.89 16.07 23.33 99.42 
School average 2011/12 69.69 16.00 18.50 99.83 
Panel B: Class-level observations: 416 
Average class size 30.59 7.02 6 44.5 
Cognitive test score (class) 60.62 11.28 27.98 85.31 
Panel C: School-level observations: 91 
UNRWA school  0.45 0.50 0 1 
School lack of resources (18-point scale)  6.02 4.47 0 17 
School educational atmosphere total (40-point 
sale) 26.95 3.54 17 38 
Problems among teachers (6-point scale) 1.73 1.64 0 6 
Panel D: Locality-level observations: 71 
Presence of the separation wall  0.376 0.484 0 1 
Percentage of the locality in area C 0.303 0.316 0 1 
Poverty headcount rate 0.194 0.131 0 0.5035 
Population per locality  24,735 48,168 237 195,733 
Urban locality  0.416 0.493 0 1 
     
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics for the Secondary Outcomes and Mechanism 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Bully–victim 4,313 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Bully–Act 4,297 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Fight in school and Injury  during past 12 months 4,272 0.93 1.26 0 4 
SDQ impact: overall difficulties  3,619 1.53 0.70 1 4 
School Teacher Support 4,253 3.94 1.76 1 10 
Peer Relations 4,316 5.50 2.35 1 15 
 
 95 
 
In column 5 in Table (4.A.1) in the appendix, I add the cohort fixed effect to the specification; 
both school- and locality-level controls do not change and remain significant. The class size is 
likely to be smaller in grade 9, which represents the final level in the preparatory stage. School 
principals tend to distribute grade 9 students into small classes, since those students tend to be 
more sociable and interactive as they see themselves as superior to others. Parents may also decide 
to move their children to larger schools that contain a secondary level. The results in Table (4.A.1) 
in the appendix suggest that students from disadvantaged localities attend smaller classes. Moreo-
ver, students from more affluent families and students in grade 9 tend to attend smaller classes. If 
the selective placement in small and large classes were disregarded, the precise estimate of class 
size on achievement would be biased. In the next section, I will address the strategy to deal with 
this problem.   
4.5 Identification Strategy 
4.5.1 Econometric Model 
The empirical specification for the model is presented below. The model assumes that the outcome 
variable (cognitive score, bullying, and violent behavior) of student i, enrolled in school k and 
town l (𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑙   ), is generated by the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑙   = α + 𝛿 𝐶𝑆𝑘𝑙 + β 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑙  + ϑ 𝑆𝑘𝑙  + ω 𝑇𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑙             (4.1) 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑙  is a vector of observable attributes of a student’s individual-level controls, including 
sex, a dummy for the month of birth,
47
 refugee status, a dummy for the student grade, household 
characteristics, such as parental level of education measured in three categories (less than, with, or 
more than a high school diploma), household income, the household living standard index (10 
                                                 
    
47
 The month of birth determines children’s school entry age. The School Entry law could affect child outcomes 
other than through educational attainment. For example, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) indicated that older children in the 
same classroom may be treated differently (e.g., be placed in more advanced programs) or experience fewer social 
problems. Cascio and Schanzenbach (2007) pointed out that entrance start dates are correlated with school perfor-
mance, grade repetition, and diagnoses of learning disabilities. 
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points),
48
 the number of books and rooms at home, and the number of siblings. 𝑆𝑘𝑙  is a vector of 
observable school-level controls and includes the school type (UNRWA vs. governmental school), 
school resource index, teacher characteristics, and school climate index, as reported by school 
principals. stands for town-level variables, like population and poverty rate, locality type (urban 
vs. rural or camp), the presence of the separation wall, and the proportion of the locality under area 
C. CS is the average class size that student i attended during the 2012/2013 academic year, and 
𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑙   denotes all the other determinants of achievement, such as the unobserved attributes of the 
student, parents, school, and locality. The coefficient of interest is 𝛿, the class size effect. Y is the 
outcome variable representing the student cognitive scores, bullying, and violent behavior. All the 
standard errors are clustered at the school level.    
 As indicated before, the endogeneity problem may produce biased OLS estimates of the class 
size effect, and the exogenous source of variation in class size is needed for reliable identification. 
The available data set provides information only on the average class size within the grade rather 
than the actual class size. In these data, there are 2 thresholds for the maximum class size number: 
40 and 45 students/class in public and UNRWA schools, respectively. Following the literature, I 
exploit the maximum class size rule in the regression discontinuity design induced by Angrist and 
Lavy (1999) to predict the average class size to be a non-linear and discontinuous function of 
enrollment. The number of classes in grade j at school k in year t can be described by (𝑓jkt): 
In  governmental ‎schools ∶   𝑓𝑗𝑘𝑡  =  𝑖𝑛𝑡  
N jkt −1
40
 + 1    (4.2)       
     In UNRWA  schools ∶   𝑓𝑗𝑘𝑡  =  𝑖𝑛𝑡  
N jkt −1
45
 + 1    (4.3)       
where 𝑁𝑗𝑘𝑡  is the total enrollment in grade j in school k in year t and int (x) is the largest integer 
smaller than or equal to x. 
        Figures (4.2.a) and (4.2.b) plot the theoretical class size and the actual average class size 
against the cohort enrollment. The actual average class size is very close to the predicted one in 
UNRWA schools and the majority of governmental schools, except in a few cases, as shown in 
                                                 
    
48
 The household living standard index represents whether a household owns a TV, mobile phone, DVD player, air 
conditioner, car, computer, central heating, washing machine, or refrigerator. 
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Figure (4.2.a). This indicates that these schools do not have the resources to follow the maximum 
class size rule. However, the graph shows that there is no good variation to identi-
fy class size effects, as no variation is yielded in the first stage when the actual average class size is 
instrumented by the theoretical class size induced by equations (4.2) and (4.3). Focusing on those 
schools that comply with the maximum size rule only produces no differences in the class size 
coefficient between OLS and 2SLS estimates. Therefore, I restrict the sample to those classes that 
comply with the maximum class size rule. Then, I estimate the effect of class size with the same 
specification as in equation (4.1) by using the reduced form, since in this case the theoretical and 
average class size should be the same.
49
 As a result, 473 observations distributed over 20 govern-
mental schools in 43 classes are excluded from the main analysis.
50
 
     
Source: Own calculations based on survey data and school enrollment. 
Figure 4.2. a: Average and predicted class size, governmental schools 
                                                 
 49 The restricted sample contains only schools that comply with the maximum class size rule, since instrumenting 
the actual average class size with the theoretical average class size yields no variation in the first stage. I apply an OLS 
regression rather than 2SLS since the two provide the same results. One of the limitations of this approach is increas-
ing the margin of error due to the decreasing sample ‎size. In addition, the adopted identification strategy is valid only 
for a restricted sub-sample; therefore, the results may be less conclusive and might affect the external validity. How-
ever, this depends on the size of the affected sample, which is very small in the current case. 
    
50
 Table A.4 represents the differences in observed variables (in particular on the school level) between schools that 
comply and schools that do not comply with the maximum class size rule. 
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Source: Own calculations based on survey data and school enrollment. 
Figure 4.2. b: Average and predicted class size, UNRWA schools 
4.5.2 Threats to Validity  
However, this identification strategy risks being influenced by unobserved school choice (specifi-
cally omitted variables) and the possibility of parents sorting across regions in search of better ser-
vices, including schools. To deal with these potential problems, I control for a variety of school 
covariates using the principal survey to construct school educational indicators. These indicators 
contain three indexes that capture many school characteristics and reflect the education climate: 
(1) an educational atmosphere index, such as teacher job satisfaction, curriculum, parental support, 
positive involvement in the educational process, and so on; (2) problematic behaviors of teachers, 
such as late school arrivals and unjustified absenteeism; and (3) a school resource index, for exam-
ple adequate stationery, the availability of qualified teachers, educational space, and heat-
ing/cooling and lighting systems.   
 Regarding the threat of cross-regional movements, the West Bank is characterized as being 
geographically fragmented (Vishwanath et al., 2014), diminishing the capacity for internal and ex-
ternal mobility. The presence of the separation wall, existing in many area C localities within West 
Bank territories, restricts movement, causing political and economic instability. This in turn rup-
tures West Bank communities. The most recent available mobility report from the PCBS (2010a) 
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confirms that the majority of West Bank residents (more than 90 percent) have the same residency 
as their birthplace.
51
 
 Another threat to validity is sorting near cutoffs. The RDD design induced by the maximum 
class size rule assumes that the predicted class size is unrelated to the student or school characteris-
tics. This assumption is violated in private schools (Urquiola & Verhoogen, 2009) as well as in 
public schools (Cohen-Zada et al., 2009) when higher socio-economic status (SES) households 
sort themselves into higher-quality schools as a response to school administration when they try to 
manipulate enrollment to avoid adding additional classrooms. Therefore, RD estimates overesti-
mate the effect of class size on student outcomes, since the students after the cutoffs come from 
higher SES backgrounds. Such sorting seems to be unlikely in the West Bank, where students are 
required to attend the closest school to their residence and mobility across school districts is rare. 
Moreover, to deal with that issue, I estimate the RD model based on Urquiola and Verhoogen’s 
(2009) specification, which can be written as follows:  
 α ( ) +               (4.4) 
 (4.5) 
where i and s indicate individual and school, respectively. Yis is the outcome of an individual stu-
dent enrolled in school s. E(CSs) is the average class size in school s, Ns is the grade enrollment, 
Cu is the value of the class size cutoff (i.e. 40 in governmental schools and 45 in UNRWA 
schools), and a(.) and b(.) are flexible functions of enrollment. Figure (4.3) presents a histogram of 
enrollment in grades 5–9 in both governmental and UNRWA schools. The histogram does not 
show any pattern in which the numbers of class sections are stacked exactly at the cutoff point, ex-
cept in a few cases in the public schools at the first and the second cutoff point. The analysis will 
focus on the two first cutoff points, since there are not enough class sections after the third cutoff. 
In general, the enrollment is not high in both types of schools, which gives the estimation more 
precision, since Maimonides’ rule better explains the class size effect at low levels of enrollment 
                                                 
     51 Other researchers have indicated the low mobility in the West Bank, for example Di Maio and Nandi (2013) and 
Mansour and Rees (2012). 
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(Angrist, Battistin, & Vuri, 2017). Furthermore, the non-high enrollment level reduces the possi-
bility of manipulation of the forcing variable, enrollment, in this case. 
 Like Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009), Table (4.2) presents regressions on household characte-
ristics with the indicator variables for the class size cutoffs and enrollment. (I use dummies indicat-
ing whether enrollments are above each of the cutoff points and piecewise linear splines for 
enrollments used.) The results provide evidence that there is no significant jump at the first or 
second enrollment cutoff for the selected covariates (mother’s education, household income, and 
household standard of living index). Moreover, Table (4.A.5) in the appendix provides additional 
evidence using RD estimates induced by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to verify that 
there is no violation of RDD assumptions with regard to the sorting of household characteristics at 
the cutoff points. These results are consistent with the visual evidence obtained from Figures 
(4.4.1.a, 4.4.1.b, 4.4.2.a, and 4.4.2.b), which confirm that mothers’ schooling and the household 
standard of living index are not significantly different before or after the cutoff points in both types 
of school.   
 The main estimation assumes that controlling several levels of covariates, including school 
characteristics and locality level controls, and excluding schools that severely deviate from the 
maximum class size rule, are sufficient to correct the biases of selective placement into schools 
with different class sizes.  
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Source: Own calculations based on school enrollment. 
Figure 4.3. a: Enrollment in governmental schools 
 
Source: Own calculations based on school enrollment. 
Figure 4.3. b: Enrollment in UNRWA schools 
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Table 4. 2: Behavior of selected variables around enrollment cutoffs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. var.: Moth. edu. Income Living standard 
Panel A: Governmental schools 
1{N≥41} 0.024 0.356 0.017 
 (0.129) (0.283) (0.364) 
1{N≥81} -0.230 0.060 -0.299 
 (0.200) (0.222) (0.295) 
N -0.004 -0.016 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) 
(N−41)×1{N≥41} 0.007 0.005 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) 
(N− 81)×1{N≥81} 0.001 0.014 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.016) 
    
Constant 1.797*** 2.682*** 4.317*** 
 (0.184) (0.382) (0.301) 
Observations 1,961 1,927 2,089 
R-squared 0.004 0.008 0.002 
Panel B: UNRWA schools 
1{N≥46} -0.039 0.148 0.003 
 (0.168) (0.209) (0.319) 
1{N≥91} 0.085 0.047 -0.066 
 (0.101) (0.162) (0.245) 
N 0.007 -0.005 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
(N−46)×1{N≥46} -0.008 0.004 -0.015 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) 
(N−91)×1{N≥91} 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant 1.427*** 1.467*** 2.071*** 
 (0.102) (0.267) (0.413) 
Observations 1,582 1,525 1,630 
R-squared 0.011 0.002 0.006 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.  
N denotes the enrollment function.   
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Source: Own calculations based on survey data and school enrollment. 
Figure 4.4.1.a: Enrollment and mothers’ schooling, government schools 
Mothers’ schooling is measured on a three-level scale: (1) less than high school diploma (12 
years), (2) high school diploma, and (3) college degree. 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data and school enrollment. 
Figure 4.4.1.b: Enrollment and mothers’ schooling, UNRWA schools 
Mothers’ schooling was measured on a three-level scale: (1) less than high school diploma (12 
years), (2) high school diploma, and (3) college degree. 
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Source: Own calculations based on survey data and school enrollment. 
Figure 4.4.2.a: Enrollment and students’ living standard index, government schools 
(Whether students’ household owns a TV, mobile phone, DVD player, air conditioner, cars, etc.)  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data and school enrollment. 
Figure 4.4.2. b: Enrollment and students’ living standard index, UNRWA schools 
 (Whether students’ household owns a TV, mobile phone, DVD player, air conditioner, cars, etc.)  
 
 105 
 
4.6 Results  
4.6.1 Cognitive Test   
The estimates of class size effects based on the identification strategy illustrated in the previous 
section are presented in Table (4.3). Each reported coefficient comes from the various specifica-
tions. The results in all the columns indicate the negative correlation between class size and cogni-
tive abilities. Column (1) represents the effect of class size without any control except the enroll-
ment function, which suggests an insignificant negative relation. Columns (2) and (3) are obtained 
from a specification with individual and locality controls; the estimates are negative but still insig-
nificant. The result in column (4) is obtained after adding school-level controls. The estimates in-
crease but remain statistically insignificant. Column (5) reports the results from specifications that 
also include performance in the previous two academic years. Including controls produces small 
negative class size estimates that are statistically insignificant. Table (4.2) suggests that reducing 
the average class size by one pupil has no significant impact on a student’s cognitive test score. 
Figure (4.5.a) plots the average class cognitive test scores against enrollment. The absence of a 
jump in scores at cutoffs in data from governmental schools suggests that class size reduction 
leaves the scores unchanged. However, Figure (4.5.b) shows a significant reduction in the average 
class score after the first and second cutoffs in UNRWA schools. 
 Table (4.A.2) in the appendix also reports the effect of other control variables on students’ 
cognitive abilities. Overall, females, refugees, and UNRWA school students outperform males, 
non-refugees, and public school students. The results are dramatically negatively affected by the 
locality poverty index. As expected, cognitive ability is strongly related to students’ grade and 
school performance. 
 There are strands in the literature indicating that the class size effect varies across subjects and 
grades in terms of the sign and size of the estimates. Table (4.4) demonstrates that class size in 
general has a negative effect on students’ performance in all the cognitive subtests in all the 
grades, but these estimates are not statistically significant. The magnitude of these estimates, how-
ever, is substantially larger and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in grade 6. The coeffi-
cient in column (3) suggests that reducing the class size by 1 student is significantly associated 
with higher cognitive scores by 0.4 percentage points compared with approximately 0.075 points 
in other grades. Table (4.4) also shows that the estimate for grade 9 is greater than those obtained 
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in the antecedent two grades. In fact, the one common characteristic in grades 6 and 9 is that these 
two grades represent the final stage in their level. Traditionally, schooling in Palestine is divided 
into three stages: elementary (grades 1–6); preparatory (grades 7–9); and secondary (grades 10–
12). Seniority affects conduct, especially for those who are moving to a higher stage. Students in 
these grades are wont to feel superior to students in lower grades and tend to be more sociable in 
class and less controllable. Furthermore, moving to the next stage may cause huge levels of uncer-
tainty and anxiety (Hofstede, 1983) and may lead to aggressive behavior, such as bullying.   
 
Table 4. 3: Class size and students’ cognitive test scores 
Dep. var.: cognitive tests  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average class size -0.007 0.053 -0.047 -0.096 -0.075 
 (0.100) (0.084) (0.072) (0.069) (0.066) 
Enrollment  0.007 -0.027 -0.012 -0.015 -0.027 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Constant 60.484*** 38.931*** 49.100*** 40.288*** 9.091 
 (2.889) (4.027) (4.572) (7.640) (7.792) 
      
Observations 4,664 4,664 4,664 4,664 4,642 
R-squared 0.000 0.257 0.288 0.305 0.467 
Mean of dep. var. 60.65 60.65 60.65 60.65 60.65 
Std err. of dep. var. 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 
Individual-level controls  NO YES YES YES YES 
Locality-level controls  NO NO YES YES YES 
School-level controls  NO NO NO YES YES 
School GPA in 2011/2012 NO NO NO NO YES 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The individ-
ual-level controls include sex, dummies for the month of birth and refugee status, household income, 
father’s and mother’s education, the standard of living scale with 9 points, the number of books at 
home, the number of rooms above the median per locality, the number of siblings, and the student 
grade. The locality-level controls contain the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, 
the presence of the separation wall, the population in 2013, and the locality type (dummy for urban). 
The school-level controls are the school resource scale, school learning atmosphere and problems 
among teachers, and school type (UNRWA or governmental). The school GPA includes the school 
GPA for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 academic years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Source: Own calculations based on survey data and school enrollment.  
Figure 4.5. a: Enrollment and average class cognitive tests scores, government schools 
 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data and school enrollment. 
Figure 4.5. b: Enrollment and average class cognitive tests scores, UNRWA schools 
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Table 4. 4: OLS estimates: the effect of class size on cognitive tests per grade   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Grade All 5 6 7 8 9 
All cognitive test parts  -0.075 0.051 -0.392*** -0.067 0.054 -0.198 
 (0.066) (0.131) (0.145) (0.119) (0.139) (0.137) 
       
Numerical tests -0.032 0.070 -0.378* 0.168 0.101 -0.231 
 (0.097) (0.186) (0.190) (0.161) (0.213) (0.212) 
       
Figural tests -0.102 0.064 -0.464** -0.121 -0.004 -0.192 
 (0.082) (0.171) (0.177) (0.142) (0.168) (0.153) 
       
Verbal tests -0.069 0.037 -0.348*** -0.095 0.080 -0.192 
 (0.062) (0.124) (0.128) (0.118) (0.128) (0.130) 
No. of observations 4,642 918 916 927 924 957 
Enrollment  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual-level controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School-level controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Locality-level controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Student GPA in 2011 and 2012 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The individ-
ual-level controls include sex, dummies for the month of birth and refugee status, household income, 
father’s and mother’s education, the standard of living scale with 9 points, the number of books at 
home, the number of rooms above the median per locality, the number of siblings, and the student 
grade. The locality-level controls contain the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, 
the presence of the separation wall, the population in 2013, and the locality type (dummy for urban). 
The school-level controls are the school resource scale, school learning atmosphere and problems 
among teachers, and school type (UNRWA or governmental). The school GPA includes the school 
GPA for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 academic years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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4.6.1.1 Heterogeneous Class Size Effects on Cognitive Test Scores 
I will now investigate whether this insignificant effect of class size reduction reported in the main 
results will have a different effect on the cognitive results for specific sub-groups. There is evi-
dence that the gains from small classes are largest for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, 
as indicated by Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Krueger (1999). Other researchers have emphasized 
that the outcome of the class depends on the teacher characteristics (Woessmann & West, 2006) 
and student achievement records (Konstantopoulos, 2008).     
 Table (4.5) presents the results for specific groups using the same specification as in equation 
(4.1). The first sub-group is classified according to gender; the results differ substantially from the 
results for girls and boys together but are still statistically insignificant. Column (3), panel A 
suggests that boys benefit more from class size reduction than girls. As for the second sub-group, I 
divide the students into two groups according to their school achievement in the previous academic 
year (2011/2012). Column 4 indicates that class size has a larger negative influence on students 
with a lower-than-average GPA (>70 percent) but no significant effect on the opposite group. 
Subgroups 4, 5 and 6 in Panel B are classified according to the locality type, teacher problem 
index, and school type, respectively. All of the reported estimates are statistically insignificant. 
Notably, the class size reduction has approximately zero effect on UNRWA students, which is 
consistent with the UNRWA claim that there is no evidence to support a class size reduction 
policy. To conclude, Table (4.5) does not provide evidence in favor of heterogeneous class size 
effects. The only exception is for students with low academic achievement profiles and those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, who benefit the most from a reduction in class size.  
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Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The individual-level controls 
include sex, dummies for the month of birth and refugee status, household income, father’s and mother’s education, the 
standard of living scale with 9 points, the number of books at home, the number of rooms above the median per locality, 
the number of siblings, and the student grade. The locality-level controls contain the poverty rate, the proportion of the 
locality under area C, the presence of the separation wall, the population in 2013, and the locality type (dummy for urban). 
The school-level controls are the school resource scale, school learning atmosphere and problems among teachers, and 
school type (UNRWA or governmental). The school GPA includes the school GPA for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 
academic years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
 
(1)              (2)                       (3)                 (4)                               (5)                   (6) 
 
Panel A 
Dep. var.: cognitive tests  Child gender   School GPA in 2012   Mother’s education 
 Girls Boys  <70 >70  <12 years >12 years 
Class size -0.045 -0.132  -0.164* 0.008  -0.097 0.044 
 (0.044) (0.153)  (0.091) (0.063)  (0.069) (0.083) 
Enrollment  -0.074 -0.015  -0.026 -0.031  -0.023 -0.044* 
 (0.052) (0.027)  (0.025) (0.022)  (0.023) (0.024) 
Observations 3,095 1,547  2,397 2,240  3,960 682 
R-squared 0.515 0.412  0.382 0.403  0.455 0.507 
Mean of dep. var. 67.13 63.18  60.53 54.48  67.13 59.77 
Std err. of dep. var. 13.95 14.81   16.7 16.73   13.95 16.60 
Panel B 
 Locality type  Teacher’s prob. index  School type 
 Urban Rural/camp  Equal to 0 0> and <6  UNRWA GOV 
Class size 0.043 -0.115  -0.049 -0.112  -0.001 -0.071 
 (0.107) (0.091)  (0.064) (0.089)  (0.081) (0.093) 
Enrollment -0.015 -0.044  -0.069** -0.031  -0.088*** 0.014 
 (0.027) (0.042)  (0.033) (0.024)  (0.029) (0.031) 
Observations 1,937 2,705  1,057 3,585  2,065 2,577 
R-squared 0.504 0.462  0.561 0.467  0.446 0.489 
Mean of dep. var. 55.79 59.53  60.18 62.04  66.19 62.80 
Std err. of dep. var. 18.83 16.93   17.01 15.83   15.71 16.15 
Individual-level controls  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Locality-level controls  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
School-level controls  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
School GPA in 2011/2012 YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Table 4. 5: Effect of class size on sub-groups 
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4.6.2 Effect of Class Size on Bullying and Violent Behavior   
Table (4.A.6) in the appendix shows the results of the marginal effect based on the model as out-
lined in equation (4.1) estimated using the probit model. Class size does not seem to be associated 
with any statistically significant effect on bullying indicators for perpetrator or perpetrator/victim 
characteristics, while the results reveal a significant relation to the students’ self-reported indica-
tion of being bullied by others. The result in Table (4.6), column (3) suggests that increasing the 
class size by 1 student increases the predicted probability of the student having been bullied during 
the past 2 months by 0.009 points. After adding the school fixed effect to control for between-
school endogeneity, the probability increases to 0.0135 with higher precision power. Next, I inves-
tigate the effect of class size on students’ self-reported probability of being bullied using a differ-
ent specification, as illustrated in Table (4.6), panel (A). Columns (1) to (5) include a linear func-
tion of the forcing variable, ―enrollment,‖ while column (6) presents the result of the quadratic 
function of enrollment and adds the school fixed effect to the model. The estimate is a very pre-
cisely estimated 0 and reveals a significant effect of class size. The size of the estimation is re-
markably similar when controlling for student self-reporting as a bully. Column (6) demonstrates 
that a 10-student class size increase will increase the probability of a student being bullied by 13 
percent, which corresponds to 0.55 percent of the mean.  
  In the second part of Table (4.6), I present the results for the effect of class size on violence 
among peers. All the estimations (columns 1 to 6) confirm that larger classes increase violence 
among students. However, the precision of these estimations varies according to each specifica-
tion. Column (4) shows the results under a full set of controls, including the school fixed effect. 
The coefficient suggests that a 10-student class size increase is associated with increasing average 
student engagement in fighting during the past 12 months and needing medical treatment 0.10 
times. After including the quadratic function of enrollment in the estimation, shown in column (6), 
the coefficient does not change; however, here the precision power is lower (with 10 percent signi-
ficance).   
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Table 4.6: Effect of class size on behavioral problems   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A, dep. var.: bullying victim. Probit estimation 
Class size 0.00902* 0.00818* 0.00944** 0.0135** 0.0131** 0.0129** 
 (0.00514) (0.00451) (0.00427) (0.00636) (0.00623) (0.00616) 
       
Bullying act    1.374***  1.381*** 1.381*** 
   (0.0613)  (0.0657) (0.0658) 
Observations 4,313 4,292 4,224 4,290 4,222 4,222 
Mean of dep. var. 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.232 0.232 0.232 
Std err. of dep. var. 0.425 0.425 0.425 0.422 0.422 0.422 
Panel B, dep. var.: violent behavior. OLS estimation 
Class size 0.0127*** 0.0101** 0.00923** 0.0109** 0.00947* 0.00975* 
 (0.00453) (0.00390) (0.00387) (0.00542) (0.00551) (0.00536) 
       
Being bullied   0.464***  0.468*** 0.468*** 
   (0.0610)  (0.0601) (0.0601) 
Observations 4,223 4,202 4,202 4,202 4,202 4,202 
R-squared 0.004 0.055 0.078 0.087 0.109 0.110 
Mean of dep. var. 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.922 
Std err. of dep. var. 1.255 1.255 1.255 1.255 1.255 1.256 
Enrollment  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Enrollment squared  NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Individual/locality controls  NO YES YES YES YES YES 
School-level controls  NO YES YES NO NO NO 
School F.E. NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Bullying act/victim NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The controls 
include: individual-level controls, sex, dummies for the month of birth and refugee status, household 
income, father’s and mother’s education, the standard of living scale with 9 points, the number of books 
at home, the number of rooms above the median per locality,  the number of siblings, and the student 
grade. The locality-level controls contain the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the 
presence of the separation wall, the population in 2013, the locality type (dummy for urban), and the 
school GPA for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 academic years. The school-level controls are the school 
resource scale, school learning atmosphere and problems among teachers, and school type (UNRWA or 
governmental). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0. 
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Focusing more narrowly on the discontinuity cutoff, as in Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) and 
Van der Klaauw (2002), Table (4.7) presents the OLS
52
 results for five student enrollment bands 
around the first and second cutoffs. I add an indicator for whether schools’ enrollment is above or 
below the respective cutoff to investigate the effect of class size around each discontinuity. Panels 
A and B present the results for the violent behavior outcome for the two schooling systems, while 
the victim of bullying outcome is presented in panels C and D. The first two columns include all 
the controls in equation (4.1), while the school fixed effect is added in columns (3) and (4). Col-
umns 3 and 4 reveal that the effect of class size on self-reported conduct problems is positive for 
both types of school and significant in some cases even after adding the school fixed effect. The 
only exceptions are the results for self-reported victims of bullying for UNRWA schools, which 
yield a negative relation.
53
 
 Based on the RDD validity, as Table (4.2) demonstrates, there is reason to interpret the consis-
tent estimates produced in Tables (4.6) and (4.7) as a causal effect of class size on the self-
reporting of violent behavior and self-reported indication of being a victim of violence. The next 
section attempts to propose a mechanism that might serve as a mediator channel related to the con-
text of this study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 The probit model and OLS yield similar outcomes for the bullying victim outcome. The probit model does not 
work effectively in UNRWA schools.  
 
53
 The same analysis is performed for the main outcome (cognitive test scores) and the results are presented in 
Table (4.A.3) in the appendix. The estimates of the effect of class size on students’ cognitive test scores are uniformly 
negative, although they are not statistically significant.  
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Table 4.7: Within five student-enrollment band regressions: Class size, violent behavior 
and victims of bullying 
Dep. var. violent behavior  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
cutoff 1st 2nd   1st 2nd 
Panel A: Governmental schools  
Dep. var.: Violent behavior  (40 students)  (80 students)   (40 students)  (80 students)  
Enrollment (N) 36≥N≥45 76≥N≥85  36≥N≥45 76≥N≥85 
Class size 0.016 0.895  -0.030*** 0.895 
 (0.010) (0.676)  (0.010) (0.676) 
Observations 426 68  426 68 
R-squared 0.170 0.507   0.206 0.507 
Panel B: UNRWA schools  
Dep. var.: Violent behavior  (45 students)  (90 students)   (45 students)  (90 students)  
Enrollment (N) 41≥N≥50 86≥N≥95  41≥N≥50 86≥N≥95 
Class size 0.043*** 0.053***  0.043*** 0.069 
 (0.002) (0.014)  (0.002) (0.047) 
Observations 155 197  155 197 
R-squared 0.248 0.329  0.248 0.352 
Panel C: Governmental schools 
Dep. var.: Bullying victim  (40 students)  (80 students)   (40 students)  (80 students)  
Enrollment (N) 36≥N≥45 76≥N≥85  36≥N≥45 76≥N≥85 
Class size 0.002 0.638  0.007** 0.638 
 (0.003) (0.388)  (0.003) (0.388) 
Observations 427 67  427 67 
R-squared 0.186 0.594  0.222 0.594 
Panel D: UNRWA schools  
Dep. var.: Bullying victim  (45 students)  (90 students)   (45 students)  (90 students)  
Enrollment (N) 41≥N≥50 86≥N≥95  41≥N≥50 86≥N≥95 
Class size -0.001 -0.007**  -0.001 -0.012 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.009) 
Observations 156 195  156 195 
R-squared 0.359 0.257  0.359 0.271 
Controls YES YES  YES YES 
School FE NO NO   YES YES 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The controls include 
the same covariates in Table (4.6). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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4.7 Possible Mechanisms 
The characteristics of school children who are victims of bullying are associated with symptoms in 
the domains of emotion, behavior, hyperactivity, and peer relationships (Moura et al., 2011). A 
strand of literature has also suggested that personality traits might contribute to typical bullying 
and aggressive behavior (Tani, Greenman, Schneider, & Fregoso, 2003). Eriksen et al. (2012) sug-
gested that the perception of teachers is a mechanism channel through which bullying could affect 
victims’ school achievements. Teachers perceive bullied children to be particularly weak in terms 
of academic skills. This perception affects teachers’ confidence in and willingness to invest in vic-
tims and bullies. They also view bullied children as having worse moods and worse social compe-
tencies. 
In this section, I will propose two transmission channels that may arise through which class 
size can affect the self-reporting of being bullied and engagement in violent behavior. The first 
group contains mental health attributes assessed by SDQ
54
 questions as part of the parental back-
ground questionnaire. The second group discusses student peer/teacher relations. Students’ peer 
relations were measured using an index established by three survey choices: ―The students in my 
class enjoy being together‖; ―Most of the students in my class are kind and helpful‖; and ―Other 
students accept me as I am.‖ Meanwhile, the teacher support index was obtained through two self-
reported survey questions: ―When I need extra help from the teachers I can get it‖; and ―My teach-
ers are interested in me as a person.‖ The answers to each question were rated on a 5-point scale 
(strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree). Then, the total 
points were considered as a final measurement for each index (on a 15-point scale for peer rela-
                                                 
     
54
 The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) is a brief behavioral screening questionnaire about 3–16-
year-olds. There are currently three self-reported versions of the SDQ in the following categories: children, parents, 
and teachers. Each version includes between one and three of the following components: 25 items on psychological 
attributes, an impact supplement, and follow-up questions (Goodman, 1997; Goodman et al., 2010). In this study, I 
employ the parent reported version and the first two components of the questionnaire: 25 items on psychological 
attributes and the impact supplement. These extended versions of the SDQ ask whether the respondent thinks the 
young person has a problem and if so enquire further about chronicity, distress, social impairment, and burden to 
others (Goodman, 1999). For a detailed description of the SDQ, see http://www.sdqinfo.com/. 
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tions and a 10-point scale for teacher support); more points indicate worse peer relations and 
teacher support. 
Table (4.8) shows the results of the probit and OLS regressions of self-reported victims of bul-
lying and engagement in violent behavior from the SDQ total scores, scores for internalizing and 
externalizing problems, and the impact supplement component of the SDQ questionnaire,
55
 as well 
as peer relations and students’ self-reported teacher support. The results in Table (4.8) obtained 
from the same specification are used in equation (4.1). I also control for school fixed effects and 
employ the quadratic function of the forcing variable ―Enrollment.‖ Columns (1) and (3) present 
twelve separate regressions, in which each proposed mediating variable is included one at a time. 
Even so, both mental health indicators on the one hand and students’ relations and teacher support 
on the other hand are strongly related to the two outcome conduct problems. Notably, the SDQ 
impact supplement coefficient is larger (more than two times) than the other mediator coefficients. 
Columns (2) and (4) in Table (4.8) show the results when the two mediator channels are jointly 
included. The SDQ’s internalizing and externalizing components are still strong predictors of the 
two outcomes. The sizable influence of the SDQ impact supplement starts to vanish when victimi-
zation of bullying is the outcome, while it becomes smaller but still has a significant effect on self-
reported violent behavior. In addition, teacher support still has a remarkable impact on self-
reported victimization of bullying and violent behavior.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
    
55
 Parents were asked ―In general, do you think that your child has difficulties in one or more of the following areas: 
emotion, concentration, behavior, harmony, and dealings with others?‖ The answers to this question were provided on 
a 4-point scale indicating zero difficulties, a few difficulties, clear difficulties, and severe difficulties. 
 117 
 
Table 4. 8: Potential mechanism 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Probit estimation   OLS estimation 
Dep. var.  Victim of bullying   Violent behavior 
      
SDQ total 0.0124***   0.0102***  
 (0.00465)   (0.00386)  
N 3,687   3,686  
SDQ internalizing  0.0116 0.00392  0.0267*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.00889) (0.0108)  (0.00722) (0.00839) 
N 3,687   3,686  
SDQ externalizing 0.0220*** 0.0189**  0.00464 -0.00527 
 (0.00681) (0.00865)  (0.00545) (0.00745) 
N 3,687   3,686  
SDQ impact supplement 
difficulties 0.0911** 0.0309  0.0897*** 0.0590* 
 (0.0385) (0.0441)  (0.0292) (0.0341) 
N 3,519   3,515  
Peer relation 0.0252** 0.0171  0.00220 -0.0109 
 (0.0106) (0.0120)  (0.0104) (0.0108) 
N 4,474   4,434  
School teacher support 0.0470*** 0.0354*  0.0334*** 0.0291** 
 (0.0143) (0.0183)  (0.0115) (0.0136) 
N 4,347     4,366   
Enrollment  YES YES  YES YES 
Enrollment squared  YES YES  YES YES 
Controls  YES YES  YES YES 
School FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations  3,354   3,356 
R-squared     0.104 
Mean of dep. var. 0.239 0.230  0.924 0.907 
Std err. of dep. var. 0.427 0.421   1.258 1.245 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The con-
trols are the same as in the other specifications, as indicated in equation (4.1). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, and * p<0. 
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Next, to demonstrate whether these channels are on the causal path from class size to students’ 
conduct problems proxied by self-reported victims of bullying and violent behavior, I estimate the 
same specification as in model (4.1) with student peer relations, teacher support, and SDQ compo-
nents as outcomes. The results from Table (4.9) suggest that peer relations and student mental 
health, obtained by the SDQ impact supplement questions, are the possible transmission mechan-
ism explaining the positive correlation between class size and conduct problems.  
 
Table 4. 9: Class size effect on teacher support, peer relations, and SDQ   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. var.: 
Peer rela-
tion 
School teacher 
support SDQ total 
SDQ inter-
nalizing  
SDQ exter-
nalizing 
SDQ im-
pact sup-
plement 
difficulties 
              
Class size 0.0192* -0.00970 -0.000812 0.00273 0.00160 0.00559** 
 (0.0113) (0.00740) (0.0204) (0.0121) (0.0146) (0.00264) 
       
Observations 4,434 4,366 3,686 3,708 3,689 3,605 
R-squared 0.054 0.093 0.144 0.103 0.149 0.128 
Enrollment  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Enrollment squared  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Mean of dep. var. 5.530 3.972 12.55 6.114 6.540 1.527 
Std err. of dep. var. 2.328 1.786 5.587 3.098 3.537 0.690 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The individual-level controls 
include sex, dummies for the month of birth and refugee status, household income, father’s and mother’s education, the 
standard of living scale with 9 points, the number of books at home, the number of rooms above the median per locali-
ty, the number of siblings, and the student grade. The locality-level controls contain the poverty rate, the proportion of 
the locality under area C, the presence of the separation wall, the population in 2013, the locality type (dummy for ur-
ban), and the school GPA for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 academic years. The school-level controls are the school 
resource scale, school learning atmosphere and problems among teachers, and school type (UNRWA or governmental). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0. 
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Table (4.10) presents a further explanation of the SDQ impact supplement question. If the child 
or parent answered ―yes‖ to the question, ―Overall, I think that the child has difficulties in one or 
more of the following areas: emotions, concentration, behavior, or being able to get on with other 
people,‖ then 5 further questions were posed about the severity of these difficulties. Taken togeth-
er, the 5 questions concerning overall distress and social impairment can be used to generate an 
impact score that ranges from 0 to 10.
56
 The impact supplement provides an important estimate of 
the burden of the problems, which is an essential part of the diagnostic criteria in the current diag-
nostic classification system. Table (4.10) presents a different estimation for the SDQ impact sup-
plement and shows that an increase in class size is significantly associated with an increase in 
these difficulties. Adding the school fixed effect to the estimate results in a loss of the significant 
power of the coefficient, but the sign is still in the right direction. 
4.8 Conclusion  
Of the various contributions to the literature on class size effects, some studies have found a 
significant relation between class size and achievement and others have not. While the literature 
remains inconclusive, less is known about the effect of class size on outcomes depending on non-
cognitive skills, such as well-being and conduct problems. This study investigates the impact of 
class size on students’ cognitive skills, bullying, and violent behavior in West Bank schools. I 
employ discontinuous regression changes in class size in governmental and UNRWA schools. I 
also provide evidence that the RDD assumptions are not violated due to discontinuities in the 
relationship between enrollment and household characteristics at cutoff points induced by a 
maximum class size rule. With regard to cognitive skills, the results show a small and insignificant 
effect of class size on pupils’ achievements, except in grade 6, in which the class size has a notable 
adverse impact on the students’ results. 
                                                 
    
56
 The impact supplement contains 5 questions: ―difficulties upset or distress me‖; ―interfere with home life‖; ―inter-
fere with friendships‖; ―interfere with classroom learning‖; and ―interfere with leisure activities.‖ Each item has 4 op-
tions and ranges from 0 to 2, 0 indicating ―not at all‖ or ―only a little,‖ 1 indicating ―quite a lot,‖ and 2 indicating ―a 
great deal.‖ The impact scores can be used as continuous variables or could be classified as normal, borderline, or ab-
normal. A total impact score of 2 or more is abnormal, a score of 1 is borderline, and a score of 0 is normal. For more 
details, see: http://www.sdqinfo.com/. 
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Table 4. 10: SDQ impact supplement and class size   
Dep. var.: SDQ impact supple-
ment  (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome classification Continuous variable Borderline  Abnormal  
Panel A: Without school fixed effect 
Class size 0.0141** 0.00372*** 0.00269** 
 (0.0056) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Mean of dep. var. 0.93 0.221 0.153 
Std err. of dep. var. 1.833 0.415 0.36 
    
Observations 3,295 3,296 3,297 
Enrollment  YES YES YES 
Enrollment squared  YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES 
School FE NO NO NO 
Panel A: With school fixed effect 
Class size 0.010 0.00288 0.00205 
 (0.0078) (0.0018) (0.0014) 
Mean of dep. var. 0.930  0.221  0.154  
Std err. of dep. var. 1.833 0.415 0.361 
    
Observations 3,488 3,488 3,488 
Enrollment  YES YES YES 
Enrollment squared  YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES 
School FE YES YES YES 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in paren-
theses. The controls include individual-level controls, sex, dummies for the month of 
birth and refugee status, household income, father’s and mother’s education, the 
standard of living scale with 9 points, the number of books at home, the number of 
rooms above the median per locality, the number of siblings, and the student grade. 
The locality-level controls contain the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality un-
der area C, the presence of the separation wall, the population in 2013, the locality 
type (dummy for urban), and the school GPA for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 aca-
demic years. The school-level controls are the school resource scale, school learning 
atmosphere and problems among teachers, and school type (UNRWA or governmen-
tal). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0. 
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 Additionally, the findings show no evidence in favor of heterogeneous class size effects on 
sub-groups. Only students with low-performance records benefit from a reduction in class size. 
The second part of this study concludes that class size reduction contributes to mitigating conduct 
problems among students measured by self-reported indication of being a victim of bullying and 
engagement in violent behavior. The main estimations suggest that a 10-student class size reduc-
tion will decrease the probability of a student being bullied by 13 percent and the number of in-
stances of fighting during the past 12 months by 0.10 on average. Finally, the data set provides 
evidence that peer relations and data from the SDQ impact supplement questions are a potential 
mechanism underlying the relationship between students’ conduct problems and class size.  
  Schools are often reluctant to implement a class size reduction policy, arguing that the increase 
in the overall educational costs cannot justify the small or non-existent impact on student achieve-
ment. Costs notwithstanding, recall that a lack of non-cognitive skills, such as conduct, can hurt 
school performance and the academic process as a whole. The findings presented above demon-
strate that wider contextual characteristics, namely being bullied and fighting, are alleviated by a 
smaller class size. Therefore, the long-run return on mitigating behavioral problems with respect to 
student achievement would offset the incremental costs of decreasing the class size. The costs and 
benefits of a class size reduction policy should be weighed carefully, especially if the school re-
sources are limited, the school suffers from ill-behaved pupils, or pupils come from a disadvan-
taged background. Much of the gain from a class size reduction policy depends on student and 
teacher characteristics in the contextual setting. 
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Appendix 
T   Table 4.A.1: OLS regression with class size as the dependent variable  
Dep. var: Average class size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Enrollment  0.125*** 0.134*** 0.117*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.041 
 
(0.00250) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) 
Female child 
 
0.029 0.496 -0.113 -0.103 -1.119*** 
  
(0.878) (0.810) (0.853) (0.855) (0.164) 
Refugee dummy 
 
-1.102 -0.851 -0.228 -0.286 -0.433 
  
(0.813) (0.673) (0.824) (0.824) (0.284) 
Fathers’ schooling 
      Less than 12 years  
 
-0.192 -0.293 -0.265 -0.226 -0.448 
  
(0.661) (0.607) (0.590) (0.605) (0.436) 
12 years  
 
0.120 -0.007 -0.117 -0.009 -0.188 
  
(0.660) (0.610) (0.598) (0.618) (0.442) 
College degree  
 
-0.192 -0.271 -0.462 -0.399 -0.484 
  
(0.652) (0.602) (0.583) (0.592) (0.421) 
Mothers’ schooling  
      Less than 12 years  
 
-0.453 -0.707 -0.275 -0.341 -0.331 
  
(0.725) (0.687) (0.672) (0.689) (0.497) 
12 years  
 
-0.221 -0.461 0.021 -0.047 -0.122 
  
(0.814) (0.758) (0.697) (0.714) (0.509) 
College degree  
 
-0.343 -0.495 -0.176 -0.331 -0.491 
  
(0.871) (0.809) (0.760) (0.769) (0.540) 
Living standard scale (10 
points) 
 
0.093 0.105 0.074 0.106 0.024 
  
(0.086) (0.075) (0.070) (0.068) (0.049) 
Net monthly income (NIS) 
 
-0.264 -0.209 -0.174 -0.175 -0.061 
  
(0.179) (0.136) (0.113) (0.112) (0.058) 
Number of books at home 
 
-0.041 -0.114 -0.134 -0.103 -0.119 
  
(0.130) (0.124) (0.117) (0.118) (0.079) 
No. of student’s siblings 
 
-0.044 -0.002 -0.013 0.004 0.005 
  
(0.067) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.028) 
Number of rooms (above 
median)  
 
1.110** 0.736* 0.655* 0.655* 0.127 
  
(0.437) (0.375) (0.355) (0.360) (0.216) 
Presence of the separation wall 
 
1.725 1.758* 1.776* 8.434*** 
   
(1.074) (0.982) (0.982) (2.004) 
Percentage of the locality in 
area C 
  
-4.467* -4.296 -4.403* -2.775** 
   
(2.564) (2.624) (2.622) (1.323) 
Poverty headcount rate 
  
-11.888*** -12.870*** -12.862*** 24.597*** 
   
(3.238) (3.086) (3.098) (3.615) 
Population per locality  
  
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Locality type (urban) 
  
-1.227 -1.932* -1.943* 3.887*** 
   
(1.066) (1.100) (1.101) (0.649) 
Continued … 
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Table 4.A.1:  Continued 
      UNRWA school  
   
-2.203 -2.127 
 
    
(1.351) (1.353) 
 School lack of resources (18-point scale)  
  
-0.170** -0.169* 
 
    
(0.085) (0.085) 
 School educational atmosphere total (40-
point scale) 
  
0.112 0.112 
 
    
(0.138) (0.138) 
 Problems among teachers (6-point scale) 
  
-0.627** -0.623** 
 
    
(0.252) (0.251) 
 Student grade 
      Student in grade 6 
    
-0.350 -0.125 
     
(0.759) (0.752) 
Student in grade 7 
    
-0.508 -0.131 
     
(0.757) (0.759) 
Student in grade 8 
    
-0.921 -0.671 
     
(0.756) (0.755) 
Student in grade 9 
    
-2.040** -2.205** 
     
(0.873) (0.869) 
School GPA 2011 
     
-0.006 
      
(0.017) 
School GPA 2012 
     
0.007 
      
(0.016) 
       Constant 24.28*** 24.815*** 28.787*** 28.325*** 28.809*** 15.899*** 
 
(0.172) (1.258) (1.587) (3.809) (3.755) (1.576) 
Observations 5,106 5,106 5,106 5,106 5,106 5,080 
R-squared 0.315 0.326 0.380 0.414 0.422 0.669 
Individual-level controls  NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Locality-level controls  NO NO YES YES YES YES 
School-level controls  NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Cohort FE NO NO NO NO YES YES 
School GPA in 2011/2012 NO NO NO NO NO YES 
School FE NO NO NO NO NO YES 
The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0. 
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Table 4.A.2: Class size and students’ cognitive test scores 
Dep. var.: Cognitive tests  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Average class size -0.007 0.053 -0.047 -0.096 -0.075 
 
(0.100) (0.084) (0.072) (0.069) (0.066) 
Enrollment 0.007 -0.027 -0.012 -0.015 -0.027 
 
(0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Female child 
 
7.691*** 8.167*** 7.299*** 6.193*** 
  
(1.812) (1.709) (1.496) (1.387) 
Refugee status  
 
3.884*** 4.545*** 1.710 1.950* 
  
(1.363) (1.487) (1.075) (1.010) 
Student grade 
     Student in grade 6 
 
6.709*** 6.626*** 6.701*** 9.270*** 
  
(0.840) (0.820) (0.811) (0.732) 
Student in grade 7 
 
10.917*** 10.984*** 11.037*** 13.970*** 
  
(0.812) (0.791) (0.790) (0.713) 
Student in grade 8 
 
14.028*** 13.994*** 13.969*** 17.975*** 
  
(0.984) (0.973) (0.974) (0.970) 
Student in grade 9 
 
16.413*** 16.323*** 16.254*** 20.463*** 
  
(0.905) (0.894) (0.912) (0.951) 
Fathers’ schooling 
     Less than 12 years  
 
0.175 0.053 -0.012 -0.507 
  
(1.910) (1.882) (1.855) (1.749) 
12 years  
 
2.408 1.985 1.894 -0.057 
  
(1.941) (1.884) (1.894) (1.752) 
College degree  
 
4.031** 3.599* 3.346* -0.036 
  
(1.946) (1.907) (1.917) (1.811) 
Mothers’ schooling  
     Less than 12 years  
 
-1.346 -1.395 -1.715 -0.117 
  
(1.748) (1.697) (1.632) (1.502) 
12 years  
 
1.017 0.688 0.277 0.481 
  
(1.828) (1.748) (1.707) (1.594) 
College degree  
 
2.661 2.671 2.053 0.196 
  
(2.003) (1.910) (1.887) (1.734) 
Living standard index (10 points) 
 
0.492** 0.465** 0.434** 0.163 
  
(0.218) (0.191) (0.182) (0.169) 
Net monthly income (NIS) 
 
0.738*** 0.631*** 0.736*** 0.446** 
  
(0.249) (0.231) (0.227) (0.199) 
Number of books at home 
 
0.913*** 0.882*** 0.842*** 0.291 
  
(0.272) (0.263) (0.265) (0.237) 
No. of student’s siblings 
 
-0.740*** -0.595*** -0.535*** -0.203 
  
(0.167) (0.157) (0.150) (0.133) 
Number of rooms (above the median)  
 
0.947 0.553 0.374 -0.299 
  
(0.769) (0.701) (0.718) (0.595) 
Presence of the separation wall 
  
-0.129 0.049 -0.354 
   
(1.420) (1.379) (1.278) 
Percentage of the locality in area C 
  
-3.978 -3.833 -4.367 
   
(3.224) (2.947) (2.906) 
Continued … 
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Table 4.A.2: Continued 
     Poverty headcount rate 
  
-30.594*** -28.463*** -23.534*** 
   
(6.064) (6.236) (6.245) 
Population per locality (2013) 
  
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Locality type (urban) 
  
-0.031 -0.259 0.245 
   
(1.667) (1.649) (1.462) 
UNRWA school  
   
4.435** 3.785** 
    
(1.703) (1.560) 
School lack of resources (18-point 
scale)  
   
0.184 0.178 
    
(0.148) (0.138) 
School educational atmosphere  
   
0.358* 0.281 
    
(0.185) (0.189) 
Problems among teachers  
   
-0.528 -0.240 
    
(0.371) (0.381) 
School GPA 2011 
    
0.195*** 
     
(0.043) 
School GPA 2012 
    
0.284*** 
     
(0.040) 
Constant 60.484*** 38.931*** 49.100*** 40.288*** 9.091 
 
(2.889) (4.027) (4.572) (7.640) (7.792) 
      Observations 4,664 4,664 4,664 4,664 4,642 
R-squared 0.000 0.257 0.288 0.305 0.467 
Individual-level controls  NO YES YES YES YES 
Locality-level controls  NO NO YES YES YES 
School-level controls  NO NO NO YES YES 
School GPA in 2011/2012 NO NO NO NO YES 
Mean of dep. var. 60.65 60.65 60.65 60.65 60.65 
Std err. of dep. var. 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 16.66 
The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and 
* p<0. 
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Table 4.A.3: Within-enrollment band OLS estimation, five-student interval   
 
Cutoff   
Dep. var.: cognitive tests  First Second First Second 
  
Panel A: Governmental schools 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
  (40 students)  (80 students)  (40 students)  (80 students)  
  
Enrollment (N) 36≥N≥45 76≥N≥85 36≥N≥45 76≥N≥85 
  
Class size -0.121 -0.560 0.271* -41.133* 
  
 
(0.244) (0.690) (0.143) (14.931) 
  
       Observations 492 82 429 68 
  
R-squared 0.002 0.051 0.574 0.825 
  
Controls NO NO YES YES 
  
Panel B: UNRWA schools 
  
  (45 students)  (90 students)  (45 students)  (90 students)  
  
Enrollment (N) 
41≥N≥50 86≥N≥95 41≥N≥50 86≥N≥95 
  
Class size 0.353 -0.248 0.308*** 0.320 
  
 
(0.303) (0.496) (0.026) (0.386) 
  
       Observations 166 216 164 202 
  
R-squared 0.036 0.008 0.662 0.652 
  
Controls NO NO YES YES 
  
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The controls 
include sex, dummies for the month of birth and refugee status, household income, father’s and moth-
er’s education, the standard of living scale from 9 points, the number of books at home, the number of 
rooms above the median per locality, the number of siblings, and the student grade. The locality-level 
controls contain the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the presence of the separa-
tion wall, the population in 2013, and the locality type (dummy for urban). The school-level controls are 
the school resource scale, school learning atmosphere, and problems among teachers. The school GPA 
includes the school GPA for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 academic years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 4.A.4: Schools that comply/do not comply with the maximum class rule charac-
teristics    
  Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max 
Panel A: Schools that comply with the maximum class size rule  
Cognitive tests score (child) 4664 60.62 11.28 27.98 85.31 
Cognitive tests score (class) 4664 60.65 16.66 0.55 94.48 
Class size 4664 30.59 7.02 6 44.5 
UNRWA school 4664 0.45 0.50 0 1 
School lack of resources (18-point scale) 4664 6.02 4.47 0 17 
School educational atmosphere total (40-point 
scale) 4664 26.95 3.54 17 38 
Problems among teachers (6-point scale) 4664 1.73 1.64 0 6 
Panel B: Schools that do not comply with the maximum class size rule 
      
Cognitive tests score (child) 473 59.69 12.01 31.77 75.97 
Cognitive tests score (class) 473 59.69 17.01 2.76 90.06 
Class size 473 43.41 3.69 40 56 
UNRWA school  473 0.00 0.00 0 0 
School lack of resources (18-point scale)  473 5.82 4.76 0 15 
School educational atmosphere total (40-
point scale) 473 26.40 2.51 22 31 
Problems among teachers (6-point scale) 473 1.74 1.68 0 6 
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       Table 4.A.5: RD regressions for pre-treatment covariates 
 
 
 
 
Cutoff  
 
First Second 
 
First Second 
 
First Second 
 
First Second 
 
Dep. var.  
 
Mother’s 
edu. 
Mother’s 
edu. 
 
Living stan-
dard 
Living stan-
dard 
 
Mother’s edu. Mother’s edu. 
 
Living stan-
dard 
Living 
standard  
  
 
Panel A: Governmental schools  
 
Panel B: UNRWA  Schools  
 
Cutoff value  
 
40 80 
 
40 80 
 
45 90 
 
45 90 
 
             
 
RD_ estimate 
 
0.284 0.0320 
 
0.437 0.647 
 
0.0617 0.145 
 
-0.106 0.208 
 
             
 
Effective observations 
 
681 504 
 
724 723 
 
348 703 
 
357 835 
 
Left of c  
 
498 381 
 
529 558 
 
165 340 
 
167 366 
 
Right of c 
 
183 123 
 
195 165 
 
183 363 
 
190 469 
 
Total observations 
 
2253 2253 
 
2404 2404 
 
1739 1739 
 
1797 1797 
 
             
 
Robust 95% CI 
 
[-.07; .78] [-.5; .35] 
 
[-.52; 1.61] [-.32; 1.74] 
 
[-.38; .61] [-.14; .47] 
 
[-1.1; 1.06] [-.33; .85] 
 
Kernel type 
 
Triangular Triangular 
 
Triangular Triangular 
 
Triangular Triangular 
 
Triangular Triangular 
 
BW type 
 
CCT CCT 
 
CCT CCT 
 
CCT CCT 
 
CCT CCT 
 
Conventional std error 
 
0.176 0.179 
 
0.432 0.455 
 
0.215 0.131 
 
0.455 0.257 
 
Conventional p-value 
 
0.107 0.858 
 
0.311 0.155 
 
0.774 0.270 
 
0.815 0.420 
 
Robust p-value 
 
0.100 0.728 
 
0.314 0.176 
 
0.638 0.301 
 
0.968 0.391 
 
Order loc. poly. (p) 
 
1.000 1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 
 
1.000 1.000 
 
Order bias (q) 
 
2.000 2.000 
 
2.000 2.000 
 
2.000 2.000 
 
2.000 2.000 
 
BW loc. poly. (h) 
 
8.456 23.443 
 
8.638 33.691 
 
10.850 19.960 
 
10.892 24.124 
 
BW bias (b)   13.109 33.322  12.191 52.140  17.472 29.931  15.938 38.509 
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Table 4.A.6: Effect of class size on bullying 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Dep. var:   Victim  Bully   Bully–victim 
                 
Class size  0.00818* 0.0135**  0.00330 0.0100  -0.000579 0.00290 
  (0.00451) (0.00636)  (0.00600) (0.00826)  (0.00562) (0.00722) 
Enrollment   0.000276 -0.000434  0.00122 0.000538  0.00100 0.000475 
  (0.00115) (0.00244)  (0.00146) (0.00400)  (0.00145) (0.00301) 
Constant  0.752* 0.259  0.494 -0.423  0.918** 0.315 
  (0.392) (0.278)  (0.424) (0.327)  (0.402) (0.301) 
          
Observations  4,292 4,290  4,224 4,201  4,224 4,201 
Individual-level controls   YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Locality-level controls   YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
School-level controls   YES NO  YES NO  YES NO 
School GPA  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
School FE  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES 
Mean of dep. var.  0.232 0.232  0.123 0.122  0.195 0.195 
Std err. of dep. var.   0.422 0.422   0.328 0.328   0.396 0.396 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The controls include sex, 
dummies for the month of birth and refugee status, household income, father’s and mother’s education, the standard 
of living scale with 9 points, the number of books at home, the number of rooms above the median per locality, the 
number of siblings, and the student grade. The locality-level controls contain the poverty rate, the proportion of the 
locality under area C, the presence of the separation wall, the population in 2013, and the locality type (dummy for 
urban). The school-level controls are the school resource scale, school learning atmosphere, and problems among 
teachers. The school GPA includes the school GPA for the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 academic years. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.A.7: OLS estimation, quartile distribution 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Distribution 
Dep. var.: Cognitive tests  Top 25% Top 50% Top 75%  
    
Average class size -0.058 -0.019 -0.077** 
 (0.038) (0.034) (0.039) 
Enrollment  -0.031*** -0.028** -0.024** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) 
Constant -7.835** 7.004** 25.330*** 
 (3.555) (3.345) (3.552) 
    
Observations 4,642 4,642 4,642 
    
Mean of dep. var. 60.65 60.65 60.65 
Std err. of dep. var. 16.66 16.66 16.66 
    
Individual-level controls  YES YES YES 
Locality-level controls  YES YES YES 
School-level controls  YES YES YES 
School GPA in 2011/2012 YES YES YES 
Notes: The robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in paren-
theses. The controls include sex, dummies for the month of birth and refugee status, 
household income, father’s and mother’s education, the standard of living scale with 
9 points, the number of books at home, the number of rooms above the median per 
locality, the number of siblings, and the student grade. The locality-level controls 
contain the poverty rate, the proportion of the locality under area C, the presence of 
the separation wall, the population in 2013, and the locality type (dummy for urban). 
The school-level controls are the school resource scale, school learning atmosphere, 
and problems among teachers. The school GPA includes the school GPA for the 
2010/2011 and 2011/2012 academic years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Panel A: Governmental Schools 
 
Panel B: UNRWA Schools 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data. 
Figure 4.B.1: Class size and average class cognitive tests scores relationship 
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Source: Own calculations based on HBSC survey and school enrollment  
Figure 4.B.2.a: Enrollment and violent behavior, governmental schools 
 
Source: Own calculations based on HBSC survey and school enrollment.  
Figure 4.B.2.b: Enrollment and violent behavior, UNRWA schools 
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Source: Own calculations based on the HBSC survey.  
Figure 4.B.3: Violent behavior distribution  
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Parental Questionnaire.  
 
Figure 4.B.4: SDQ follow-up question 
Mothers/parents were asked: ―In general, do you think that your child has difficulties in 
one or more of the following areas: emotion, concentration, behavior, harmony, or deal-
ings with others?‖ 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Wage Differential between Palestinian Non-refugees and 
Palestinian Refugees in the West Bank and Gaza 
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5.1 Introduction 
Economists have pointed to various factors that may account for the main reasons behind the dif-
ference in earnings. They have also focused on labor market discrimination as a cause of the in-
equality among groups classified by gender, ethnicity, and other characteristics. Discrimination 
against individuals hurts labor market outcomes, including job opportunities, promotions, and 
earnings – of which the level is hard to measure (Kaas & Manger, 2012). Although controlling 
for educational and other socio-economic characteristics among different groups could explain 
several individual wage differentials, part of this earning gap could not be explained. Therefore, 
it has been attributed to labor market discrimination (Altonji & Pierret, 2001; Black, Haviland, 
Sanders, & Taylor, 2006). This chapter will focus on the wage differential in the Palestinian la-
bor market among refugees and non-refugees. According to the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA),
57
 Palestinian refugees are defined as 
anyone whose ―normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 
1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.‖ This de-
finition has expanded to include the children or grandchildren of such refugees, and they are eli-
gible for agency assistance if they are registered with the UNRWA, living in the area of the 
UNRWA’s operations, and in need (UNRWA, 2017).58 
Palestinian refugees represent 41.2 percent of the total Palestinian population living in Pales-
tine. In general, the living conditions of Palestinian refugees are worse than those of non-
Palestinian refugees. According to the monthly household real consumption patterns in Palestine, 
the poverty index among refugees reached 31.2 percent in 2011 compared with 21.8 percent for 
non-refugees. Furthermore, there is a clear difference in levels of unemployment among refugees 
and non-refugees (33.7 percent versus 22.3 percent, respectively). It is also significant that the 
                                                 
       57 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was estab-
lished in late 1949 following the 1948 Arab–Israeli conflict to carry out direct relief and works programs for Pales-
tinian refugees. 
      
58
 Today, some 5 million Palestine refugees are eligible for services from the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Nearly one-third of the registered Palestine refugees, 
more than 1.5 million individuals, live in 58 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian 
Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. For more details, see www.unrwa.org. 
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education level among Palestinian refugees is higher than that among non-refugees, with a higher 
female participation rate in the labor force (PCBS, 2015).
59
  
The Palestinian labor market has experienced various structural changes, many of which are 
not to the advantage of its workers. First, the skilled labor force faced a decrease in the return to 
schooling due to an increase in the educated labor supply after 1980 following an increase in the 
number of colleges and universities (Angrist, 1995). Then, the economy was destroyed as a re-
sult of the outbreak of the First and the Second Palestinian Intifada in the periods 1987–1993 and 
2000–2005, respectively (Daoud, 2005). A relatively small improvement occurred after the es-
tablishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994 (MAS, 2014). The restrictions 
on labor movements by the Israeli authority led to significant adverse effects on Palestinian wag-
es, with a sharp increase in unemployment (Mansour, 2010; Miaari & Sauer, 2011). Finally, 
since 2006, the PNA has experienced a reduction in the volume of financial aid, which represents 
the vast majority of the Palestinian budget (Sarsour, Naser, & Atallah, 2011). The Palestinian 
labor market is characterized by an excess labor supply in relation to the demand. Hence, unem-
ployment is high. The low female participation rate (Miaari, 2009) and the high growth rate of 
public employment
60
 are due to weaknesses in the private sector in terms of absorbing the 
enormous increase in worker numbers; this is also a result of the restrictions on movements, in-
vestments, exports, and imports as well as the high population growth (Daoud & Shanti, 2016).  
After a thorough search for relevant studies regarding the differences between Palestinian 
non-refugees’ and Palestinian refugees’ wages, to the best of my knowledge, only two studies 
refer to that issue. Angrist (1998) employed Labor Force Survey data for the period 1992–1995 
and suggested that the first and second generations of refugees earned less than non-refugees in 
both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. He pointed to the fact that, after the establishment of the 
PNA in 1994, the gap for the second generation of refugees in the West Bank shrunk; the overall 
pattern suggests that refugees’ gaps have been closing. In the Gaza Strip, the second generation 
of refugees earned no less than other workers after 1992. Daoud (2005) found that refugees 
                                                 
59
 According to the PCBS (2015), the percentage of Palestinian refugees aged 15 years and over who obtained a 
bachelor’s degree or higher reached 13.7 percent of the total refugees against 11.6 percent for non-refugees, while 
the rate of female participation in the labor force of refugees living in Palestine reached 20.9 percent against 18.4 
percent for non- refugees.  
60
 However, hiring in the public sector has recently been capped to only 3,000 per year (MAS, 2014). 
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earned 3–4 percent less than non-refugees in 1999 and 2001, before and after the Second Pales-
tinian Intifada.   
This study takes the earlier works as a starting point and aims to make several contributions. 
First, it estimates the wage differential among Palestinian non-refugees and Palestinian refugees 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and describes its dynamics between 1999 and 2012. Second, it 
aims to discover how much of this wage gap can be explained by differences in individuals’ cha-
racteristics and how much is due to the return of these characteristics across the two population 
groups. Third, it discusses the impact of some individual wage determinant variables, such as 
gender, education, experience and seniority, working in Israel, and employment sector, on the 
observed wage gap between the two groups and the extent to which this observed gap varies be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers in the West Bank and Gaza.  
 The current study argues that the pattern in the wage differential in the West Bank is in favor 
of non-refugees during all the observation periods. This trend can be explained by both a change 
in the relative prices of observed characteristics of non-refugee and refugee workers and the 
workers’ characteristics. The greater effect, however, can be attributed to the workers’ characte-
ristics until 2005, when the Second Intifada ended, while the unexplained part makes a larger 
contribution to explaining the wage gap after the Second Intifada. The wage gap has a larger sig-
nificant impact on unskilled than skilled laborers and greater prevalence in the private sector. In 
the Gaza Strip, the wage gap is always in favor of refugee workers, and most of this gap is ex-
plained by workers’ human capital components, the ―endowment effect.‖ 
The results of this chapter have important policy implications regarding wage equity. The ex-
istence of wage inequality poses challenges for policy makers in terms of providing appropriate 
legislation that prevents wage discrimination. Furthermore, the Palestinian community is re-
quired to invest in new resources to absorb the population growth, mainly since Palestinian refu-
gees are often more educated and have higher fertility rates than their non-refugee Palestinian 
counterparts (PCBS, 2015). The results also indicate the role of education in reducing the wage 
gap between Palestinian non-refugees and Palestinian refugees. Investment in education will also 
reduce the Palestinian labor market’s dependency on employment in Israel, since the wages in 
the domestic labor market were negatively affected during the closure period by the increase in 
the labor supply (Daoud & Sadeq, 2014; Mansour, 2010; Miaari & Sauer, 2011). Additionally, 
workers with low educational attainment earn higher salaries than educated laborers employed 
locally, leading to reduced economic returns to schooling. 
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 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section (5.2) presents the data used in 
this work and provides some descriptive statistics of the sample. It also documents the overall 
wage gap trend among Palestinian non-refugees and Palestinian refugees during the study period. 
Section (5.3) examines workers’ characteristics and occupational differences during and after the 
Second Intifada. Section (5.4) provides the model and empirical analysis. The results are pre-
sented in Section (5.5), and Section (5.6) shows the robustness checks, followed by the conclu-
sion.    
5.2 Data 
The study employs the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS) conducted by the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) on a quarterly basis over the years 1999–2012. Each house-
hold that participated in the PLFS was interviewed twice consecutively, left for two quarters, 
then interviewed again for two quarters. The sample is restricted to those who were wage em-
ployees aged from 15 to 65 and classified within the labor force according to the PCBS. The ref-
ugee status was identified based on the respondent’s answer regarding whether s/he is registered 
as a refugee.
61
 For the purpose of the analysis, I employee the log of workers’ daily wages, 
which are calculated by dividing the monthly income by the days worked per month. Table (5.1) 
reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this chapter. The registered refu-
gees represent 48 percent of the total observations; 69 percent of the observations live in the 
West Bank, and the remaining 31 percent live in the Gaza Strip. Despite the fact that refugees 
represent approximately half of the sample, only 19 percent of the total sample lives in camps. 
The majority of the sample is male, since the Palestinian labor market is characterized by a low 
participation rate of females. 
Figure (5.1) shows the wage differential trend between non-refugees and refugees in the Pal-
estinian territories from 1999 to 2012. The unadjusted wage gap increased until 2000 and sharply 
decreased during the second Intifada (2000–2005). This gap continued to expand after the 
Second Intifada, except in 2009, when the wage gap was at its minimum level. However, this gap 
took a different direction when the sample was split between the West Bank and Gaza. The geo-
                                                 
61
 More than 1.7 million Palestinian refugees are not registered with the UNRWA (MIFTAH, 2003). In the 
sample utilized, more than 92 percent of the refugees are registered with the UNRWA. Including both officially reg-
istered refugees and non-registered refugees in the analysis does not change the results in the robustness check sec-
tion. 
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graphic and administrative segmentation between the two regions is very pronounced and poses 
a significant constraint on growth. Each operates with its own labor market characteristics, labor 
demand, and wage levels (MAS, 2014). Gaza is facing more unstable economic conditions due 
to continuous border closures and higher unemployment rates. The overall conflict intensity in 
the Gaza Strip is higher than that in the West Bank due to the effect of three tough military oper-
ations in the years 2008–2009, 2012, and 2014. Since 2007, Gaza has been governed by a differ-
ent authority, and, most importantly, the percentage of the refugee population in Gaza is higher 
than the West Bank percentage.
62
 Figure (5.2.a) and Figure (5.2.b) show the different patterns of 
wage distribution in the two regions. In the West Bank, the share of refugees in the lower wages 
is higher than that of non-refugees; when the daily log wage starts to increase, the percentage of 
non-refugees becomes higher than that of refugees. The vertical lines show that refugee workers 
have lower unadjusted log wage means than non-refugee workers. In Gaza, the opposite case ap-
plies.  
Next, looking at the wage gap over the years in the two regions, Figure (5.3) depicts the trend 
and the different directions of the wage gap between the two population groups in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip.
 
In the West Bank (the solid line), the unadjusted wage gap reached its mini-
mum (2 percent) in 2003 during the second Intifada and the maximum value occurred in 2009 
(12 percent), the wage gap always favoring non-refugees. In Gaza, the wage gap represents the 
annual average difference between Palestinian refugees and Palestinian non-refugees’ log daily 
wage. The former always enjoy a positive wage premium over the later. The wage gap in Gaza 
increased at a continuous rate during the period of interest and reached 22 percent in 2007, then 
decreased to 17 percent in 2012. In the following section, I will shed light on the differences be-
tween worker characteristics and occupational differences in the two groups in Gaza and in the 
West Bank.  
 
 
                                                 
62
 The data show that the proportion of the population of refugees in Palestine in 2014 is estimated at 41.2 per-
cent of the total Palestinian population living in Palestine and indicate that 25.2 percent of the population in the 
West Bank consists of refugees, while the percentage of refugees in the Gaza Strip is about 66.8 percent (PCBS, 
2015). 
                                                                                                                                     
140 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Workers’ characteristics ‎ 
 Mean SD 
Daily wage (NIS) 77.795 44.453 
Log wage 4.157 0.739 
Years of school  11.236 4.001 
University degree (0/1) 0.360 0.480 
Experience 17.688 11.215 
Male  0.839  
Employment in Israel (0/1) 0.170  
Private sector employment (0/1) 0.564  
Refugee status (0/1) 0.479  
Registered refugee (0/1) 0.435  
Married (0/1) 0.438   
Panel B: Regional and geographical characteristics  
 Mean SD 
West Bank  0.689  
Locality affected by the wall (1/0) 0.102 0.303 
Percentage of the locality under area C 0.049 0.128 
Locality type    
Urban  0.503  
Rural  0.305  
Camp 0.192   
 Panel C: Sectoral and occupational distribution  
Sectors %   
Agriculture 0.053  
Manufacturing 0.127  
Construction 0.167  
Commerce 0.099  
Transport  0.032  
Service 0.522  
Occupations %  
Manager 0.026  
Technical  0.339  
Service 0.145  
Skilled agric. 0.007  
Craft worker 0.160  
Machine operation  0.074  
Elementary  0.249   
Observations  224,794  
 Note: The sample is restricted to those individuals who are classified as being within the labor force during 
the period 1999–2012. 
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 Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5. 1: Wage gap between Palestinian refugees and Palestinian non-refugees, 1999–2012 
Note: The wage gap represents the annual average difference between Palestinian non-refugees and Palestinian ref-
ugees’ wages in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between the first quarter of 1999 and the fourth quarter of 2012. 
The two dashed lines represent the beginning and the end of the Second Palestinian Intifada (starting in the fourth 
quarter of 2000 and ending in the second quarter of 2005). 
  
Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5. 2: The distribution of log daily wages for refugee and non-refugee workers in the West 
Bank and Gaza, 1999–2012 
Note: The vertical line represents the mean of the unadjusted log wage for each group.  
The distribution is obtained by kernel density estimates, bandwidth=0.7. 
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Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5. 3: Wage gap over the period (1999–2012) in the West Bank and Gaza 
Note: The solid line represents the wage gap between non-refugees and refugees in the West Bank, while the dashed 
line represents the differences between Palestinian refugees and Palestinian non-refugees in Gaza.  
 
5.3 Workers’ Characteristics and Occupational Differences 
Table (5.2) summarizes the means of the potential wage determinants for the period 1999–2012 
for Palestinian refugees and Palestinian non-refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, respectively. 
Panel (A) shows the labor force attributes, while Panel (B) presents the sectoral and occupational 
distribution for each group. The log real daily wage by refugee status is pooled for years in the 
period of interest. In the West Bank, the observed log real wage is higher for non-refugees, and 
the pooled wage gap is approximately 9 percent. In this table, I use two measures to control the 
educational background of labor market participants – years of schooling and tertiary degree – of 
which Palestinians in the two groups have similar levels of education. The participation of males 
is over-represented, with similar distributions (80 percent in the West Bank for the two groups). 
The two groups have the same experience and marital status and a similar ratio of workers in the 
private sector. The main factor that might explain the wage difference to the favor of non-
refugees is that the percentage of non-refugees working in Israel is higher than that observed 
among refugee workers (approximately one-third), since employment in Israel provides a wage 
premium over the local labor market. Refugees tend to be found more in the refugee camps, 
while non-refugees have similar distributions between urban and rural areas. Panel (B) shows the 
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occupational differences between the two groups in the West Bank and Gaza. The motivation for 
adding this table is that the wage differential literature has emphasized that the earning gap is 
generated not only by individual differences but also by systematic variation in the occupational 
structure, which serves to accentuate or exacerbate the effects of discrimination (Grodsky & 
Pager, 2001; O’Neill, 2003; Swed, 2014). The differences in occupational choices are 
represented across six different sectors and seven occupational groups. The descriptive analysis 
shows similar distributions of the sector choice among Palestinian non-refugees and Palestinian 
refugees in the West Bank with the exception of two sectors: construction and services. The per-
centage of non-refugees in construction is higher than the refugees’ share in the same sector by 5 
percent. This is consistent with the results obtained in panel (A), since construction represents 
the main sector for Palestinian employment in Israel, where non-refugees have a larger percen-
tage of employment than refugees. One of the explanations for this distribution is likely to be 
related to the restricted labor mobility imposed during and after the Second Intifada on refugee 
camps. Notably, during the period of interest, the largest share of both population groups is 
found in the service sector, with a greater proportion of refugees. Columns (3) and (4) show that 
the unconditional mean wages are higher for Palestinian refugees than for non-refugees in Gaza. 
This unadjusted wage gap is approximately 11 percent. Palestinian refugees in Gaza are better 
educated than non-refugees and have more experience. Similar to the West Bank, the share of 
non-refugee workers in Israel is larger than the refugees’ share. The average occupational status 
of refugees in Gaza is similar to that of non-refugees, the only exception being found in technical 
occupations, in which the share of refugee workers is greater than that of non-refugees.         
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Table 5. 2: Descriptive statistics: Differences between non-refugees and ref-
ugees in the West Bank and Gaza 
 West Bank   Gaza 
  
Non-
refugees Refugees   
Non-
refugees Refugees 
Differences in socio-economic characteristics  
Daily wage (NIS) 85.55 78.41  61.44 67.44 
Log wage 4.262 4.173  3.907 4.017 
Years of school  10.945 10.900  11.319 12.144 
University degree 0.329 0.326  0.358 0.458 
Male 0.830 0.807  0.914 0.861 
Experience 17.303 17.887  17.935 18.225 
Married 0.406 0.411  0.474 0.519 
Work in private sector 0.681 0.625  0.447 0.301 
Work in Israel 0.244 0.187  0.057 0.039 
Urban 0.500 0.372  0.901 0.477 
Rural 0.489 0.222  0.073 0.081 
Camp 0.011 0.406   0.026 0.442 
Sectoral and occupational differences  
Sectors      
Agriculture 0.050 0.048  0.089 0.049 
Manufacturing 0.163 0.138  0.079 0.058 
Construction 0.226 0.172  0.098 0.062 
Commerce 0.114 0.128  0.080 0.049 
Transport  0.030 0.032  0.046 0.029 
Service 0.417 0.482  0.608 0.753 
Occupations      
Manager 0.028 0.026  0.022 0.022 
Technical  0.298 0.313  0.355 0.443 
Service 0.110 0.118  0.208 0.221 
Skilled agric. 0.007 0.005  0.012 0.009 
Craft worker 0.197 0.172  0.118 0.087 
Machine operation 0.086 0.079  0.070 0.047 
Elementary  0.275 0.287   0.214 0.170 
N 107,159 47,623   19,915 50,095 
Source: Data collected by the Labor Force Survey (1999–2012) conducted by the PCBS. 
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5.4 Empirical Model 
 
Following the literature, I conduct wage regression analysis to capture the wage differences be-
tween non-refugees and refugees in the Palestinian territories with a dummy variable for the ref-
ugee group. In the following model, workers’ wages are a function of their demographic, human 
capital, and socio-economic characteristics and are specified as follows:   
𝐿𝑛 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑗 =  𝛼 + 𝛿𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑞𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗             (5.1)     
where Ln 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑗  is the logarithm of the daily wage of worker i in quarter t in district j. A dummy 
variable 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑗  takes the value of one if respondent i in quarter t in district j is defined as a regis-
tered refugee and zero otherwise, and it captures the wage differential for refugees. 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  captures 
the demographics, socio-economics, and job classification. 𝑑𝑗  stands for district fixed-effect 
dummies to control for cross-district differences, which vary little over time. 𝑞𝑡  represents the 
time (quarter) fixed effect. Finally, the term 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗  stands for the error term. The regressor vector 
Xitj includes gender, experience, and experience squared to account for life cycle wage earnings, 
years of schooling, personal status (a dummy takes the value one if the worker is married and 
zero otherwise), and a set of industry sector dummies to account for any cross-industry wage dif-
ferences. 
I also add seven occupational dummies to account for distinct profession–skill differences 
and a variable takes the value one if the worker works in Israel and zero otherwise. Further, the 
estimation includes a set of locality type dummies to account for the wage differences between 
urban areas, rural areas, and refugee camps. In addition, the estimation includes a dummy varia-
ble to show whether the locality has been affected by the West Bank separation wall
63
 and the 
proportion of the locality under area C.
64
 Time (quarter) dummies are added to capture any time 
                                                 
63
 The Israeli West Bank barrier or wall is a separation barrier built by the Israeli Government in the West Bank 
along the 1949 Armistice Line known as the ―Green Line‖ (B’Tselem, 2012). The barrier divides Palestinian 
communities, encircles some, and isolates others from their surroundings while separating East Jerusalem from the 
rest of the West Bank (UNESCO, 2014). 
64
 Area C: Areas in the West Bank are still under full Israeli military and civil control based on the Oslo Ac-
cords of 1993, while the Palestinian Authority (PA) has civil and security control in area A. The PA has civil auton-
omy but no security control in area B (Vishwanath et al., 2014). Communities in area C are living in difficult life 
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variation shocks in the region. All the standard errors are clustered at the locality level (worker’s 
locality of residence).   
However, the OLS procedures as specified above do not control for workers’ unobserved 
characteristics, such as their innate ability, which might affect the wage differences across work-
ers. To estimate the extent to which any wage differential between Palestinian non-refugees and 
Palestinian refugees is attributed to unobserved worker characteristics, I employ the Oaxaca–
Blinder (1973) decomposition technique, which separates the wage gap into an explained part 
based on the observed characteristics (workers’ endowment effect) and an unexplained part (un-
observed workers’ characteristics). The wage decomposition equation is specified as follows:  
 
𝐿𝑛 𝑊𝑅=0 −  𝐿𝑛 𝑊𝑅=1 =     𝑋  R =0 − X
 
 R =1   𝛽R=0 + X
 
 R =0
 𝛽R=0 − 𝛽R=1 +  X  R =0 − X
 
 R =1  𝛽R=0 − 𝛽R=1             (5.2) 
The left-hand term is the difference in mean log wages between non-refugees and refugees in 
Palestinian territories during the period of interest. The right-hand side consists of three parts. 
The first term is the human capital component of the overall wage gap; it is the difference in the 
distribution of average characteristics between workers according to their refugee status esti-
mated in equation (5.1) (the endowment effect). The second and third parts together represent the 
unexplained component of the overall wage gap. The second term refers to the wage differential 
that is attributed to differences in the estimated coefficients of both models (it measures the ex-
pected change in refugee workers’ wages if they have non-refugee workers’ attributes). The third 
part is an interaction term that accounts for the difference in endowment and coefficient effects. 
  The validity of the Oaxaca decomposition method depends largely on whether the model 
captures all the dimensions in which the skills of the two groups differ (Borjas & Van Ours, 
2010). One can argue that the estimation model seldom observes all the components that make 
up a worker’s human capital, for example ability and the quality of education. In fact, the majori-
ty of Palestinian refugees enroll in UNRWA schooling systems, which provide free primary edu-
cation until grade 9 (UNESCO, 2011). The UNRWA schools adopt the same national curriculum 
                                                                                                                                                             
circumstances due to the lack of major services. Workers from area C also experience a wage penalty compared with 
other workers from localities in areas A and B (Fallah & Daoud, 2015). 
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as the host country, and, in spite of the adverse circumstances in which Palestinian refugee stu-
dents live, they achieve higher than average learning outcomes compared with other governmen-
tal school students, as indicated by the World Bank (Abdul-Hamid, Patrinos, Reyes, Kelcey, & 
Varela, 2015). Another factor that might affect the wage gap is the selection bias, and economists 
have dealt with this using the standard two-step estimation method proposed by Heckman 
(1974), which attempts to control for the selection by modeling what determines it.
65
 In the cur-
rent study, the main coefficient (refugees’ status) is an exogenous factor and is obtained only 
through paternal inheritance.     
 
5.5 Results  
5.5.1 OLS Results   
Table (5.3) summarizes the OLS results from the estimation in equation (5.1). Panels (A) and (B) 
show the effect of being a refugee on workers’ earnings in the West Bank and Gaza, respective-
ly. The results present the estimations for the pooled sample of all 14 years. All the estimations 
include district and quarter fixed effect. The results in Table (5.3) are obtained using different 
specifications to explore the extent to which workers’ characteristics explain any refugee work-
ers’ wage differentials. The findings in Panel (A) suggest that the status of being a refugee has a 
negative impact on workers’ earnings even after controlling for workers’ observable demograph-
ic characteristics. Adding the working in Israel dummy (in column 3) reduces the impact of the 
refugee status coefficient from 9 percent to 5 percent. Consistent with several works in the litera-
ture about the labor market in Palestine (Fallah, 2017; Fallah & Daoud, 2015; Mansour, 2010; 
Miaari, 2009), the working in Israel coefficient explains many labor wages in Palestinian territo-
ries. In the employed sample, this coefficient provides a wage premium of more than 50 percent 
for West Bank workers and 85 percent for workers in Gaza. Column (4) presents the results after 
adding the set of all controls mentioned in equation (5.1) and demonstrates that the refugee coef-
ficient still significantly reduces West Bank workers’ wages by 3 percent.     
                                                 
65
 Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure is used to estimate the probit selection equation and the wage eq-
uation with the inverse Mills ratio (Heckman, 1979). 
                                                                                                                                     
148 
 
The registered refugees’ distribution in the employed sample is significantly different in the 
West Bank from in the Gaza Strip. While they represent 29 percent in the West Bank labor force 
participants, their participation in Gaza reaches 70 percent. In Gaza, the refugee coefficient 
shows a significant positive impact on workers’ earnings during the period of interest. This coef-
ficient reduces approximately to half after adding workers’ demographic characteristics (from 10 
percent to 5 percent). Column (4), in Panel (B), suggests that refugees earn 3 percent more than 
non-refugees with the same demographics and occupational attributes.   
With regard to the control variables between the two regions, the return to education is simi-
lar for the West Bank and Gaza workers after controlling for all the demographic and occupa-
tional variables, and males enjoy higher wages in both regions.  
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Table 5. 3: Effect of refugee status on workers’ earnings 
 Dep. variable: Log wage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: West Bank  
     Refugee status -0.087*** -0.090*** -0.059*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) 
Male 
 
0.384*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 
  
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009) 
Years of education 
 
0.039*** 0.052*** 0.038*** 
  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Working in Israel 
  
0.564*** 0.530*** 
   
(0.020) (0.016) 
     Observations 154,703 154,694 154,694 154,657 
R-squared 0.516 0.610 0.696 0.724 
Panel B: Gaza Strip  
     Refugee status 0.102*** 0.048*** 0.059*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
Male 
 
0.145*** 0.136*** 0.213*** 
  
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
Years of education  
 
0.073*** 0.078*** 0.038*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Working in Israel 
  
0.846*** 1.026*** 
   
(0.028) (0.025) 
     Observations 70,010 70,010 70,010 70,010 
R-squared 0.342 0.547 0.594 0.691 
District fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Quarter fixed effect  YES YES YES YES 
Demographic controls  NO YES  YES YES 
Locality control  NO NO NO YES 
Occupation dummies NO NO NO YES 
Industry dummies  NO NO NO YES 
Sector (private/public) NO NO NO YES 
Note: The robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The data were collected by 
the Labor Force Survey (1999–2012) conducted by the PCBS. All the regressions’ specifications are based on 
wage equations with the regressors gender, experience, experience squared, years of schooling, marital status, 
urban area/refugee camp residence, percentage of the locality under area C, whether the locality was affected by 
the separation wall, a dummy for working in Israel, a dummy for working in the private sector, quarter and district 
fixed effects, and a set of occupational and industry dummies. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * 
p<0.1. 
5.5.2 Wage Gap Decomposition   
The previous section demonstrates that Palestinian refugees in the West Bank/Gaza earn low-
er/higher wages than their relative non-refugees even after controlling for a large set of observa-
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ble individual, socio-economic, and geographical characteristics. Still, unobserved workers’ ef-
fects might be influential. This also addresses the issue of how each group equally is paid (along 
similar characteristics to the relative attributes). The following section contains two types of 
analysis: the first one sheds light on the overall wage gap in the Palestinian territory between the 
two groups during the period 1999–2012 (pooled sample), while the second part presents the 
analysis of the wage gap on an annual basis for the West Bank and Gaza workers separately.  
 The first column in Table (5.4) presents the decomposition result for the West Bank work-
ers’ wage gap, while the results for Gaza workers’ wage gap decomposition are presented in the 
second column. The decomposition output contains two parts. The first panel reports the mean 
predictions by groups and their difference. In the employed sample, the mean of the daily log 
wages for the West Bank workers is 4.262 for Palestinian non-refugees and 4.174 for Palestinian 
refugees, yielding a wage gap of 0.09 between the two groups. This wage gap is divided into two 
parts. The first part reflects the mean increase in refugees’ wages if they have the same characte-
ristics as non-refugees. This increase (0.0561) suggests that around 63 percent of the wage diffe-
rential during the period (1999–2012) in the West Bank can be attributed to differences in work-
ers’ observed characteristics. The second part demonstrates the unexplained part of the wage dif-
ferential between the two groups, which explains around 37 percent of the total wage gap. This 
part represents the second and the third term in equation (5.2), which quantifies the change in 
refugees’ wages when applying the non-refugees’ coefficients to refugees’ characteristics and the 
interaction term that measures the simultaneous effect of differences in endowments and coeffi-
cients.  
The second column in Table (5.4) describes the wage differentials between the two groups in 
Gaza. The decomposition shows that Palestinian refugees face a positive wage premium of, on 
average, 11 percent. More than 78 percent of this wage gap is due to differences in workers’ ob-
served characteristics (8 percent), while the remainder (approximately 3 percent) can be inter-
preted as a positive wage premium due to difference in prices paid for the refugee workers’ cha-
racteristics.  
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Table 5.4: Oaxaca–Blinder wage decomposition (1999–2012) 
 (1) (2) 
 West Bank Gaza 
   
Variable  Log wage  Log wage 
   
Non-refugee 4.262*** 3.907*** 
 (0.00223) (0.00520) 
Refugee 4.174*** 4.017*** 
 (0.00336) (0.00320) 
Log wage differences 0.0885*** -0.109*** 
 (0.00404) (0.00611) 
 
Decomposition of the log wage difference 
   
Explained by differences in workers’ characteristics   
 Endowments 0.0561*** -0.0816*** 
 (0.00371) (0.00542) 
Unexplained part: Coefficients 0.0325*** -0.0276*** 
 (0.00257) (0.00379) 
   
Observations 154,690 70,010 
   
Source: The data were collected by the Labor Force Survey (1999–2012) conducted by the PCBS. All the re-
gressions’ specifications are based on wage equations with the regressors, gender, experience, experience 
squared, years of schooling, marital status, urban area/refugee camp residence, percentage of the locality under 
area C, whether the locality was affected by the separation wall, a dummy for working in Israel, a dummy for 
working in the private sector, quarter and district fixed effects, and a set of occupational and industry dummies. 
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
 
The analyses in Table (5.4) present the mean wage gaps between the two groups but do not pro-
vide information about how the wage gap varies by observed characteristics. Table (5.5) shows 
the decomposition results for selected variables. These variables are gender, schooling, expe-
rience, and experience squared to indicate seniority, working in Israel, and working in the private 
sector. Male workers have a wage premium over female workers, and the gender coefficient is in 
favor of non-refugee workers. With regard to education, the negative value for the unexplained 
part of the schooling coefficient indicates that educated refugees in the West Bank are paid more 
than non-refugees. One of the potential explanations for this result could be the fact that the 
UNRWA provides refugees with many working opportunities, particularly in the education and 
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health service sectors, in which the salaries are determined administratively by the level of edu-
cation and tenure rather than productivity (Tansel & Daoud, 2011).
66
 Experience represents an 
important source of wage inequality. The negative value of the explained part of the experience 
coefficient means that the gap would increase if the two groups had equal experiences. However, 
this discrimination is softened by the effect of the quadratic association between experience and 
wages, and the accumulated experience reduces the wage gap.
67
 As expected, working in Israel 
makes a significant contribution (more than 50 percent) to explaining the wage gap in favor of 
non-refugee laborers. Finally, wage discrimination against refugees tends to be more prevalent in 
the private sector, since much of its labor force tends to be classified as unskilled workers 
(Daoud & Shanti, 2016; Miaari, 2009). The analysis in Table (5.5.a) suggests that working in 
Israel explains much of the wage differential among different groups. For example, Swed (2014) 
attributed the decrease in the gender gap in Palestinian territories during the Second Intifada to 
males’ reducing ability to access the Israeli market due to the closure policy. Notably, some ref-
ugee camps in the West Bank experienced harsher movement restrictions due to greater in-
volvement in violent conflict with the Israeli military during the Second Intifada than those in 
other localities.
68
 Reducing the number of workers inside Israel can also explain part of the de-
creasing unadjusted wage gap between non-refugees and refugees during the Second Intifada, as 
Figure (5.1) suggests. Palestinian employment in Israel started after the 1967 war. Part of the 
Israeli leadership encouraged the integration between the Palestinian and the Israeli economy to 
                                                 
66 
Tansel and Daoud (2011) indicated that the highest return to education in Palestine during 2004 and 2008 was 
observed for workers employed in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the UNRWA.    
 67 In Figures (5.A.5.a) and (5.A.5.b), I use the STATA command specify detail (exp:exp*) to subsume expe-
rience and experience squared. Figure (5.A.5.a) shows the effect of experience and its quadratic value together and 
suggests that the gap would increase if non-refugee and refugee workers had equal experiences. In general, the coef-
ficient for experience is expected to be positive (linear) and that for experience squared to be negative (non-linear). 
The wage increases with age as people become more experienced, but, with greater age, the wage starts to increase 
at a decreasing rate, and at a certain point it does not grow (reaches the optimal wage level) and then starts to fall 
(after retirement). 
68
 During the Second Intifada, Israel took the initiative to bring the fighting to the refugee camps in Nablus and 
Jenin (Eiland, 2010). For example, according to Human Rights Watch (2002), during Operation Defensive Shield in 
2002, more than 50 Palestinians were killed in Jenin refugee camps, since this camp served as a launch site for nu-
merous attacks against Israeli targets.  
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improve the quality of life of Palestinian people. They argued that higher income and a low un-
employment level would reduce Palestinian resistance to the occupation. On the other hand, this 
provided Palestinian access to Israeli territories, which would raise some concerns regarding the 
security of Israel (Gazit, 1995; Miaari, Zussman, & Zussman, 2014). The Israeli Government 
implemented two policies that severely affected the Palestinian labor market, substituting Pales-
tinian labor with foreigners and imposing movement restrictions. These two factors are corre-
lated and interdependent. Increasing the movement restriction on Palestinian laborers would re-
duce their ability to access the Israeli market, increase absent days, and motivate Israeli employ-
ers to substitute them with foreigner workers (Miaari & Sauer, 2011). Many factors play a signif-
icant role in creating barriers in front of Palestinian movements, such as closures, checkpoints, 
and curfews (Calì & Miaari, 2013), and many localities in the West Bank are categorized as area 
C and contained the separation wall after 2005 (Vishwanath et al., 2014). Figure (5.A.6.a) and 
(5.A.6.b)  in the appendix show that, following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 
2000, the number of Palestinians from both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who were em-
ployed in Israel dropped sharply. This shock to the labor supply also had a heterogeneous impact 
on Palestinians’ wages based on their educational attainment (skilled vs. unskilled labor) (Man-
sour, 2010) and employment sector (e.g., public vs. private; rural wages vs. urban wages) (Miaa-
ri, 2009). Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) indicated that Palestinian districts that were in-
volved in conflict with Israel experienced more adverse economic consequences (an increase in 
unemployment, a decrease in wages, and a reduction in the number of Palestinians working in 
Israel) than other districts during the Second Intifada period.  
The wage gap decomposition in Gaza was in favor of refugee workers. To avoid confusion of 
the coefficient sign, I change the reference group to non-refugees; therefore, unlike in the West 
Bank, the positive wage gap in Table (5.5.b) represents the wage differential between refugees 
and non-refugees. The education and private sector coefficients explain most of this gap. Work-
ing in Israel gives a wage premium in Gaza to refugee workers; the wage gap will increase in 
favor of refugee workers if the two groups have access to the Israeli labor market. Neither expe-
rience nor accumulated experience plays a significant role in determining the wage gap between 
the two groups in Gaza.  
Figures (5.A.5.a) and (5.A.5.b) depict the wage gap decomposition for selected variables 
among the two groups in the two regions for the pooled sample of all 14 years.  
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Table 5.5 
Table 5.5 a: Wage decomposition for selected variables in the West Bank 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
   Differential Explained Unexplained   
Non-refugee log wage 4.262*** 
   
 
(0.00223) 
   Refugee log wage 4.174*** 
   
 
(0.00336) 
   Log wage differences 0.0885*** 
     (0.00404)       
Wage decomposition for selected variables 
     Male 
 
0.00652*** 0.0528*** 
 
  
(0.000629) (0.00556) 
 Years of education  
 
0.00171** -0.0213** 
 
  
(0.000813) (0.00996) 
 Experience 
 
-0.0142*** 0.0258* 
 
  
(0.00153) (0.0131) 
 Experience
2
 
 
0.00542*** -0.0152** 
 
  
(0.000901) (0.00683) 
 Working in Israel 
 
0.0302*** -0.00829*** 
 
  
(0.00118) (0.00123) 
 Private sector 
 
-0.00372*** 0.0515*** 
 
  
(0.000295) (0.00579) 
 Constant 
  
-0.00304 
 
   
(0.0307) 
 
     Total 
 
0.0561*** 0.0325*** 
 
  
(0.00371) (0.00257) 
 Observations 154,690       
Source: The data were collected by the Labor Force Survey (1999–2012) conducted by the 
PCBS. All the regressions’ specifications are based on wage equations with the regressors 
gender, experience, experience squared, years of schooling, marital status, urban area/refugee 
camp residence, percentage of the locality under area C, whether the locality was affected by 
the separation wall, a dummy for working in Israel, a dummy for working in the private sec-
tor, quarter and district fixed effects, and a set of occupational and industry dummies. Signi-
ficance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.5 b: Wage decomposition for selected variables in Gaza 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Differential Explained Unexplained 
        
Refugee log wage 4.017*** 
  
 
(0.00320) 
  Non-refugee log wage 3.907*** 
  
 
(0.00520) 
  Log wage differences 0.109*** 
  
 
(0.00611) 
  Wage decomposition for selected variables 
    Male 
 
-0.0114*** -0.0696*** 
  
(0.000619) (0.0132) 
Years of education  
 
0.0311*** 0.0234 
  
(0.00141) (0.0158) 
Experience 
 
0.00931*** -0.0290 
  
(0.00293) (0.0256) 
Experience
2
 
 
-0.00196 0.0129 
  
(0.00193) (0.0137) 
Work in Israel 
 
-0.0190*** -0.00309*** 
  
(0.00191) (0.000979) 
Private sector 
 
0.0523*** -0.0170** 
  
(0.00201) (0.00800) 
Constant 
  
0.0278 
   
(0.0509) 
Total 
 
0.0816*** 0.0276*** 
  
(0.00542) (0.00379) 
Observations 70,010 
  Source: The data were collected by the Labor Force Survey (1999–2012) conducted 
by the PCBS. All the regressions’ specifications are based on wage equations with 
the regressors gender, experience, experience squared, years of schooling, marital 
status, urban area/refugee camp residence, percentage of the locality under area C, 
whether the locality was affected by the separation wall, a dummy for working in 
Israel, a dummy for working in the private sector, quarter and district fixed effects, 
and a set of occupational and industry dummies. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
 
 
Next, I analyze the wage differentials between the two groups in the West Bank and Gaza over 
time. The following analyses do not include observations for workers who report their place of 
work as Israel or Israeli settlements to avoid an estimation bias that would mask any wage diffe-
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rential between non-refugees and refugees.
69
 Those workers represent 17 percent of the overall 
sample.
70
    
The figures in Table (5.6), column (3), indicate the mean (log) wage differential between the 
non-refugee and the refugee Palestinian workers in the West Bank (panel A) and the Gaza Strip 
(panel B). Column (4) represents the sum or aggregate of the endowment effect, ―the explained 
difference,‖ while the treatment effect, the unexplained difference, is presented in column (5). In 
the West Bank, the wage gap decreases over the last two years of the Second Uprising period 
(2003–2004) and then increases rapidly over time. This gap reaches its peak in 2009 and then 
decreases relatively during the following years. The analysis in panel (A) also shows that, during 
the Second Intifada (2001–2005), most of the wage gap is attributed to the endowment effect due 
to the differences in observed characteristics among the two groups. Then, after 2007, a greater 
weight is given to the treatment effect. Notably, before the Second Intifada, in 1999, the large 
positive endowment impact on refugees’ characteristics is offset by the negative treatment effect 
component. 
Furthermore, the explained part in 2011 shows a negative result, which suggests that the gap 
would increase if the two groups had equal observed characteristics; this could indicate wage 
discrimination against refugees. In most cases, both the treatment effect and the endowment ef-
fect are positive and work in the same direction to provide a remarkable wage premium to non-
refugee workers over refugees. More than 50 percent of this premium, especially after the 
Second Intifada, is due to the treatment effect.   
Panel (B) presents the wage gap between non-refugees and refugees among Gazan workers. 
The wage gap increases rapidly over time to the advantage of the refugees’ group. Within 14 
years, the wage gap increased from 6 percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2012. After the Second 
                                                 
69
 A strand of the existing literature on Palestinian economics has eliminated employment in Israeli when trying 
to explain the wage differential in the Palestinian labor market; for example, see Fallah (2017); Fallah and Daoud 
(2015); and Miaari (2009). 
70
 The percentage of employment in Israel varies significantly between the West Bank and Gaza. While those 
workers represent 22.75 percent of the West Bank sample (35,959 observations), in Gaza they only account for 4.39 
percent (3,074) of observations. According to the regression results in Table (5.3), working in Israel gives Palestini-
an laborers, on average, a 55 percent wage premium in the West Bank and a more than 80 percent wage premium in 
Gaza. 
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Intifada, the vast majority of the wage gap is attributable to the endowment effect, while the 
treatment effect had more significant influence in earlier years of the study. 
 The results show that, in the pre-Intifada period, the wage gap between non-refugee and ref-
ugee workers was at its lowest level, with an opposite direction in both the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. However, in the post-Intifada period, a sharp increase is observed to the favor of ref-
ugees in the Gaza Strip. In contrast, the wage gap in the West Bank increased sharply only in 
2009, then declined to the level close to that observed during the Second Intifada period. This 
wage gap consistently favors non-refugee workers. The results show a wage penalty for having 
refugee status in the West Bank, and a large part of this penalty can be attributed to the unex-
plained effect of wage decomposition components.     
Figure (5.4) depicts the wage gap decomposition between 1999 and 2012 between the two 
groups in the two regions (panel A). In panel (B), the wage gap represents the wage differential 
between refugee and non-refugee workers in Gaza. 
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Table 5.6: Decomposing the wage differential over time 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
     % 
Year  Observations Log wage gap Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
Panel A: West Bank 
1999 7,224 0.028 0.041 -0.014 149% -49% 
2000 9,485 0.066 0.047 0.019 72% 28% 
2001 7,721 0.049 0.033 0.015 68% 32% 
2002 5,646 0.062 0.036 0.026 58% 42% 
2003 6,931 0.015 0.009 0.006 57% 43% 
2004 6,985 0.034 0.025 0.009 73% 27% 
2005 8,538 0.064 0.039 0.025 61% 39% 
2006 8,987 0.069 0.031 0.038 45% 55% 
2007 9,054 0.071 0.039 0.032 55% 45% 
2008 6,847 0.058 0.014 0.044 24% 76% 
2009 10,085 0.102 0.045 0.057 44% 56% 
2010 10,675 0.047 0.001 0.046 2% 98% 
2011 11,249 0.048 -0.002 0.050 -5% 105% 
2012 10,191 0.049 0.023 0.026 46% 54% 
Panel B: Gaza Strip 
1999 3,997 -0.060 -0.032 -0.028 53% 47% 
2000 5,387 -0.058 -0.016 -0.043 27% 73% 
2001 4,466 -0.037 0.001 -0.038 -2% 102% 
2002 3,672 -0.046 0.032 -0.078 -70% 170% 
2003 4,536 -0.077 -0.048 -0.029 63% 37% 
2004 4,439 -0.098 -0.076 -0.022 78% 22% 
2005 5,041 -0.132 -0.116 -0.016 88% 12% 
2006 4,572 -0.158 -0.138 -0.020 87% 13% 
2007 4,831 -0.225 -0.181 -0.044 80% 20% 
2008 2,814 -0.183 -0.181 -0.002 99% 1% 
2009 5,105 -0.169 -0.164 -0.005 97% 3% 
2010 5,357 -0.181 -0.198 0.017 109% -9% 
2011 6,305 -0.224 -0.203 -0.021 91% 9% 
2012 6,414 -0.165 -0.162 -0.003 98% 2% 
Note: Specifications based on wage equations with the regressors gender, experience, experience squared, years of 
schooling, personal status, urban area/refugee camp residence, percentage of the locality under area C, whether the 
locality was affected by the separation wall, the quarterly fixed effect, a dummy for working in the private sector, 
and a set of occupational and industry dummies. The analysis does not include laborers working in Israel. The log 
wage gap represents the difference between non-refugee and refugee workers. Explained refers to the human capital 
component of the wage gap (endowment effect), and unexplained refers to the treatment effect component of the 
wage gap. All the items in bold typeface are statistically significant at the conventional level of 5 percent or better. 
The wage gap in both regions represents the difference between the log wages of non-refugee and refugee workers.  
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Note: The wage gap represents the differences between non-refugees’ and refugees’ salaries in the West Bank. 
 
Note: The wage gap represents the differences between refugees’ and non-refugees’ salaries in Gaza. 
Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5. 4: Wage gap decomposition over the period 1999–2012 
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5.5.3 Wage Gap for Skilled and Unskilled Workers 
Employment in the Palestinian territories is regulated by the applied Palestinian labor law, such 
as the minimum wage, anti-discrimination, equal employment opportunities, and other em-
ployees’ benefits. However, the compliance rate with these regulations is higher in skilled labor 
jobs that require more than 12 years of education than in unskilled labor jobs (Fallah, 2016). Less 
skilled workers usually look for employment in Israel, since it provides better wages. Thus, less 
skilled wages are more adversely affected by closures than highly skilled labor (Mansour, 2010). 
The unskilled workers in the Palestinian labor market are homogeneous, so we would expect the 
wage gap to be attributed more to the treatment effect than the endowment component of the 
wage gap if it exists (Miaari, 2009). Table (5.7) presents the decomposition of the wage gap for 
the skilled; this gap, among skilled laborers in the West Bank, increased during the first two 
years of the Second Intifada. Then, it decreased until the last three years of the study period, 
when the gap became close to the unskilled workers’ wage gap. Before and during the Second 
Intifada, the endowment effect contributed the vast majority of the wage gap among the un-
skilled workers in the West Bank, while most of the wage differential after 2007 is attributed to 
the treatment effect. A possible explanation may lie in the availability of few working opportuni-
ties for low-skilled refugee workers in their host communities. The only exception can be found 
in 2006 and 2007, two years after the Second Intifada was over, when the wage gap among un-
skilled workers reached the maximum level, and both the endowment and the treatment effect 
make a significant contribution to explaining this gap. In Gaza, the wage gap for both skilled and 
unskilled labor increased over the period 1999–2012. Similar to the West Bank, the wage gap 
among unskilled laborers is greater than the skilled labor wage gap but favors refugees. Unlike 
the West Bank, the human capital component among skilled workers made up the majority of the 
overall wage gap until 2006, when Hamas controlled the Palestinian Legislative Council elec-
tions then commanded the Gaza Strip overall in 2007, and then the treatment effect had a more 
significant impact in the following years. Most of the wage gap among unskilled workers over 
the years is explained by the endowment compensation and follows the pattern of the overall 
gross gap.      
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Table 5.7: Wage differential decomposition by skill group 
  
West Bank 
 
Gaza Strip 
  
Skilled 
 
Unskilled 
 
Skilled 
 
Unskilled 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) (9) (10) 
 
(11) (12) (13) 
Year  
 
Δ W E U 
 
Δ W E U 
 
Δ W E U 
 
Δ W E U 
1999 
 
-0.011 0.033 -0.044 
 
0.052 0.050 0.002 
 
-0.015 0.040 -0.055 
 
-0.026 -0.004 -0.022 
2000 
 
0.028 0.025 0.003 
 
0.083 0.054 0.029 
 
-0.009 0.045 -0.054 
 
-0.063 -0.020 -0.044 
2001 
 
0.054 0.037 0.017 
 
0.039 0.037 0.002 
 
0.016 0.066 -0.050 
 
-0.075 -0.038 -0.038 
2002 
 
-0.002 0.004 -0.006 
 
0.110 0.086 0.024 
 
0.022 0.138 -0.117 
 
-0.073 -0.015 -0.058 
2003 
 
-0.060 -0.032 -0.028 
 
0.064 0.045 0.020 
 
0.000 0.041 -0.041 
 
-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 
2004 
 
-0.011 0.005 -0.016 
 
0.035 0.018 0.017 
 
-0.008 0.035 -0.043 
 
-0.111 -0.095 -0.017 
2005 
 
0.011 0.011 0.000 
 
0.071 0.044 0.027 
 
0.016 0.036 -0.020 
 
-0.142 -0.128 -0.014 
2006 
 
0.018 -0.014 0.032 
 
0.080 0.039 0.041 
 
-0.050 0.005 -0.054 
 
-0.130 -0.125 -0.005 
2007 
 
0.016 0.010 0.006 
 
0.095 0.042 0.054 
 
-0.101 -0.020 -0.081 
 
-0.189 -0.168 -0.021 
2008 
 
0.015 0.007 0.007 
 
0.073 0.008 0.065 
 
-0.118 -0.036 -0.082 
 
-0.155 -0.205 0.050 
2009 
 
0.001 -0.003 0.004 
 
0.075 0.003 0.073 
 
-0.088 -0.033 -0.055 
 
0.024 0.004 0.020 
2010 
 
0.019 -0.022 0.040 
 
0.057 -0.024 0.080 
 
-0.040 -0.035 -0.006 
 
-0.160 -0.188 0.028 
2011 
 
0.018 -0.002 0.021 
 
0.055 0.016 0.039 
 
-0.048 -0.013 -0.036 
 
-0.197 -0.188 -0.009 
2012 
 
0.034 -0.028 0.062 
 
0.033 -0.009 0.041 
 
-0.086 -0.042 -0.044 
 
-0.082 -0.108 0.026 
Source: Author calculations using the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS) by the PCBS. 
Notes: A skilled worker is defined as one with more than 12 years of schooling. The specifications are based on wage equations with the regressors gender, expe-
rience, experience squared, years of schooling, personal status, urban area/refugee camp residence, percentage of the locality under area C, whether the locality was 
affected by the separation wall, the quarter fixed effect, a dummy for private sector employment, and a set of occupational and industry dummies. The analyses do 
not include laborers working in Israel. Δ W represents the difference in the daily log wage between non-refugee and refugee workers. E refers to the explained hu-
man capital component of the wage gap (endowment effect), and U refers to the unexplained treatment effect component of the wage gap. All the items in bold type-
face are statistically significant at the conventional level of 10 percent or better. The wage gap in both regions represents the difference between the log wages of 
non-refugee and refugee workers. 
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5.6 Robustness Checks  
Table (5.8) provides additional results that are consistent with the main findings in this work. In 
panel (A), I include all refugees in the sample, regardless of their registration status; the number of 
Palestinian refugees in the working sample increases by approximately 9,800 observations.
71
  I al-
so divide the period into three periods, before, during, and after the Second Palestinian Intifada 
(October 2000–May 2005), since it caused a significant shock to the Palestinian labor market (Di 
Maio & Nandi, 2013; Mansour, 2010; Miaari, 2009).
72
 All the estimations include the set of all the 
controls mentioned in equation (5.1) in addition to the district and quarter fixed effects. The esti-
mations do not include observations that recorded their working place as Israel. Similar to the re-
sults obtained in Table (3.1), the findings show the same pattern of effects, except before the 
Second Intifada period, when the coefficient gives an insignificant negative/positive sign in the 
two regions. In the West Bank, and after the Second Intifada, Palestinian refugees earn about 4 
percent less than non-refugees with the same demographic and socio-economic characteristics. 
This adverse effect is approximately twice as large as the percentage obtained during the Second 
Intifada periods. In Gaza, the effect of the refugee coefficient increases to 4 percent during the 
Second Intifada and then decreases after this period but still has a significant positive impact; it 
gives refugees a wage premium of 2 percent more than non-refugees after the Second Intifada.  
  Panel (B) shows an interaction dummy for whether the respondent is a refugee and lives in a 
camp. Despite the fact that Palestinian refugees have the same citizenship and legal status as non-
refugees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, social discrimination and other forms of mistreat-
ment towards refugees residing in camps are increasingly prevalent (Al Husseini & Bocco, 2009; 
PCBS, 2010b).
73
 In the West Bank, the effect of the interaction dummy is significantly larger than 
the refugee coefficient alone. During and after the Second Intifada, the interaction coefficient in-
creased from 5 percent to 10 percent, which is more substantial than the impact of refugee status 
on workers’ earnings obtained in Table (5.3), panel (A). In Gaza, the sign for the interaction coef-
                                                 
71 
The UNRWA does not recognize the Palestinian refugees who did not seek refugee status in one of UNRWA’s 
fields of operations, those who chose not to register with it (Al Husseini & Bocco, 2009), and the Palestinians who lost 
their land and their property as a result of the 1967 war (MIFTAH, 2003). 
72
 In all the calculations, the Second Intifada started in the fourth quarter of 2000 and ended in the second quarter 
of 2005. 
73
 The perceived discrimination against refugees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is less than that in other 
countries, like Syria and Lebanon (Al Husseini & Bocco, 2009).   
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ficient during the three periods changes and becomes negative but insignificant. These results sug-
gest that Palestinians living in camps have the worst living conditions of all Palestinian citizens. 
However, UNRWA services are provided for registered refugees regardless of their economic sta-
tus (Al Husseini & Bocco, 2009). The results in panel (C) show the effect of the refugee coeffi-
cient on the unemployment status of the respondents. All the estimations are obtained by probit 
estimation, and the outcome variable takes the value 1 if the respondent was unemployed during 
the quarter of the survey and 0 otherwise. Before and during the Second Intifada, there is no signif-
icant impact of refugees’ status on unemployment. After the Second Intifada, the refugee coeffi-
cient increases the individual probability of being unemployed by 15 percent in the West Bank and 
6 percent in Gaza. These results are interesting, since the unemployment rate in all Palestinian ter-
ritories during the Second Intifada was the highest compared with the overall rates in the years af-
ter the Second Intifada due to mobility restrictions (Mansour, 2010; Miaari et al., 2014).   
Table (5.9) shows different impacts of refugees’ status on earnings according to workers’ 
gender and employment sector. In Palestine, a gender wage gap exists in favor of males (Swed, 
2014). The return to schooling favors women and plays a remarkable role in decreasing the gender 
wage differentials (Daoud, 2005; Rizk, 2016; Swed, 2014; Tansel & Daoud, 2011). Furthermore, 
the less educated labor force is found to be in the private sector, since this sector is competing not 
only with the public sector but also with many non-governmental organizations to recruit and re-
tain good human resources (Daoud & Shanti, 2016). During and after the Second Intifada, the Pal-
estinian labor market experienced a rapid decrease in private sector wages; this was due to an in-
crease in the Palestinian labor supply as a result of the sharp decline in the number of Palestinians 
working in Israel (Miaari, 2009). In panel (A), columns (2) and (4), the refugee status coefficient 
has a more adverse impact on males’ earnings and on private sector wages in the West Bank than 
the coefficient obtained for the entire sample in Table (5.3), while the impact on females’ earnings 
and on public sector wages is close to zero. These results are consistent with the results obtained in 
Table (5.7), since skilled labor is to be found more in the public sector, in which the gap in skilled 
laborers’ wages is too small and most of this gap, if it exists, is explained by the endowment effect. 
In Gaza, the results are in line with the main results for the positive influence of refugees’ coeffi-
cient on female/male workers’ earnings in the public sector only, while this impact vanishes in pri-
vate sector wages.  
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Panel (B) in Table (5.9) provides evidence that gender differences exist by sector of employ-
ment. In both regions, the gender differences for refugees’ status are in favor of females, and they 
are more significant in the public than in the private sector.
74
 According to Figures (5.A.1.a) and  
(5.A.1.b), the share of workers’ distribution in the West Bank in the private sector is larger than 
that in the public sector for both groups. Meanwhile, in Gaza, public employment consists of a 
more substantial share of workers than the private sector, Figures (5.A.2.a) and (5.A.2.b). The only 
exception is during the pre-Second Intifada period (1999–2000), when non-refugee workers in Ga-
za tended to be observed more in the private sector, while refugee workers were more concentrated 
in the public sector, which includes employment in the UNRWA. Figures (5.A.3 and 5.A.4) in the 
appendix show the wage gap decomposition by gender over years in the two regions. In contrast to 
males’ wage in the West Bank, female refugees enjoy positive wage gaps in most years, and a sig-
nificant part of this wage premium reflects differences in individual human capital. In Gaza, the 
wage differential decomposition results for females and males show the same trend. However, 
even though most of the wage gap in Gaza is due to differences in workers’ characteristics (the 
explained wage gap), differences in the prices paid for the employees’ characteristics (the unex-
plained wage gap) are more prevalent in females’ wage gap.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74
 Fallah (2017) indicated the important role of public employment in the West Bank on both tradable and non-
tradable sectors through the positive impact of public employment on the number of local entrepreneurs (employers 
and self-employers).  
 
                                                                                                                                     
165 
 
Table 5. 8: Robustness checks: The effect of refugee status on wages and unemployment 
 
Before the Second 
Intifada  
 
During the Second Inti-
fada  
 
After the Second Inti-
fada  
 
1999–2000 
 
2001–2004 
 
2005–2012 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (9) 
  West Bank Gaza   West Bank Gaza   West Bank Gaza 
Panel A – Dependent variable: Log wage, OLS estimation  
Refugee -0.0130 0.0245 
 
-0.0157* 0.0392*** 
 
-0.0388*** 0.0186* 
 
(0.0105) (0.0193) 
 
(0.00862) (0.00838) 
 
(0.00726) (0.00955) 
         R-squared 0.493 0.621 
 
0.500 0.427 
 
0.788 0.757 
Panel B – Dependent variable: Log wage, OLS estimation 
Registered refugee * lives in 
a camp 
-0.060 -0.042 
 
-0.053* -0.042 
 
-0.103*** -0.015 
(0.043) (0.057) 
 
(0.029) (0.035) 
 
(0.028) (0.026) 
         R-squared 0.495 0.625   0.500 0.436   0.790 0.774 
Panel C – Dependent variable: Unemployment, probit estimation 
Registered refugee 0.008 -0.042 
 
0.021 0.015 
 
0.151*** 0.059* 
  (0.053) (0.109)   (0.042) (0.040)   (0.025) (0.032) 
Observations 19,184 8,747   36,482 18,722   92,428 39,292 
Notes: The robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The data were collected by the 
Labor Force Survey (1999–2012) conducted by the PCBS. All the regressions’ specifications are based on wage equa-
tions with the regressors gender, experience, experience squared, years of schooling, marital status, urban area/refugee 
camp residence, percentage of the locality under area C, whether the locality was affected by the separation wall, an 
employment sector dummy, quarter and district fixed effects, and a set of occupational and industry dummies. In all 
the estimations, the Second Intifada started in the fourth quarter of 2000 and ended in the second quarter of 2005. The 
analyses do not include observations of workers who report their place of work to be Israel or Israeli settlements. Sig-
nificance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.9: Effect of registered refugee status on wages according to employment sector and workers’ gender 
  
West Bank  
 
Gaza 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A – Effect of the refugee coefficient according to gender and employment sector  
  
Female Male 
Public 
sector  
Private 
sector  
 
Female Male 
Public 
sector  
Private 
sector  
  
        
     Registered refugee 
 
0.006 -0.042*** -0.001 -0.051*** 
 
0.065*** 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.010 
  
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) 
           Observations 
 
26,625 92,982 50,822 68,785 
 
8,686 58,250 46,003 20,933 
R-squared   0.695 0.703 0.754 0.681   0.687 0.702 0.711 0.554 
Panel B – Effect of the refugee coefficient according to the interaction between gender and employment sector  
  
 
Female  
  
public  
Male 
   
public 
Female 
   
private 
Male 
  
private 
 
Female 
   
public  
Male 
   
public 
Female 
   
private 
Male  
   
private 
           Registered refugee 
 
0.029*** -0.016* -0.023 -0.057*** 
 
0.085*** 0.026*** 0.005 0.011 
  
(0.010) (0.008) (0.018) (0.007) 
 
(0.017) (0.008) (0.058) (0.011) 
           Observations 
 
14,854 35,968 11,771 57,014 
 
7,171 38,832 1,515 19,418 
R-squared   0.726 0.771 0.648 0.691   0.678 0.723 0.496 0.573 
Notes: The robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the locality level. The data were collected by the Labor Force Survey (1999–2012) 
conducted by the PCBS. All the regressions’ specifications are based on wage equations with the regressors gender, experience, experience squared, 
years of schooling, marital status, urban area/refugee camp residence, percentage of the locality under area C, whether the locality was affected by the 
separation wall, an employment sector dummy, quarter and district fixed effects, and a set of occupational and industry dummies. The analyses do not 
include observations of workers who report their place of work as being Israel or Israeli settlements. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * 
p<0.1. 
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5.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I analyze the wage gap between Palestinian non-refugees and refugees in the West 
Bank and Gaza over the years 1999–2012. First, I quantify the unadjusted wage gap between the 
two groups over the period of interest. I find that the wage differential between the two groups has 
different directions in the two regions. Second, I explore whether this change in the wage gap can 
be attributed to differences in workers’ characteristics, regional differences, and occupational 
choices. I find that part of this change could be attributed to the regional variation between Gaza 
and the West Bank, employment in Israel, and occupational choices. Third, I use the Oaxaca–
Blinder decomposition to estimate the human capital and unexplained components of the wage gap 
between 1999 and 2012. In the West Bank, the wage gap has always existed and favored non-
refugees. A significant part of this wage gap is explained by the larger portion of non-refugee 
workers in the Israeli labor market. However, this difference still exists after excluding workers 
employed in Israel. The wage gap is greater among low-skilled workers and in the private sector; 
most of this gap among unskilled workers is attributed to the unexplained part of the wage decom-
position model. In Gaza, in all the periods, the wage gap is in favor of refugees. Among the skilled 
workers, the endowment effect makes up most of the wage gap until 2006, then most of this wage 
gap is attributed to the treatment effect, the ―unexplained part,‖ in the following years. The human 
capital components explain most of the wage differential among unskilled workers over the years 
1999–2012. The results of the study indicate the importance of existing policies that encourage the 
absorption of refugees in the private and public sectors, especially in the West Bank. Investment in 
education and the expansion of public sector employment contributes to mitigating this wage gap. 
Palestinian refugees, particularly those who live in refugee camps, are exposed to poverty as well 
as other adverse life circumstances. The recent threats by the United States of America’s Govern-
ment to reduce aid to the UNRWA
75
 will throw Palestinian refugees’ future into doubt and in-
crease their suffering.  
 
 
                                                 
75
 For more details, see Lee (2018): http://time.com/5105444/donald-trump-palestine-refugee-funding/. 
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Appendix  
                                                       
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.1.a: Share of Palestinian non-refugee workers across various employment sectors in 
the West Bank, 1999–2012 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.1.b: Share of Palestinian refugee workers across various employment sectors in the 
West Bank, 1999–2012 
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Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.2.a: Share of Palestinian non-refugee workers across various employment sectors in 
Gaza, 1999–2012 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.2.b: Share of Palestinian refugee workers across various employment sectors in Gaza, 
1999–2012 
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Notes: The analyses do not include observations of workers who report that their place of work is Israel or Israeli 
settlements. Number of observations: 26,629. 
 
 
 
Notes: The analyses do not include observations of workers who report that their place of work is Israel or Israeli 
settlements. Number of observations: 92,102.  
 
Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.3: West Bank–Gaza wage gap decomposition by gender over the period 1999–2012 
 
―Wage gap=non-refugees’ log wage-refugees’ log wage‖ 
 
 171 
 
 
 
Notes: The analyses do not include observations of workers who report that their place of work is Israel or Israeli 
settlements. Number of observations: 8686.  
 
 
 
 
Notes: The analyses do not include observations of workers who report that their place of work is Israel or Israeli 
settlements. Number of observations:58,250.  
 
Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.4: Gaza wage gap decomposition by gender over the period 1999–2012 
―Wage gap=refugees’ log wage-non-refugees’ log wage‖ 
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Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.5.a: Wage decomposition for selected variables in the West Bank 
―The wage gap represents the differences between non-refugees’ and refugees’ salaries‖ 
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Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.5.b: Wage decomposition for selected variables in Gaza 
―The wage gap represents the differences between refugees’ and non-refugees’ salaries‖ 
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Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.6.a: Share of Palestinian non-refugee and refugee workers in the West Bank employed 
in Israel, 1999–2012 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on PCBS data. 
Figure 5.A.6.b: Share of Palestinian non-refugee and refugee workers in Gaza employed in Israel, 
1999–2012 
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